Workplace Safety
On August 12, the Ohio Supreme Court released its opinion Camara v. Gill Dairy, L.L.C. The majority opinion was written by Justice Brunner and joined by all of the justices, except for one section that Justice Fischer did not join. The case involves an injury sustained by an employee from equipment on the dairy farm. The case reached the Ohio Supreme Court because the employee, Camara, appealed a decision from Ohio’s Twelfth District Court of Appeals. We covered that decision in an Ag Law Harvest post back in 2023 (available here).
Background
The lawsuit, originally filed in Madison County Court of Common Pleas, alleged that Jose Camara, the employee, suffered severe injuries while operating a piece of machinery called a sand spreader. The Court explains the incident, saying that the sand spreader was connected to a tractor by a power take-off (PTO) shaft, which was equipped with a hydraulic motor that caused the PTO shaft to rotate while in use. However, the safety guards on the PTO shaft were not there on the day Camara was injured in 2019. Camara explained that he observed an oil leak in the sand spreader and first turned the sand spreader off to look for the source of the leak. He could not identify the source of the leak, so he turned the sand spreader on to investigate the matter further. As he looked for the leak, a piece of clothing on his left leg got caught in the unguarded, rotating PTO shaft. The rotation of the PTO shaft pulled Camara toward the machine, then threw him over the shaft to the other side of the tractor. Camara suffered severe and permanent injuries to both legs and his left shoulder, requiring skin grafts and multiple surgeries.
At trial, the jury found the dairy farm liable and ordered it to pay over $1.9 million in damages. Gill Dairy appealed to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals arguing that its failure to repair or replace does not amount to a “deliberate removal” of the safety guards from the PTO shaft and sand spreader, and the appellate court agreed, and vacated and reversed the jury’s judgement. Camara appealed the Twelfth District’s ruling, taking the lawsuit to the Ohio Supreme Court.
Guiding statutory language
Before getting into the majority’s opinion, it is first important to understand the statute at the center of this case. Ohio Revised Code (ORC) section 2745.01 reads in part (emphasis added):
(A) In an action brought against an employer by an employee…for damages resulting from an intentional tort committed by the employer during the course of employment, the employer shall not be liable unless the plaintiff proves that the employer committed the tortious act with the intent to injure another or with the belief that the injury was substantially certain to occur.
(B) As used in this section, "substantially certain" means that an employer acts with deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer an injury, a disease, a condition, or death.
(C) Deliberate removal by an employer of an equipment safety guard or deliberate misrepresentation of a toxic or hazardous substance creates a rebuttable presumption that the removal or misrepresentation was committed with intent to injure another if an injury or an occupational disease or condition occurs as a direct result.
In other words, if an employee is harmed on the job and the employee proves that there was an intent to injure, or a belief that injury would occur, the employer can be found liable at trial. Further, deliberate removal of a safety guard on equipment helps the employee’s argument, because it creates a presumption under the law that there was an intent by the employer to injure, although the employer may provide evidence to rebut such a claim.
Questions before the Ohio Supreme Court
The Twelfth District’s decision conflicted with a Third District Court of Appeals decision on what an employee must prove to establish “deliberate removal” of a safety guard, so the Ohio Supreme Court agreed to hear to the case. In addition to that conflict, in his appeal, Camara asked the Ohio Supreme Court to answer two questions. The first question is whether an injured employee must establish both the deliberate removal of an equipment safety guard and the employer’s intent to never replace the guard in order to trigger presumption of intent to injure under ORC 2745.01(C). The second question is whether the appellate court should have reviewed only the evidence provided in the pretrial stage or the evidence presented at trial when making their decision.
