Mill Creek MetroParks
When a landowner legally challenges an agency’s use of eminent domain to appropriate property, Ohio law requires a trial court to hold a hearing to determine the agency’s right to make the appropriation, according to a recent decision by the Ohio Supreme Court. The Court held that an appeal to a higher court is not permissible until the trial court holds such a hearing and rules on the issues raised in the hearing. For landowner Diane Less, the ruling means the trial court--the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas--must hold a hearing to determine whether Mill Creek MetroParks had the right to make the appropriation of her land and whether that appropriation is necessary.
The case is one of several lawsuits and long-running controversies over Mill Creek MetroPark’s use of eminent domain to appropriate land for a bike path. The Mahoning County disputes are one reason behind a current legislative proposal to revise Ohio’s eminent domain laws, which includes a prohibition against the use of eminent domain for recreational trails. The legislation is at a standstill, however, with many opponents lining up against the recreational trails and other provisions of the bill.
Basis for the decision
The current Mill Creek MetroParks v. Less case made its way to the Ohio Supreme Court after the Seventh District Court of Appeals reversed the Mahoning County court’s summary judgment decision that MetroParks was authorized to use eminent domain to take Less’ land. MetroParks appealed that decision to the Ohio Supreme Court. But rather than addressing the issue of authority to take the land, the high court focused on the procedures outlined in Chapter 163 of the Ohio Revised Code. The statutes “provide a uniform eminent domain procedure for all appropriations sought by public and private agencies,” including procedures for when a property owner contests an appropriation. The Court reviewed the statutory requirements in ORC 163.09, which require a trial court to hold a hearing when:
- A property owner files an answer to a petition for eminent domain that specifically denies the right to make the appropriation or the necessity for the appropriation,
- The answer alleges sufficient facts in support of the denial, and
- The appropriation is not sought in a time of war or other public exigency or not for the purpose of making or repairing roads.
When MetroParks filed the eminent domain action against Less, she did file an answer that denied the Park District’s right to make the appropriation and the necessity for the appropriation. Less also filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the court to rule in her favor and dismiss the case because there were no genuine issues of material fact in the case. The trial court denied her motion, however, and Less filed an appeal of that denial to the Seventh District Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court points out that the appeal should not have occurred, however, because the statutory procedures required the trial court to hold a hearing after it denied the summary judgment motion by Less. Nevertheless, the Seventh District ruled on the appeal, reaching a decision that agreed with Less’ argument that the Park District did not have authority to take her land.
The Supreme Court accepted the case for review, but its purpose was not to rule on the issue of whether there was authority for the use of eminent domain. Instead, the Court held that it had no jurisdiction to hear MetroPark’s appeal of the Seventh District’s decision, and that the Seventh District Appeals Court did not have jurisdiction to review the decision of the trial court. Because the trial court had failed to follow the statutory procedures for a hearing and decision on the authority and necessity of the appropriation, there was no “final appealable order” that either party could appeal to a higher court.
What happens next?
The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Seventh District Court of Appeals and sent the case back down to the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas. The county court must now hold a hearing to review the landowner’s arguments on the authority and necessity for the park’s appropriation. The court’s decision after that hearing will be an order that either party may choose to appeal to the Seventh District. The best answer to the question of what happens next, most likely, is that case will continue to roll on for quite some time.
Read the Supreme Court’s Decision in Mill Creek MetroParks v. Less.
Tags: eminent domain, appropriation, Mahoning County, bike path, Mill Creek MetroParks
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A landowner challenging the taking of land for a bikeway has lost in an appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court. The decision by the state’s highest court doesn’t address whether Mill Creek MetroParks may take the land for the bike trail, but instead gives the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court the go ahead to continue the eminent domain proceeding.
The landowner’s argument. Mill Creek MetroParks filed a case in 2019 to appropriate land from Edward Schlegel, who would not voluntarily consent to selling some of his land for the park district’s bike trail extension. Schlegel sought to have the case dismissed when the Ohio General Assembly included a provision in the state’s budget bill in 2021 intended to address landowner opposition to the Mill Creek MetroParks bike trail. The new provision prevents any park district in a county of between 220,000 and 240,000 people from using eminent domain for a “recreational trail” until July 1, 2026. Mahoning County falls within the population range.
