Supreme Court
Over the past several years, numerous lawsuits have been filed against the Monsanto Company regarding the safety of its herbicide Roundup and its main ingredient glyphosate. On January 16, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States granted the Monsanto Company’s petition to review one of these cases from the Missouri Court of Appeals, Durnell v. Monsanto Company.
Background of the case
In 2019, John Durnell of St. Louis sued Monsanto in Missouri state court, arguing that exposure to glyphosate contained in Roundup caused his non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. Mr. Durnell argued that Monsanto should be found strictly liable for defective design of its product and for failure to warn users of the danger of using Roundup, as well as negligence.
At trial, the jury sided with Monsanto on the defective design and negligence claims, meaning that the company was not found liable for these claims. On the remaining claim, the 12-person jury unanimously found Monsanto to be strictly liable for its failure to warn of the risks of using glyphosate, granting Mr. Durnell $1.25 million in compensatory damages.
Eventually, Monsanto appealed the case to the Missouri Court of Appeals, claiming that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempts failure to warn claims under state law. Federal preemption of state law can happen either expressly or impliedly. Express preemption happens when a federal statute contains language that specifically says that other laws or requirements cannot be imposed. Implied preemption happens when there might not be explicit language in a statute calling out the preemption, but Congress’s intent to supersede state law is implicit due to the nature of the statute. Here, the appeals court did not find Monsanto’s preemption argument persuasive; instead finding that the language in FIFRA did not expressly preempt Mr. Durnell’s failure to warn claim, and that there was no implied irreconcilable conflict between the state and federal law. You can read the Missouri Court of Appeals opinion in its entirety here.
Since the Missouri Supreme Court declined to hear the case, Monsanto filed a petition with the Supreme Court of the United States to review the Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision on April 4, 2025. On January 16, 2026, the Supreme Court granted Monsanto’s petition, agreeing to review the case. The Court has limited its review of the case to one question: “whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act preempts a label-based failure-to-warn claim where EPA has not required the warning.”
What are each side’s arguments for the Supreme Court?
In the lead up to a Supreme Court determination to hear a case, the legal teams for both parties file documents explaining why or why not the case should be heard. The party asking the Court to hear the case (in this case, Monsanto) files a petition for writ of certiorari, laying out their reasons for asking for review. Then the respondent (Durnell), has a chance to file a brief with the Court detailing their arguments as to why the lower court’s decision should stand. These documents can give us some insight into how each party may form its arguments if the case is heard before the Supreme Court.
Between the two parties in this case, there are hundreds of pages laying out their lines of reasoning for hearing or not hearing the case. In its most basic form, Monsanto’s argument is that language in FIFRA expressly preempts state requirements for the labeling and packaging of herbicides like Roundup. The language they point to is in Chapter 7 of the U.S. Code, Section 136v(b) and reads: “state(s) shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.” You can see the statute here. FIFRA requires pesticides to be registered with the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) before they can be sold or distributed in the country. Monsanto asserts that because EPA continues to accept Roundup’s product registration under FIFRA without requiring the company to include any warning or caution statement about the possible health risks of glyphosate on its labeling, any state law claim that would require such a warning should be overridden. You can read Monsanto’s petition for writ of certiorari here.
For their part, Mr. Durnell’s legal team points to a case previously decided by the Supreme Court in 2005, Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC (you can read that case here), in which the majority determined that state common-law claims like failure-to-warn are not automatically preempted by the language of FIFRA Section 136v(b). In Bates, the Court found that while FIFRA does preclude states from imposing different or additional labeling requirements for pesticides, it does not preclude states from imposing different or additional remedies. In other words, since “FIFRA does not provide a federal remedy to farmers and others who are injured as a result of a…violation of FIFRA’s labeling requirements, nothing in [FIFRA] precludes the states from providing such a remedy.” Furthermore, Mr. Durnell’s lawyers argue that EPA’s continued acceptance of Roundup’s product registration does not necessarily prevent the requirement of a cancer or health warning on the label, it just means that that Monsanto has not provided any evidence of glyphosate’s potential health effects or asked EPA to consider including such a warning. You can read Durnell’s response here.
