Property
UPDATE: Governor DeWine signed H.B. 95, the Beginning Farmer bill, on April 18, 2022. The effective date for the new law is July 18, 2022. The Governor signed the Statutory Lease Termination bill, H.B. 397, on April 21, and its effective date is July 21, 2022.
Bills establishing new legal requirements for landowners who want to terminate a verbal or uncertain farm lease and income tax credits for sales of assets to beginning farmers now await Governor DeWine’s response after passing in the Ohio legislature this week. Predictions are that the Governor will sign both measures.
Statutory termination requirements for farm leases – H.B. 397
Ohio joins nine other states in the Midwest with its enactment of a statutory requirement for terminating a crop lease that doesn’t address termination. The legislation sponsored by Rep. Brian Stewart (R-Ashville) and Rep. Darrell Kick (R-Loudonville) aims to address uncertainty in farmland leases, providing protections for tenant operators from late terminations by landowners. It will change how landowners conduct their farmland leasing arrangements, and will hopefull encourage written farmland leases that clearly address how to terminate the leasing arrangement.
The bill states that in either a written or verbal farmland leasing situation where the agreement between the parties does not provide for a termination date or a method for giving notice of termination, a landlord who wants to terminate the lease must do so in writing by September 1. The termination would be effective either upon completion of harvest or December 31, whichever is earlier. Note that the bill applies only to leases that involve planting, growing, and harvesting of crops and does not apply to leases for pasture, timber, buildings, or equipment and does not apply to the tenant in a leasing agreement. A lease that addresses how and when termination of the leasing arrangement may occur would also be unaffected by the new provisions.
The beginning farmer bill – H.B. 95
A long time in the making, H.B. 95 is the result of a bi-partisan effort by Rep. Susan Manchester (R-Waynesfield) and Rep. Mary Lightbody (D-Westerville). It authorizes two types of tax credits for “certified beginning farmer” situations. The bill caps the tax credits at $10 million, and sunsets credits at the end of the sixth calendar year after they become effective.
The first tax credit is a nonrefundable income tax credit for an individual or business that sells or rents CAUV qualifying farmland, livestock, facilities, buildings or machinery to a “certified beginning farmer.” A late amendment in the Senate Ways and Means Committee reduced that credit to 3.99% of the sale price or gross rental income. The bill requires a sale credit to be claimed in the year of the sale but spreads the credit amount for rental and share-rent arrangements over the first three years of the rental agreement. It also allows a carry-forward of excess credit up to 7 years. Note that equipment dealers and businesses that sell agricultural assets for profit are not eligible for the tax credit, and that an individual or business must apply to the Ohio Department of Agriculture for tax credit approval.
The second tax credit is a nonrefundable income tax credit for a “certified beginning farmer” for the cost of attending a financial management program. The program must be certified by the Ohio Department of Agriculture, who must develop standards for program certification in consultation with Ohio State and Central State. The farmer may carry the tax credit forward for up to three succeeding tax years.
Who is a certified beginning farmer? The intent of the bill is to encourage asset transition to beginning farmers, and it establishes eligibility criteria for an individual to become “certified” as a beginning farmer by the Ohio Department of Agriculture. One point of discussion for the bill was whether the beginning farmer credit would be available for family transfers. Note that the eligibility requirements address this issue by requiring that there cannot be a business relationship between the beginning farmer and the owner of the asset.
An individual can become certified as a beginning farmer if he or she:
- Intends to farm or has been farming for less than ten years in Ohio.
- Is not a partner, member, shareholder, or trustee with the owner of the agricultural assets the individual will rent or purchase.
- Has a household net worth under $800,000 in 2021 or as adjusted for inflation in future years.
- Provides the majority of day-to-day labor and management of the farm.
- Has adequate knowledge or farming experience in the type of farming involved.
- Submits projected earnings statements and demonstrates a profit potential.
- Demonstrates that farming will be a significant source of income.
- Participates in a financial management program approved by the Department of Agriculture.