Schlegel asked the Mahoning Court of Common Pleas to dismiss the Park District’s eminent domain proceeding against him based on the new law. But Common Pleas Court Judge Sweeney denied Schlegel’s request, stating that the new law did not apply because the legislature passed the law after the Park District filed Schlegal’s case. Schlegal then asked the Ohio Supreme Court for a “writ of prohibition” that would prevent Judge Sweeney from continuing with the eminent domain case.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning. In seeking a writ of prohibition, Schlegal had to demonstrate that the common pleas court exceeded its authority and that he had no remedy at law other than a writ of prohibition. The problem with Schlegel’s request, according to the Supreme Court, is that he did have an alternative and adequate remedy: an appeal. When the Mahoning County court issues a decision in the eminent domain proceeding, Schlegal has a right to appeal the decision. At that time, he could challenge the judge’s decision not to dismiss the case due to the new law.
Schlegel argued that the procedures for an eminent domain case prevented him from challenging the common pleas court’s refusal of his request to dismiss the case. An eminent domain proceeding has two parts: the first is a determination of whether the agency has the right to make an appropriation of property and if so, the second is to determine the amount of compensation due for the appropriation. Schlegel argued that because the new law became effective after the common pleas court determined the Park District had eminent domain authority, he lost his right to appeal that issue. Not so, according to the Supreme Court. Schlegel still has the right to appeal whether the park district may use eminent domain when the court issues its final judgment in the case regarding compensation. A writ of prohibition therefore is not warranted, the Court concluded.
What now? Schlegel’s eminent domain case will resume in the Mahoning County court. We can expect an appeal by Schlegel when the court determines the amount of compensation for the taking.
Another bike trail case is coming. In the meantime, the Ohio Supreme Court recently decided to review another case challenging the Mill Creek MetroParks bike trail. The Seventh District Court of Appeals issued a decision earlier this year in favor of a bike trail challenge by landowner Diane Less. The court held that the Park District lacked authority to use eminent domain against Less, basing its decision on the insufficiency of the resolutions the Park District passed when it decided to acquire land for the bike trail. Ohio law allows a park district to use eminent domain authority for two specific purposes: the conversion of forest reserves and the conservation of natural resources, and the appellate court determined that the Park District’s purpose for using eminent domain to extend the bike trail did not meet either of those purposes. The Park District appealed that decision and on September 14, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed to review the decision. The Court will likely hear the case in 2023.
Read the Schlegel v. Sweeney opinion and the Mill Creek v Less opinion online in the Opinions section of the Ohio Supreme Court’s website.
Tags: eminent domain, Mill Creek MetroParks, bike trail, recreational trail
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An appeals court ruling now stands in the way of a bikeway project begun more than 27 years ago by the Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District (MetroParks) in Mahoning County. The Seventh District Court of Appeals recently ruled that MetroParks did not have the power of eminent domain when it attempted to acquire undeveloped stretches of the bikeway. Several landowners have challenged MetroPark’s use of eminent domain for the project over the years, but this is the first case to yield a positive outcome for landowners who have not wanted the bikeway on their properties. We take a closer look at the decision in today’s post.
The case
The court case began in 2019, when MetroParks offered landowner Diane Less $13,650 for a permanent easement for construction of the bikeway across her land. When the landowner did not agree to the conveyance, MetroParks filed an eminent domain proceeding in the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas. The landowner responded that MetroParks did not have authority to use eminent domain for the bikeway project and attempted to have the case dismissed through a summary judgment motion. The trial court found that MetroParks was authorized to appropriate the property for the bikeway and denied the motion, and the landowner appealed.
The appellate court began its review of the case by pointing out that whenever Ohio’s legislature grants the power of eminent domain to a subdivision of the state, that grant must be “strictly construed” and any doubts about the right must be resolved in favor of the property owner. An entity like a park district has eminent domain authority (also referred to as appropriation or takings) only when the Ohio legislature grants the power in statutory law. MetroParks relied on Ohio Revised Code 1545.11 as the grant of power to acquire the bikeway land by eminent domain. That statute states:
The board of park commissioners may acquire lands either within or without the park district for conversion into forest reserves and for the conservation of the natural resources of the state, including streams, lakes, submerged lands, and swamplands, and to those ends may create parks, parkways, forest reservations, and other reservations and afforest, develop, improve, protect, and promote the use of the same in such manner as the board deems conducive to the general welfare. Such lands may be acquired by such board, on behalf of said district, (1) by gift or devise, (2) by purchase for cash, by purchase by installment payments with or without a mortgage, by entering into lease-purchase agreements, by lease with or without option to purchase, or, (3) by appropriation.