What’s next?
While it can be fun to predict the outcome of Supreme Court cases, between the language of FIFRA and case law, I can’t begin to guess where the Court will end up in this case. What is certain is that the Court will examine “whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act preempts a label-based failure-to-warn claim where EPA has not required the warning.” Oral arguments for each side will happen sometime between October 2026 and April 2027, and the Court may release an opinion on the case in May or June of 2027. Additionally, the Court’s final decision will likely have implications for similar lawsuits regarding Roundup and glyphosate throughout the country. We will do our best to keep you updated on this complicated case as it works through the system. In the meantime, additional court documents and filings on the case can be found here.
Tags: pesticides, herbicides, roundup, Monsanto, glyphosate, EPA, FIFRA, Supreme Court, Supreme Court of the United States, U.S. Supreme Court
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Even with most of the country shut down, the U.S. EPA and the Supreme Court last week released an important rulemaking and a decision, respectively, regarding how parts of the Clean Water Act will be interpreted going forward. On April 21, 2020, the EPA and the Department of the Army published the Trump administration’s final rule on the definition of “waters of the United States” (WOTUS) under the Clean Water Act (CWA). Then, on April 23, the Supreme Court released its long awaited opinion determining whether or not pollutants from a point source, which are released and then carried by groundwater into a navigable water, must be permitted under the CWA.
Trump’s new WOTUS
If you recall, we explained this final rule in January when the draft version was released. Basically, the Trump administration wanted to repeal and replace the Obama administration’s 2015 WOTUS rule (explained here) because the administration felt that it was overreaching in the waters it protected. The Trump administration did repeal the 2015 rule, and replaced it with the old 1986/1988 version of the WOTUS rule while they worked on the new version. (See an explanation of the 1986/1988 language here.)
So what is included in the administration’s new definition? The following are defined as WOTUS, and therefore subject to the CWA under the new rule:
- The territorial seas, and waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
- Tributaries;
- Lakes and ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters; and
- Adjacent wetlands.
Importantly, the new rule also includes an extensive list of what waters are not WOTUS, and therefore will not be protected by the CWA:
- Waters or water features that are not identified in the definition of WOTUS, above;
- Groundwater, including groundwater drained through subsurface drainage systems;
- Ephemeral (caused by precipitation) features, including ephemeral streams, swales, gullies, rills, and pools;
- Diffuse stormwater run-off and directional sheet flow over upland;
- Ditches that are not territorial seas, waters used in foreign commerce, or tributaries, and those portions of ditches constructed in some adjacent wetlands;
- Prior converted cropland;
- Artificially irrigated areas, including fields flooded for agricultural production, that would revert to upland should application of irrigation water to that area cease;
- Artificial lakes and ponds, including water storage reservoirs and farm, irrigation, stock watering, and log cleaning ponds, constructed or excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters, so long as those artificial lakes and ponds are not impoundments of jurisdictional waters that are connected the territorial seas, or waters used in interstate or foreign commerce;
- Water-filled depressions constructed or excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters incidental to mining or construction activity, and pits excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters for the purpose of obtaining fill, sand, or gravel;
- Stormwater control features constructed or excavated in upland or in nonjurisdictional waters to convey, treat, infiltrate, or store stormwater run-off;
- Groundwater recharge, water reuse, and wastewater recycling structures, including detention, retention, and infiltration basins and ponds, constructed or excavated in upland or in non-jurisdictional waters; and
- Waste treatment systems.