- Meets any other requirements the Ohio Department of Agriculture establishes through rulemaking.
We’ll provide further details about these new laws as they become effective. Information on the statutory termination bill, H.B. 397, is here and information about the beginning farmer bill, H.B. 95, is here. Note that provisions affecting other unrelated areas of law were added to both bills in the approval process.
Tags: farm lease, verbal farm leases, lease termination, HB 397, beginning farmers, tax credits, HB 95
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In farm estate and transition planning, we caution against leaving farmland to multiple heirs as co-owners on the deed to the property. That’s because Ohio law allows any co-owner of property to seek “partition,” a legal action asking the court to either sell the property and divide sale proceeds among the co-owners or, in some cases, to physically divide the property between co-owners. If the goal of a farm family is to keep property in the family, co-ownership and partition rights put that goal at risk. A recent case from the Ohio Court of Appeals illustrates how partition can force the unwilling sale of property from a co-owner of the property.
The recent court case didn’t involve farmland, but concerned a home and four acres of land owned jointly by an unmarried couple, each on the deed to the property as co-owners with rights of survivorship. The couple separated and one remained in the home, but the two could not agree upon how to resolve their interests in the property. That led to a court case in which one co-owner asked the court to declare that the other had no remaining interest in the property. The other co-owner disagreed and filed a partition claim asking the court to sell the property and divide sale proceeds according to each person’s property interest. The trial court determined that each co-owner did have ownership interests in the property and ordered the property to be sold according to the partition law.
The trial court granted each party the right to purchase the property within 14 days before it would be sold, but neither exercised that right. After an appraisal, the court ordered the property sold and also ordered payment of the outstanding mortgage. That left the court with the challenge of determining how to divide the remaining sale proceeds according to each party’s interests in the property. A complicated analysis of payments, credit card debts, a home equity loan, rental value, and improvements to the property resulted in a final determination that granted one co-owner more of the proceeds than the other.
Both parties appealed the division of proceeds to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, unfortunately adding more cost and consternation to resolving the co-ownership problem. The court of appeals noted that Ohio law grants a court the duty and discretion to apply broad “equitable” principles of fairness when determining how to divide property interests among co-owners in a partition proceeding. A review of the trial court’s division of the proceeds led the appeals court to affirm the lower court’s holding as “equitable,” ending the three-and-a-half-year legal battle.
Ohio’s partition statute itself provides a warning of the risk of property co-ownership. It states in R.C. 5307.01 that co-owners of land “may be compelled to make or suffer partition…” While the purpose of partition is to allow a co-owner to obtain the value of their property interests, it can certainly force others to “suffer.” If a co-owner can’t buy out another co-owner, the power of partition can force the loss of farm property. As a result, family land can leave the family and a farming heir can lose land that was part of the farming operation. That’s most likely not the outcome parents or grandparents expected when they left their farmland to heirs as co-owners.
Fortunately, legal strategies can avoid the risk of partition. For example, placing the land in an LLC removes partition rights completely, as the land is no longer in a co-ownership situation—the LLC is the single owner of the land. The heirs could have ownership interests in the LLC instead of in the land, so heirs could still receive benefits from the land. The LLC Operating Agreement could contain rules about if and how land could be sold out of the LLC, and could ensure terms that would allow other LLC members to buy out another member’s ownership interests. An agricultural attorney can devise this and other legal strategies to ensure that partition isn’t a risk to farmland or farm heirs.
Tags: parition, farm transition planning, Estate Planning, Property, co-ownership
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It’s time to round up a sampling of legal questions we’ve received the past month or so. The questions effectively illustrate the breadth of “agricultural law,” and we’re happy to help Ohioans understand its many parts. Here’s a look at the inquiries that have come our way,
I’m considering a carbon credit agreement. What should I look for? Several types of carbon credit agreements are now available to Ohio farmers, and they differ from one another so it’s good to review them closely and with the assistance of an attorney and an agronomist. For starters, take time to understand the terminology, make sure you can meet the initial eligibility criteria, review payment and penalty terms, know what types of practices are acceptable, determine “additionality” requirements for creating completing new carbon reductions, know the required length of participation and how long the carbon reductions must remain in place, understand how carbon reductions will be verified and certified, be aware of data ownership rights, and review legal remedy provisions. That’s a lot! Read more about each of these recommendations in our blog post on “Considering Carbon Farming?”
