Recent Blog Posts

Congress has unanimously passed a bi-partisan proposal to increase debt limits for small business reorganization bankruptcies under Chapter 11 of the federal bankruptcy code.   H.R. 7730, the Bankruptcy Threshold Adjustment Act, now sits on the President’s desk, awaiting his action.

The bill will raise the debt limits for businesses who want to reorganize under Chapter 11’s Subchapter V, a small business alternative to the traditional Chapter 11 reorganization.  Current law sets a debt ceiling of $3.424 million to qualify for Subchapter V, but that amount would more than double under the bill, to $7.5 million.  The bill also raises the debt limit for individuals to qualify for Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings to $2.75 million.

How will this new law affect agriculture?  The new, higher debt limit in Subchapter V will allow more farmers and other agricultural businesses to reorganize debt while staying in business.

Chapter 12 bankruptcy was created specifically to allow family farmers and fishermen to reorganize debt.  But Chapter 12 is not an option for part-time farmers who cannot meet the eligibility requirement that more than 50% of the farmer’s gross income derives from farming. Farmers who can’t qualify for Chapter 12 must instead look to Chapter 11, designed to allow other types of businesses to reorganize their debts while continuing in operation. Likewise, smaller farm-related businesses that don’t involve production agriculture cannot use Chapter 12 and must use Chapter 11 for if they want to restructure and remain in business. 

Chapter 11 was originally built to accommodate large businesses, however, and often proves too expensive and complicated to benefit small businesses.  In 2020, Congress enacted  another option for small businesses --Subchapter V.  Congress designed Subchapter V as an easier option than the typical Chapter 11 reorganization.  The original debt limit for Subchapter V was $2.72 million, but Congress temporarily raised that amount to $7.5 million during COVID, but with a sunset provision. Since then, Congress has raised and sunset the limit several times, ending at the current $3.42 million limit.  The new law does not contain a sunset provision, making the increase permanent.

In addition to being less expensive, quicker, and more streamlined than Chapter 11, Subchapter V offers an important benefit farmers have under Chapter 12: debtors are not subject to the “absolute priority rule” that applies in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which requires all unsecured creditors to be paid in full before the debtor can retain any of their property interests.  Under Subchapter V, the debtor can retain their ownership interests while they restructure, pay off debts, and continue the business.

With bankruptcy filings on the rise, the Bankruptcy Threshold Adjustment Act, when effective, will extend bankruptcy protection to more small businesses that cannot qualify for Chapter 12 or afford an expensive and complex Chapter 11 reorganization.  Learn more about Subchapter V from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court.

Since President Trump signed the “Emergency Tax Relief on Diesel Fuel” Executive Order on October 5, 2026, there’s been a great deal of discussion and confusion about what the order says and how it will play out. To help clear up these misunderstandings, we’ve taken a close look at the plain language of the order itself.  Here’s a step-by-step walkthrough of what the order says and its timeline and guidance for implementation, along with thoughts on what we can expect next.

1. Purpose.  The order states that the farming and trucking industries have been “particularly hard hit” by rising diesel prices.  For that reason, the purpose of the order is to provide temporary relief to ensure fuel affordability for farmers, truckers, and workers.

2. Deferral of fuel tax payments and no penalties or interest for deferred tax payments.

• a) Necessity of the deferral.  Under federal law in 26 U.S. Code 7508A, the Secretary may postpone a tax deadline by up to one year when there is a “federally declared disaster, a significant fire, or a terroristic or military action. The order requires the Secretary of the Treasury, by October 10, 2026, and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to determine whether there are grounds for postponing a tax related deadline under the federal law.  Specifically, the Secretary must determine whether one of the necessary events has occurred and must identify the taxpayers affected by the event.
• b) Deferral of taxes and penalties.  Authorizes the Secretary to defer payments and penalties for diesel taxes.  If the Secretary determines there are grounds for postponement of the tax, the Secretary must defer payments of the federal diesel taxes established in 26 U.S.C. 4041(a)(1)(A) and 26 U.S.C. 4041(b)(1)(B) from October 5 to December 31, 2026.  No taxes deferred during this period are to be subject to penalties, interest, or other amounts in addition to the tax.
• c) No penalties for dyed fuel use.  By October 10, the Secretary must direct the IRS to announce that it will not assess penalties “when dyed diesel fuel is sold or used on the highway” from October 5 to December 31, 2026, and that the agency will “address relief from penalties for failure to make the semimonthly deposits of that tax.”