The appeals court examined MetroParks’ purpose for acquiring the land for the bikeway to determine if it met either of the authorized purposes in the statute of “conversion into forest reserves” or “conservation of natural resources.” MetroParks explained that it established its purposes and the necessity of acquiring the bikeway land in two resolutions in 1993 and 2018. The first resolution stated that the “public interest demanded the construction of a bicycle path” and the second stated that the bikeway “will provide local and regional users with a safe, uniformly-designed, multi-use, off-road trail facility dedicated for public transportation and recreational purposes.”
According to the court, however, both resolutions failed to relate the necessity of the bikeway to the purposes in the statute of acquiring land “for conversion into forest reserves and for the conservation of the natural resources of the state.” The court noted other Ohio court decisions that do conclude that a bikeway meets the purpose of acquiring land for the “conservation of natural resources” when it “supplies a human need,” “contributes to the health, welfare, and benefit of the community” and is “essential for the well-being of such community and the proper enjoyment of its property.” But important to the landowner is the court’s statement that it disagrees with these principles, “especially when applied to a rural area where it appears the public need is speculative at best and the harm to the private property owners is great." Reminding us that a statutory grant of eminent domain authority must be strictly construed and interpreted to favor a property owner, the court stated that prior decisions characterizing any project that serves the public and contributes to the health and welfare of the community as “conservation of natural resources” for purposes of R.C. 1545.11 is “a bit of a stretch.”
A second point the court made in questioning whether a bikeway fits within the purposes of park district land acquisition outlined in R.C. 1545.11 is that a law enacted after that statute assigned Ohio’s Department of Natural Resources the duty to plan and develop recreational trails, along with the authority to appropriate land for recreational trails. The statute suggests that the state agency, not park districts, possesses the authority to use eminent domain to establish recreational trails and bikeways.
Despite its disagreement with the assumption that R.C. 1545.11 permits the acquisition of land for bikeways as the “conservation of natural resources,” the court reviewed the MetroParks resolutions to determine if the park’s purpose constituted the “conservation of natural resources.” Not surprisingly, the court concluded that the resolutions were completely devoid of any purposes that met the statute’s requirements. Creating a bikeway through an extensive acreage of family-owned farmland in a rural area does not constitute the purpose of acquiring land for “conservation of natural resources of the state,” the court stated. Nor does providing recreation automatically equate to the conservation of natural resources. The resolutions did not “indicate that the creation of this particular trail or bikeway is designed to promote the general health and welfare of the pubic, which we believe requires more than just a recreational purposes” and failed at “even remotely tying the creation of the bikeway to the conservation of natural resources.”
Lacking a required statutory purpose for acquiring the bikeway land, the court concluded that MetroParks abused its discretion in attempting to appropriate the landowner’s property. The appeals court instructed the Mahoning Court of Common Pleas to grant summary judgment not only in this case, but also for a second bikeway eminent domain case the landowner was a party to with MetroParks.
Now what?
A question now before MetroParks is whether it will ask the Ohio Supreme Court to review the decision of the Seventh District Court of Appeals. The park district board will meet on May 9 to discuss how it will proceed.
A continuing problem
The case highlights a recurring issue with the use of eminent domain for bike paths, as this is not the only legal issue MetroParks has faced in its mission to build its bikeway. Several other court cases have challenged the park’s eminent domain authority, though unsuccessful, and an amendment to last year’s budget bill included specific language that prohibits the use of eminent domain for recreational trails for five years in a county with a population between 220,000 and 240,00 people. Mahoning County falls within that population range. Recent attempts by Mahoning County legislators to enact laws that prohibit the use of eminent domain for recreational trails or give local governments the right to veto such actions have not made it through the Ohio General Assembly. The divisive issue is clearly one that requires a closer look by our legislators.
Read the case of Mill Creek Metro. Dist. Bd. of Commrs. v. Less here.
Tags: eminent domain, bikeways, recreational trails, Mill Creek MetroParks
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