I want to replace an old line fence. Can I remove trees along the fence when I build the new fence? No, unless they are completely on your side of the boundary line. Both you and your neighbor co-own the boundary trees, so you’ll need the neighbor’s permission to remove them. You could be liable to the neighbor for the value of the trees if you remove them without the neighbor’s approval, and Ohio law allows triple that value if you remove them against the neighbor’s wishes or recklessly harm the trees in the process of building the fence. You can, however, trim back the neighbor’s tree branches to the property line as long as you don’t harm the tree. Also, Ohio’s line fence law in ORC 971.08 allows you to access up to 10 feet of the neighbor’s property to build the fence, although you can be liable if you damage the property in doing so.
I want to sell grow annuals and sell the cut flowers. Do I need a nursery license? No. Ohio’s nursery dealer license requirement applies to those who sell or distribute “nursery stock,” which the law defines as any “hardy” tree, shrub, plant, bulb, cutting, graft, or bud, excluding turf grass. A “hardy” plant is one that is capable of surviving winter temperatures. Note that the definition of nursery stock also includes some non-hardy plants sold out of the state. Because annual flowers and cuttings from those flowers don’t fall into the definition of “nursery stock,” a seller need not obtain the nursery dealer license.
Must I collect sales tax on cut flowers that I sell? Yes. In agriculture, we’re accustomed to many items being exempt from Ohio’s sales tax. That’s not the case when selling flowers and plants directly to customers, which is a retail sale that is subject to the sales tax. The seller must obtain a vendor’s license from the Ohio Department of Taxation, then collect and submit the taxes regularly. Read more about vendor’s licenses and sales taxes in our law bulletin at this link.
I’m an absentee landowner who rents my farmland to a tenant operator. Should I have liability insurance on the land? Yes. A general liability policy with a farm insurer should be affordable and worth the liability risk reduction. But a few other steps can further minimize risk. Require your tenant operator to have liability insurance that adequately covers the tenant’s operations, and include indemnification provisions in your farm lease that shift liability to the tenant during the lease period. Also consider requiring your tenant or hiring someone to do routine property inspections, monitor trespass issues, and ensure that the property is in a safe condition.
My neighbor and I both own up to the shoreline on either side of a small lake--do I have the right to use the whole lake? It depends on where the property lines lay and whether the lake is connected to other waters. If the lake is completely surrounded by private property and not connected to other “navigable” waters, such as a stream that feeds into it, the lake is most likely a private water body. Both of you could limit access to your side of the property line as it runs through the lake. You also have the legal right to make a “reasonable use” of the water in the lake from your land, referred to as “riparian rights.” You could withdraw it to water your livestock, for example; but you cannot “unreasonably” interfere with your neighbor’s right to reasonably use the water. The law changes if the lake is part of a “navigable” waterway. It is then a “water of the state” that is subject to the public right of navigation. Others could float on and otherwise navigate the water, and you could navigate over to your neighbor’s side. Public users would not have the riparian rights that would allow them to withdraw and use the water, however, and would be trespassing if they go onto the private land along the shore.
If I start an agritourism activity on my farm, will I lose my CAUV status? No, not if your activities fit within the legal definition of “agritourism.” Ohio law states in ORC 5713.30(A)(5) that “agritourism” activities do not disqualify a parcel from Ohio’s Current Agricultural Use Valuation (CAUV) program. “Agritourism,” according to the definition in ORC 901.80, is any agriculturally related educational, entertainment, historical, cultural, or recreational activity on a “farm” that allows or invites members of the general public to observe, participate in, or enjoy that activity. The definition of a “farm” is the same as the CAUV eligibility—a parcel devoted to commercial agricultural production that is either 10 acres or more or, if under 10 acres, grosses $2500 annually from agricultural production. This means that land that is enrolled in the CAUV program qualifies as a “farm” and can add agritourism activities without becoming ineligible for CAUV.