3. Implementation of the order.  The Secretary of the Treasury must establish guidance for implementing the order.  There is no deadline for completion of the guidance, but the order requires that the guidance shall identify:

• The specific relief being granted and any conditions for the relief;
• The legal basis for relief, covered taxpayers, persons, locations, acts, liabilities, and deadlines;
• The beginning and ending dates of each applicable period;
• The date by which the postponed taxes must be paid.

4. Tax forgiveness.  The Secretary must “explore avenues, including legislation” that would eliminate the obligation to pay the deferred tax amounts. As with the guidance directive, there is no timeline for when the Secretary must do so.

5. Prioritizing fuel compliance resources.  The Secretary must publicly announce his determination on how the IRS should allocate its resources for inspecting vehicle fuel tanks and fuel sampling during the deferral period.

6. Maintaining highway safety and efficiency. The Transportation Secretary must engage with states and other relevant organizations to safely and expediently coordinate the policies in the order.

7. Promoting diesel access for farmers.  The Secretary of Agriculture must further the priorities of the order by coordinating with agricultural cooperatives, rural fuel distributors, farm supply organizations and others to:

• Ensure the adequate distribution of dyed diesel for use in high-demand areas;
• Encourage states to take actions to further the policies of the order.

8. Engaging state governments.  The White House Office of Intergovernmental Affairs must work with the states to adopt policies that correspond with the tax deferral.

What’s next?  

• October 10 should bring the first round of implementation of the order.  That’s when we can expect Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to declare the necessity of the tax deferral.  That declaration then authorizes the Secretary to announce the deferral of the diesel fuel taxes and removal of tax payment penalties. The deferral period will be from October 5 to December 31, 2026.  October 10 is also the date by which Secretary Bessent must direct the IRS not to assess penalties for the sale or use of dyed diesel fuel on highways.
• The implementation timeline is less clear after October 10.  While the Secretary must develop guidance that includes the date for paying the postponed taxes, there is no deadline for when that guidance must be complete.
• Also unclear is whether the administration will seek complete elimination of the deferred tax payments.  The order only requires the Secretary to “explore” alternatives for diesel fuel tax elimination, and there is no timeline for the exploration. Only Congress has the power to eliminate or adjust the federal fuel taxes, but that has never happened since Congress set up the Highway Trust Fund in 1956 to create a dedicated source of funding for roadways.
• Remaining directives should play out along the way.  We can expect different timelines for implementation of the mandates on how to allocate resources towards fuel tank inspections and fuel sampling, maintaining highway safety and efficiency, promoting fuel access for farmers, and engaging with states to adopt similar policies.  Some state policy coordination discussions have already begun and some states, like Ohio, have already acted to temporarily suspend fuel taxes. 

Watch for continued updates on fuel taxes and other legal issues affecting agriculture on the Ohio Ag Law Blog.  Access the Executive Order “Emergency Tax Relief on Diesel Fuel” at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/10/emergency-tax-relief-on-diesel-fuel/.

Farm and rural landowners often allow friends, family members, neighbors, and others to use their property for recreational activities. A neighbor may hunt in woods, a friend may fish a pond, or a guest may ride an ATV or UTV on the farm. But if someone gets hurt while recreating on the property, is the landowner responsible?

A recent Ohio Court of Appeals decision, Hug v. Hake (2026-Ohio-3272) provides insight into Ohio's Recreational User Statute and how it affects a landowner's premises liability. The case involved a serious UTV accident on a rural property, but the court's discussion applies much more broadly to recreational use of farm and rural land.

The UTV Accident

Devin and Stacy Hake owned more than 50 acres in Williams County, Ohio. The property included about 20 acres of farmland, along with their house, garage, shop, wooded areas, ponds, a creek, a shooting range, and trails.

