Ohio Agricultural Law Blog -- The Legal Challenges to the Lake Erie Bill of Rights Begin
Written by Evin Bachelor, Law Fellow, OSU Extension Agricultural & Resource Law Program
Toledo’s Lake Erie Bill of Rights (LEBOR) has been in the headlines a lot lately, and certainly on the minds of farmers in the Lake Erie watershed. So far, the Ag Law Blog has focused attention on what LEBOR is, why it was on the ballot, and what types of defenses agricultural producers can raise if sued. Because voters approved the ballot measure, the focus now shifts to how LEBOR will be treated in the courts.
On February 26th, Toledo held a special election, with one of the ballot questions being whether to amend the City of Toledo’s charter to adopt LEBOR. While less than 9 percent of Toledo’s registered voters cast a ballot, the majority of those who did voted in favor of amending the city’s charter to include LEBOR.
On February 27th, the Drewes Farm Partnership filed a complaint and initiated a lawsuit in federal court against the City of Toledo. Family owned and operated, this Wood County based grain farm operates wholly within the Lake Erie watershed. Drewes Farm utilizes both manure and commercial fertilizers, and states in its complaint that it follows industry best practices, scientific recommendations, and all legal requirements such as keeping records and not applying fertilizer on snow covered ground. Two of the family members obtained Fertilizer Applicator Certificates, and the Ohio Department of Agriculture certified the farm under its Ohio Agricultural Stewardship Verification Program.
The complaint specifically alleges violations of Drewes Farm’s rights under the First Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, and Due Process Clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Further, the complaint argues that LEBOR exceeds the City of Toledo’s authority by intruding on state and federal powers by attempting to meddle with international relations, invalidate state and federal permits, invalidate state law, alter the rights of corporations, and create new causes of action in state courts. Drewes Farm requests that the court 1) grant it a preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent LEBOR’s enforcement, 2) invalidate LEBOR, and 3) grant the plaintiff an award for costs and fees.
The following day, Drewes Farm filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Parties use preliminary injunctions as a way to enforce the status quo and prevent the other parties from acting in a way that would cause further harm. If granted, the preliminary injunction would prevent the enforcement of LEBOR against the Drewes Farm Partnership during the course of the litigation. At the end of the case, there would be a determination of whether Drewes Farm should receive a permanent injunction, which would prevent LEBOR from being enforced against it after the case has ended.
The party who brings the motion must argue and prove four elements in order for the court to grant the motion for a preliminary injunction:
First, that the movant has a likelihood of success on the merits, meaning that it is likely that the movant will win the underlying case. Drewes Farm’s motion examines each of the grounds that it believes violates its constitutional rights and state and federal law. Drewes Farm argues that it can win on each of the dozen grounds it examines, and that it need only show a likelihood of success on one ground to satisfy this element.
Second, that the movant could suffer irreparable harm without a preliminary injunction, meaning that without a preliminary injunction, the other party may take action to harm the movant in a way that it will not be able to recover. Here, Drewes Farm cites court cases explaining that the loss of one’s constitutional rights for any amount of time constitutes irreparable harm, and that a likelihood of success also demonstrates irreparable harm.
Third, that the issuance of an injunction will not cause greater harm. This element balances the previous element to see whether the injunction is fair. Where the second element looks at the harm to the movant, the third element looks at whether a preliminary injunction will harm others. Here, Drewes Farm argues that others will not be harmed by the granting of a preliminary injunction because it will merely allow the farm to continue operating as required under the law and its permits using best practices. Further, Drewes Farm mentions that the other farms in the watershed will actually experience a benefit from the prevention of LEBOR’s enforcement.
Fourth, that the issuance of a preliminary injunction would serve the public interest. Here, Drewes Farm cites additional court cases explaining that the enforcement of constitutional rights is inherently in the public interest. Further, it argues that the State of Ohio holds its portion of Lake Erie in trust “for all Ohio citizens, not just those residing in a single municipality.”
If the court is satisfied that Drewes Farm has established each of the four elements, it may grant a preliminary injunction.
At this time, the City of Toledo has not filed any responses to the complaint or motion; however, procedural rules require it to respond in a timely manner. Because it has not filed anything with the court, it is unclear how the City of Toledo intends to defend or respond. However, since enforcement of LEBOR had not been commenced against the Drewes Farm Partnership, it is possible that Toledo will challenge the plaintiff’s standing to sue at the present time.
The case is cited in court records as Drewes Farm Partnership v. City of Toledo, Ohio, 3:19-cv-00343 (N.D. Ohio). Stay tuned to the Ag Law Blog for updates about the case.