Send your questions to aglaw@osu.edu and we’ll do our best to provide an answer. Also be sure to check out our law bulletins and the Ag Law Library on https://farmoffice.osu.edu, which explain many of Ohio’s vast assortment of agricultural laws.
Tags: carbon agreements, line fence law, trees, cut flowers, sales tax, Insurance, riparian rights, water rights, agritourism, cauv
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Did you know that the loudest land animal is the howler monkey? The howler monkey can produce sounds that reach 140 decibels. For reference, that is about as loud as a jet engine at take-off, which can rupture your eardrums.
Like the howler monkey, we are here to make some noise about recent agricultural and resource law updates from across the country. This edition of the Ag Law Harvest brings you court cases dealing with zoning ordinances, food labeling issues, and even the criminal prosecution of a dairy farm. We then look at a couple states proposing, or disposing, of legislation related to agriculture.
A zoning ordinance has Michigan landowners hogtied. The Michigan Supreme Court recently ruled that Michigan’s 6-year statute of limitations does not prevent a township from suing a landowner for alleged ongoing zoning violations, even if the start of landowner’s alleged wrongdoing occurred outside the statute of limitations period.
Harvey and Ruth Ann Haney (“Defendants”) own property in a Michigan township that is zoned for commercial use. Defendants began raising hogs on their property in 2006. Defendants started with one hog and allegedly grew their herd to about 20 hogs in 2016. In 2016, Fraser Township (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against Defendants seeking a permanent injunction to enforce its zoning ordinance and to prevent Defendants from raising hogs and other animals that would violate the zoning ordinance on their commercially zoned property. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and argued that Plaintiff’s claims were barred because of Michigan’s 6-year statute of limitations. A statute of limitations is a law that prevents certain lawsuits from being filed against individuals after a certain amount of time has passed. In Ohio, for example, if someone were to be injured in a car accident, they would only have 2 years to bring a personal injury claim against the person who caused the accident. That’s because Ohio has passed a law that mandates most personal injury claims to be brought within 2 years of the date of injury.
In the Michigan case, Defendants argued that because their first alleged wrongdoing occurred in 2006, Plaintiff could not file their lawsuit against the Defendants in 2016. A trial court disagreed with Defendants and denied their motion to dismiss. Defendants took the motion up to the Michigan Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals found that Plaintiff’s claim was barred because of the 6-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which overturned the Court of Appeals’ decision and held that Plaintiff’s claim was not barred. The Michigan Supreme Court reasoned that the presence of the hogs constitutes the alleged unlawful conduct of the Defendants, and that unlawful conduct occurred in 2006 and has occurred almost every day thereafter. The court concluded that because Defendants unlawful conduct was ongoing after 2006, Plaintiff’s claims were not barred by the statute of limitations. The case now goes back to the trial court to be tried on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants.
Where there’s smoke, there’s fire. Family Dollar Stores, Inc. (“Family Dollar”) has found itself in a bit of nutty situation. Plaintiff, Heather Rudy, has filed a class action lawsuit against Family Dollar, alleging that Family Dollar has misled her and other consumers by marketing its Eatz brand Smoked Almonds as “smoked.” Plaintiff asserts that Family Dollar is being deceptive because its Smoked Almonds are not smoked over an open fire, but instead flavored with a natural smoke flavoring. Plaintiff’s claims against Family Dollar include violating the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“ICFA”); breaches of express warranty and implied warranty of merchantability; violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; negligent misrepresentation; fraud; and unjust enrichment.