The Hakes hosted a social gathering at their home. During the evening, a guest, Tacia Livensparger, drove the Hakes' Polaris Ranger UTV with Candace Hug as a passenger. Later that night, the women took the UTV onto a trail through the property. The UTV's right front tire caught a washout near a bridge over a creek, causing the UTV to overturn into the creek. Hug became trapped underneath the UTV and suffered serious injuries, including a fractured neck vertebra and a fractured radial-head.

Hug sued the Hakes and Livensparger. The Hakes argued that Ohio's Recreational User Statute protected them from liability. Hug argued that the Hakes should have warned the women about the washout and other hazards on the property. The court rejected Hug’s argument because Ohio’s Recreational User Statute eliminated the Hakes' duty to keep the premises safe.

Ohio's Recreational User Statute

Ohio's Recreational User Statute, R.C. 1533.181, provides significant protection to owners, lessees, and occupants of privately owned, non-residential property.

The statute states that a qualifying landowner:

• owes no duty to a recreational user to keep the premises safe for entry or use;
• does not assure a recreational user that the premises are safe simply by giving permission to use them; and
• does not assume responsibility for injuries caused by an act of the recreational user.

A recreational user is a person who receives permission, without paying a fee or consideration to the landowner other than a lease payment, to enter the property for activities such as hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, hiking, swimming, operating a snowmobile, all-purpose vehicle, or four-wheel-drive motor vehicle, or engaging in other recreational pursuits. (R.C. 1533.18(B).

The Property Must be "Non-residential"

The recreational user statute does not apply to every piece of private property. The property must be non-residential.  The statute does not define "non-residential," so courts look at the ordinary meaning of the term and the essential character of the property. Courts generally consider recreational property to involve the "true outdoors," including land, water, trees, and vegetation. Property does not have to be completely natural to qualify, and a property containing a residence can still be considered non-residential depending on its character and use.

The Hakes' property contained a residence, but the court nevertheless concluded that it was non-residential. Most of the more than 50 acres consisted of farmland or land left in its natural state. The accident occurred 300 to 400 yards from the residence, outside the backyard, in an area left in its natural state. The court determined that these facts were sufficient to establish that the property was non-residential.

For rural landowners, the case suggests that the character and use of the property, along with where the recreational activity occurs, can be important when determining whether the recreational user statute applies.

The Property Can Remain Private

The property does not have to be open to the public. R.C. 1533.181 expressly applies whether or not the premises are kept open for public use and whether or not the owner denies entry to particular individuals. Thus, a landowner may potentially receive recreational-user protection when allowing friends, family members, neighbors, or other invited guests to use the property.

Recreational Immunity Eliminates the Ordinary Premises Liability Duty

Ordinary premises liability generally asks whether a landowner owed a duty to a person entering the property and, if so, whether the landowner breached that duty.  The recreational user statute changes that analysis. When the statute applies, the landowner owes no duty to the recreational user to keep the property safe for entry or use. Without a duty, there generally can be no premises liability for an unsafe condition on the property.

That was particularly important in Hug. The plaintiffs argued that the Hakes should have warned the women about the washout and other hazards on the property. The court rejected the argument because the recreational user statute eliminated the Hakes' duty to keep the premises safe.

Was the Driver Liable to the Passenger?

The court also addressed whether the driver, Livensparger, was liable for Hug’s injuries.  Livensparger did not receive the protection of the Recreational User Statute because she was not the owner of the land upon which the accident occurred.  However, the court concluded that Livensparger was not liable under Ohio's recreational activity doctrine, which provides that participants in recreational activities assume the ordinary risks inherent in those activities.  Here, the court determined that a UTV overturning is an inherent, foreseeable, and customary risk of riding in a UTV. Hug argued that darkness, unmarked trails, terrain, and lack of safety equipment increased the risks. The court concluded that those circumstances did not change the basic nature of the risk.

What Does this Mean for Farm and Rural Landowners?

The Hug v. Hake decision offers several practical lessons.  Ohio law provides substantial protection for landowners who allow recreational use on their property provided the requirements of R.C. 1533.181 are satisfied.  Ohio law also recognizes that participants in recreational activities assume the ordinary risks inherent in those activities.