Question 1
The Ohio Supreme Court, with Justice Brunner writing for the majority, found that an injured employee does not have to establish both the deliberate removal of a safety guard and the employer’s intent to not replace the guard to be entitled to the “rebuttable presumption” under ORC 2745.01(C). Firstly, according to Justice Brunner, the presumption available to a plaintiff under the statute “may…be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence,” whereas the appellate court said that only direct evidence could be used to show proof of an “intent to injure another” under ORC 2745.01(A) and (C). Secondly, an injured employee only needs to provide evidence that the employer deliberately removed an equipment safety guard, not that they “specifically decided not to reattach” the guard. Brunner reasons that the “plain text” of ORC 2745.01(C) entitles the employee to the rebuttable presumption that the removal was committed with the intent to harm another. This means evidence regarding the employer’s decision not to replace a safety guard is not required for the presumption to apply. This reasoning also answered the conflict between the two appellate decisions—an employee does not have to prove both that their employer had knowledge of a missing safety guard and that they made a “deliberate decision” not to replace it. The knowledge that the safety guard is missing is enough.
Question 2
In their appeal to the Twelfth District, Gill Dairy asked the court to review the lower court’s denial of summary judgement in their favor. Summary judgement is granted when a judge finds that no genuine issue of material fact (a disagreement about facts) exists between the parties. Thus, the case is decided without continuing on to a jury trial. When overturning the lower court’s denial of summary judgement, the Twelfth District Court only looked at the evidence provided at the summary judgement stage, and not the evidence provided at trial. The Ohio Supreme Court found that this was an error; when deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the appellate court must review “the record as it existed both at the time of the summary-judgement ruling and [at] the conclusion of the trial.” Justice Fischer did not join this part of the opinion.
What might this mean for my farm?
The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that an injured employee must only prove that an employer has knowledge of missing safety equipment, not that the employer deliberately removed them or decided not to replace them. What is more, this statutory rebuttable presumption may be proved with either direct or circumstantial evidence. Therefore, to protect yourself and employees, and to limit your liability, it is advisable to keep track of your equipment and replace missing safety guards and other safety measures as needed. However, this does not mean that every case will find that the employer is at fault—the presumption of intent to injure is rebuttable. Thus, in similar cases, the employer may provide evidence to a court to disprove such a claim, and a judge or jury may find such evidence persuasive. The bottom line is to protect your employees, yourself, your farm, and to avoid lengthy lawsuits like this one, safety guards on equipment should be properly installed and replaced as necessary.
Tags: Employer Intentional Tort, Ohio case law, Ohio Supreme Court, safety, Workplace Safety
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Did you know there is a bird with talons larger than grizzly bear claws? The Harpy Eagle’s back talons can reach lengths of 5 inches, which is larger than a grizzly bear’s claws which reach lengths of around 4 inches. Thankfully, the Harpy Eagle is not usually found in the United States, they are traditionally found in the rainforests of Central and South America.
The variety and extent of the animal kingdom can be a good analogy when we talk about the scope and variability of agricultural and resource law. “Ag law” isn’t in and of itself a core area of law, at least not an area of law taught in most law schools across the country. Those core areas of law are traditionally contracts, constitutional, tort, property, and a few others. But ag law includes most, if not all, of the core legal subjects. This includes property law, tax law, tort law, international law, intellectual property law, environmental law, contracts, business, labor and employment, and others. This week’s edition of the Ag Law Harvest shows you how diverse ag law really is. We review some legislation moving in parts of the country that deal with tax law, property law, and administrative law. We also review Federal regulations and court cases that address food law, trademark law, and antitrust law.
Florida introduces legislation to protect farmers’ preferential tax benefits amid agritourism boom. Florida’s legislature is hard at work to ensure the success of Florida’s agriculture and agritourism industries. Recently, Florida’s legislature introduced Senate Bill 1186 and House Bill 717. The purpose of both bills is to promote Florida’s agritourism industry and protect farmers when it comes to land classification, taxation, and regulation. Both pieces of legislation look to:
- Eliminate duplicate regulatory authority over agritourism by preventing local government from enacting regulations that prohibit, restrict, or otherwise limit an agritourism activity from taking place on land classified as agricultural land.
- Prevent land from being classified “non-agricultural” simply because an agritourism activity takes places on the land, so long as the agritourism activity is taking place on a bona fide farm.
- Implement a hybrid property taxation scheme which allows the buildings and other structures used for agritourism activities to be assessed at just value and added to the agriculturally assessed value of the land.
Both bills are currently making their way through their respective chamber’s committees and should be voted on soon.