Currently, the 1986/1988 rules are the law of the land until this new rule goes into effect on June 22, 2020. While this is the so-called “final” rule, chances are that it will be anything but final. Like Obama’s 2015 rule, this new 2020 rule will probably be subject to lawsuits, this time from environmental groups and some state governments. If you want to know more about WOTUS, our colleagues at the National Ag Law Center have created a very helpful timeline that explains all the different definitions of waters of the United States.
U.S. Supreme Court determines the scope of a “point source”
The CWA requires the polluter to obtain a permit from the EPA if pollutants are being discharged from a point source into navigable waters. Under the CWA, “point source means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” The term “navigable waters” is defined as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”
In County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund et. al., the United States Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether water treated by the County of Maui, which is pumped into the ground water and then travels about half a mile before it goes into the Pacific Ocean, requires a point source permit from the EPA. Ultimately, in a 6-3 majority led by Justice Breyer, the court decided that yes, in this case, a permit would be required. However, that does not mean that every conveyance through ground water will have the same outcome.
So, how did the court come to this conclusion? First, Justice Breyer examined the meaning of the word “from” in the CWA. Remember that the definition of a point source “means any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance…from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” On one hand, Breyer says that the Ninth Circuit’s definition of “from” was too broad, and on the other, he says that Maui’s definition was too narrow. The Ninth Circuit adopted a “fairly traceable” approach, meaning that permits would be required for any pollutant that is “fairly traceable” back to a point source. Breyer and the majority say that the Ninth Circuit took it too far, because then any pollutant that travelled for years and years or many miles could be considered to be “from” a point source. Maui County argued that “if at least one nonpoint source” is “between the point source and the navigable water,” then no permit is necessary under the CWA. The majority felt this was too narrow, because then every time a pollutant was moved along to a navigable water by a little bit of rainwater or a small stretch of groundwater, the polluter would be free to pollute without a permit. In other words, there would be a huge loophole in the statute—because the polluter or “pipe’s owner, seeking to avoid the permit requirement,” could “simply move the pipe back, perhaps only a few yards, so that the pollution must travel through at least some groundwater before reaching the sea.” What is more, Breyer cites congressional actions and history to interpret that Congress did not mean to make the statute as broad as the Ninth Circuit found it to be, nor as narrow as Maui County and the EPA suggest.
If the majority determined that one side read the statute too liberally and one too narrowly, then in what situations are point source permits required? Well, the court takes a kind of “we know it when we see it” approach. The court says that a permit is required “when there is a direct discharge from a point source into navigable waters or when there is a functional equivalent of a direct discharge.” The court further explains this language saying that a “functional equivalent” happens when pollutants reach the “same result through roughly similar means.” The court then provides some examples. For instance, a permit is obviously needed if a pipe ends just a couple of feet from a navigable water, and the pollutants then travel underground or across the land to the navigable water. However, “[i]f the pipe ends 50 miles from navigable waters,” the pollutants would travel through a long stretch of groundwater, mixing with other pollutants, and taking years to reach the navigable waters. In this situation, the court says a permit would likely not be required. Finally, Breyer lists relevant factors to consider when determining whether a permit is required:
- Transit time,
- Distance traveled,
- The nature of the material through which the pollutant travels,
- The extent to which the pollutant is diluted or chemically changed as it travels,
- The amount of pollutant entering the navigable waters relative to the amount of the pollutant that leaves the point source,
- The manner by or area in which the pollutant enters the navigable waters, and
- The degree to which the pollution (at that point) has maintained its specific identity.
Note that other factors could apply. In addition, the court says that time and distance will often be the most important factors, but not always. In the future, the EPA and lower courts will use this guidance to determine whether or not a point source permit is required.
Two major actions took place last week that will guide how the CWA is carried out going forward. Trump’s WOTUS rule could be taken down by lawsuits or replaced by the next administration, and the Supreme Court’s ruling may be further clarified by future decisions. As of today, though, these are the guidelines for implementing the CWA.
Tags: Clean Water Act, CWA, WOTUS, waters of the United States, EPA, Supreme Court
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