A property containing a residence can potentially qualify for the Recreational User Statute. Courts will consider the essential character and use of the property. A large farm containing fields, woods, streams, ponds, and other natural areas may qualify even though the owner also lives on the property. Hug demonstrates that the location of the accident within the property can be important.

People engaged in recreational activities assume ordinary risks. This doctrine provides an additional protection for injuries resulting from ordinary risks inherent in recreational activities. The doctrine generally requires reckless or intentional conduct before another participant can be held liable.

Summary

The Recreational User Statute can provide substantial protection to Ohio farm and rural landowners, but landowners should not view it as a substitute for reasonable risk management. Landowners should know who is using their property and what activities they are conducting. Extra caution is appropriate when the landowner provides equipment such as ATVs, UTVs, boats, or other vehicles. Landowners should also review their liability insurance to make sure recreational activities and recreational equipment are adequately covered.

Hug v. Hake demonstrates how significant the Recreational User Statute can be to protecting landowners. Despite a serious injury occurring on the Hakes' property, the court concluded that the Recreational User Statute prevented the injured guest from pursuing a premises liability claim against the landowners.

It’s hard to find news that doesn’t mention data centers and the controversies they’re raising across Ohio.  In the upcoming November 3 election, local residents will vote on data center issues in at least 19 Ohio communities (see this map). Several more controversies evolved into legal battles, with several making their way to the Ohio Supreme Court. The Court recently issued three decisions on data center cases.  

You might expect the cases to be against the data  center developers themselves, but that’s not so. Instead, each data center case pits citizens against their own local governments. Each involves a citizen-led “petition” that seeks to place data center issues on the local ballot. Two of the petitions would allow citizens to vote on whether to prohibit data centers in their communities. A third would create city charter provisions that would enable a recall process for removing local officials, presumably for their actions on data centers. In each of the three court cases, the local government rejected the petition and prohibited the issue from being placed on the ballot and the Ohio Supreme Court ruled against the local government’s actions. 

Here’s a summary of the three cases.

1. Ashville Fiscal Officer must certify citizen petition on data center resolution

The Ashville Village Council in Pickaway County adopted a resolution last April that approved a “term summary” of an agreement with developer EdgeConneX for the construction of two data centers and a natural gas power plant on Ashville village property.  The resolution also stated that the project would not be subject to a previously enacted moratorium on data centers.  Additionally, the resolution included an “emergency clause” declaring that the resolution was “immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety of the municipality” and stating that the Council needed to accept the term summary “as soon as possible so that this project is not unnecessarily delayed.”

A group of citizens organized in opposition to the Village resolution.  The group circulated a referendum petition that would allow Ashville voters to repeal the resolution on the November 3 ballot. After obtaining the required number of signatures, the group submitted the petition to the Village Fiscal Officer, who was to transfer the petition to the Board of Elections. The Fiscal Officer, however, did not forward the petition. The officer declared the petition invalid according to the Ashville City Charter, which stated that an emergency measure is not subject to the referendum process.

One of the citizens challenged the Village’s refusal to accept the petition by filing a “writ of mandamus” with the Ohio Supreme Court. The writ asked the Court to order the Fiscal Officer to perform her legal duty and submit the petition to the Board of Elections.

The Ohio Supreme Court agreed that the Village could, according to its charter, refuse to accept a petition against an emergency measure.  However, the Court explained that Ohio law requires an emergency resolution to contain sufficient reasons for declaring it an emergency. The language must “apprise voters of any specific reasons to declare the [resolution] to be an emergency.” After reviewing the emergency measure language in the Village’s resolution, the Court held that the language did not provide sufficient emergency reasons. The Court ordered City to proceed with certifying the petition to the Board of Elections.

The case is State ex rel. Mcnamara-Smith v. Grube, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-3035.

2. Trenton improperly refused citizen petition that would ban data centers

In Butler County, a group of five citizens circulated a petition proposing to amend the Trenton City Charter with a provision that would prohibit the construction of data centers over 25 MW within the city.  If the petition was successful, the proposed amendment would be placed on the November 3 ballot. The group obtained 336 valid signatures on the petition.  However, Trenton refused to certify the petition, stating first that it did not have the required number of signatures and second that it could not be on the upcoming November 3 ballot but must wait until the City’s municipal election.