Michigan looking to pass legislation to reduce fines for family farmers that do not report accidental workplace deaths to the state. The Michigan Senate recently passed a substitute for House Bill 4031, which is focused on reducing the fine incurred by family farms for not reporting the death of a family member within eight hours. Under current Michigan law, a family farm must report any fatality to the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Administration within eight hours or face a fine of at least $5,000, which is exactly what happened to the Eisenmann family in 2019. The Eisenmann family ran a family farm and was fined $12,000 after Keith Eisenmann fell to his death while repairing a barn roof. The bill seeks to reduce the fine for families that are grieving the unexpected loss of a loved one. Although a family farm will still be required to report the accidental work-related death of a loved one within eight hours, if a family fails to do so, the substitute bill drastically reduces the penalty. The original bill passed Michigan’s House of Representatives late last year, but the substitute bill passed by the Michigan Senate clarifies the definition of family farm. The substitute bill now goes back to the House of Representatives for approval.
Bioengineered food standard now in effect. January 1st marked the first day of compliance for the Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard (the “Standard”). The Standard requires food manufacturers, importers, and certain retailers to disclose to consumers that foods are or may be bioengineered. The Standard defines bioengineered foods as “those that contain detectable genetic material that has been modified through certain lab techniques and cannot be created through conventional breeding or found in nature.” The Agricultural Marketing Service has created a list of bioengineered foods to identify the crops or foods that are available in a bioengineered form. For more information on the Bioengineered Food Disclosure Statement visit https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/be.
A bite into the cheesier side of trademark law. Last month, a federal court in Virginia decided on a dispute between European and American cheesemakers. The dispute arose over whether the term “Gruyere” should only be used to identify cheeses produced in the Gruyère region of France and Switzerland or whether the term can be used generically to describe a type of cheese, regardless of where the cheese is produced. The Plaintiffs, two European business groups, filed an application with the United States Patent Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to register “Gruyere” as a certification mark under 15 U.S.C. § 1127 which would only allow cheesemakers to use the term “Gruyere” if the cheese came from the Gruyère region. The U.S. Dairy Export Council and others (“Defendants”) filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ application with the Trademark Trials and Appeals Board (“TTAB”). The TTAB found the term “Gruyere” to be generic term used to describe a type of cheese, not a cheese’s origin. Plaintiffs’ then filed suit in a federal court in Virginia. The federal court held that the “Gruyere” term had become a generic term to describe a type of cheese and failed to find the term worthy of trademark protection. The court reasoned that although the term “Gruyere” may have once been understood to indicate where a cheese came from, over time “Gruyere” became a generic term to describe a type of cheese. The court noted the term “Gruyere” has become generic overtime because: (1) U.S. regulations allow the use of the term “Gruyere” regardless of where the cheese is produced, (2) there is widespread sale and import of Gruyere cheese that is produced outside the Gruyère region, and (3) “Gruyere” is commonly used in dictionaries, media communications, and cheese industry events to describe a type of cheese without regards to where the cheese is produced. Plaintiffs have since appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which means we still have a gooey situation on our hands.
USDA and Department of Justice announce commitment to protect farmers against unfair anticompetitive practices. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) each announced their shared commitment to enforcing federal competition laws that are aimed at protecting farmers, ranchers, and other agricultural producers from unfair, anticompetitive practices. In continuing their commitment to enforcing such laws, the agencies released a statement of principles and commitments which include:
- Farmers, ranchers, and other producers and growers deserve the benefits of free and fair competition. The DOJ and USDA are therefore prioritizing matters impacting competition in agriculture.
- The agencies will develop an accessible, confidential process for agricultural producers to submit complaints about potential violations of the antitrust laws and the Packers and Stockyards Act.
- Increased cooperation between the agencies to enforce the laws that protect agricultural producers and to identify areas where Congress can help modernize rules and regulations.
As we have seen over the past few months, the federal government is keen on preventing the consolidation of the agricultural industry in order promote fair and equal competition. The announced commitments and principles demonstrate the government’s continued dedication to cracking down on unfair practices.
Tags: agritourism, Workplace Safety, Bioengineered Foods, Food Labeling, Antitrust, Trademark law
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