Trenton relied on its city charter to determine the number of required signatures for the petition.  The charter states that a petition to amend the charter must be signed by “ten per centum of the electors of the Municipality.” Trenton concluded that under the charter,  “electors” means all persons entitled to vote in Trenton.  Because there were 8,197 people registered to vote in Trenton in the last election, the city concluded that the petition should be signed by at least 10% of 8,197, or 820 persons. Since only 336 persons signed the petition, the council refused to send the petition to the board of elections. The city also argued that it could reject the petition for the November 3 general election, as the petition should go on the ballot for the next municipal election, which would be in 2027.   

The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that Trenton’s city charter conflicted with Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, which defined electors as persons “who cast ballots” in the last election rather than all registered voters. The Court stated that when there is a conflict between the Constitution and a city charter, the Constitution prevails. Based on the Constitution, the group needed to obtain signatures from 10% of 1,277, the number of persons who voted in the last election. Because the group had exceeded that number, the Court ordered Trenton to certify the petition to the Board of Elections.

The Court secondly addressed the issue of when the petition should go onto the ballot.  Again applying the Constitution to the petition, the Court stated that the Constitution did not require Trenton to submit the proposed amendment for the November 3 general election ballot.  Instead, Article 18 of the Constitution required Trenton to place the matter on a “special election” that must take place between 60 and 120 days after the city passed an ordinance certifying that enough signatures were submitted to put the issue on the ballot.

Interestingly, the Court denied a request by the citizen group to award them attorney fees. The Court concluded that the group offered no evidence that the city council’s actions rose to the level of “dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.”

The case is State ex rel. Blankenship v. Trenton City Council, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-3406.

3. Petition proposing a “recall” amendment in Sidney must proceed to ballot

Data center tensions in Sidney, Ohio have led to the circulation of several data center-related petitions in Shelby County.  The petition currently before the Ohio Supreme Court is regards “recalling” or removing elected city officials.  A second petition, not before the Court, would limit data center construction in Sidney. 

Upon learning that the Sidney City Charter does not contain procedures for recalling an elected local official from office, a committee of citizens organized a petition to amend the city charter with recall provisions. The committee obtained 561 signatures and submitted the petition to the Sidney City Clerk in July of 2026.

The city clerk, however, rejected the petition for failure to comply with a state law, Ohio Revised Code 731.32. That law states that “whoever seeks to propose an ordinance or measure in a municipal corporation by initiative petition or files a referendum petition against any ordinance or measure shall, before circulating such petition, file a certified copy of the proposed ordinance or measure with the city auditor or the village clerk.”

Determining that the committee did not pre-file a certified copy of the proposed amendment prior to circulating the petition as required by ORC 731.32, the city clerk rejected the petition.  The committee asked the Ohio Supreme Court to order the clerk to accept the petition.  

The Supreme Court determined that the clerk had erred by applying the pre-filing provision to the committee’s petition. The Court distinguished a petition proposing an amendment to a city charter (which is the city’s governing document) from an “initiative petition” (which initiates a new city ordinance) and a “referendum petition” (which repeals an existing city ordinance). The pre-filing requirement of ORC 731.32 applies only to initiatives and referenda and does not apply to a petition that proposes a city charter amendment, the Court concluded.

The case is State ex rel. Turner v. Barhorst, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-3439.

Lessons learned. The recent cases don’t resolve the data center conflicts in these communities, but they do illustrate the role of citizen-initiated petitions in data center policymaking at the local level.  Cities have broad powers to govern data center development within their borders, but Ohio law gives citizens an opportunity to challenge city governance and decision making through the petition process.  The cases teach us that the Ohio Constitution—not a city's charter—is the primary guideline for petitioning municipal laws. The Ohio Revised Code, Ohio city charters, and those who propose petitions must understand and comply with the constitutional guidelines.

A hard lesson the cities may have learned in these cases is that incorrect application of the laws that govern the petition process can be costly and add time and complexity to data center conflicts. That’s an outcome that, hopefully, both sides of the data center debate can agree on as undesirable.