Family Dollar filed an early motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for which relief can be granted. A federal district court in Illinois dismissed some of Plaintiff’s claims but ruled that some claims against Family Dollar should be allowed to continue. Plaintiff’s claims for breaches of warranty, violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud were all dismissed by the court. The court did decide that Plaintiff’s claims under ICFA unjust enrichment should stay. The court reasoned that Plaintiff’s interpretation that Family Dollar’s almonds would be smoked over an open fire are not unreasonable. Moreover, the court recognized that nothing on the front label of Family Dollar’s Smoked Almonds would suggest, to consumers, that the term “smoked” refers to a flavoring rather than the process by which the almonds are produced. The court even pointed out that competitors’ products contain the word “flavored” on the front of similar “smoked” products. Therefore, the court concluded that Plaintiff’s interpretation of Family Dollar’s Smoked Almonds was not irrational and her claims for violating the ICFA should continue into the discovery phase of litigation, and possibly to trial.
Undercover investigation leads to criminal prosecution of Pennsylvania dairy farm. A Pennsylvania Court of Appeals (“Court of Appeals”) recently decided on Animal Outlook’s (“AO”) appeal from a Pennsylvania trial court’s order dismissing AO’s petition to review the decision of the Franklin County District Attorney’s Office (“DA”) to not prosecute a Pennsylvania dairy farm (the “Dairy Farm”) for animal cruelty and neglect. An undercover agent for AO held employment at the Dairy Farm and captured video of the condition and treatment of animals on the farm, which AO claims constitutes criminal activity under Pennsylvania’s animal cruelty laws.
AO compiled a report containing evidence and expert reports documenting the Dairy Farm’s alleged animal cruelty and neglect. AO submitted its report to the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) in 2019. The PSP conducted its own investigation which lasted for over a year, and in March 2020, issued a press release indicating that the DA would not prosecute the Dairy Farm.
In response, AO drafted private criminal complaints against the Dairy Farm and submitted those to the local Magisterial District Judge. The local Magisterial Judge disapproved all of AO’s complaints and concluded that the complaints “lacked merit.” AO then filed a petition in a Pennsylvania trial court to review the Magisterial Judge’s decision. The trial court dismissed AO’s petition and concluded that the DA correctly determined “that there was not enough evidence, based upon the law, to initiate prosecution against any of the Defendants alleged in the private criminal complaints.” AO appealed the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals which ended up reversing the trial court’s decision.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court failed to view the presented evidence through a lens that is favorable to moving forward with prosecution and the trial court failed to consider all reasonable inferences that could be made on the evidence. The Court of Appeals observed that the trial court made credibility determinations of the evidence by favoring the evidence gathered by PSP over the evidence presented by AO. The Court of Appeals noted that a trial court’s duty is to determine “whether there was evidence proffered to satisfy each element of an offense, not to make credibility determinations and conduct fact-finding.” Additionally, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not do a complete review of all the evidence and favored the evidenced obtained by PSP over the evidence presented by AO. The Court of Appeals determined that had the trial court reviewed all the evidence, it would have found that AO provided sufficient evidence to establish prima facie cases of neglect and animal cruelty, which would have provided the legal basis for the DA’s office to prosecute the claims.
Lastly, the DA argued that no legal basis for prosecution exists because the Dairy Farm is protected by the normal agricultural operations exemption to Pennsylvania’s animal cruelty laws. However, the Court of Appeals found that the conduct of the Dairy Farm, as alleged, would fall outside the normal agricultural operations exemption because AO’s report demonstrates that the Dairy Farm’s practices were not the dairy industry norm.
Ultimately the Court of Appeals found that AO’s private criminal complaints did have merit and that the DA had enough evidence and a legal basis to prosecute AO's claims. The Court of Appeals remanded the trial court’s decision and ordered that the DA to go ahead and prosecute the Dairy Farm on its alleged animal cruelty violations.
Wyoming fails to pass legislation limiting what can be considered agricultural land. The Wyoming House of Representatives struck down a recent piece of legislation looking to increase the threshold requirement to allow landowners the ability to classify their land as agricultural, have their land appraised at an agricultural value, and receive the lower tax rate for agricultural land. Current Wyoming law classifies land as agricultural if: (1) the land is currently being used for an agricultural purpose; (2) the land is not part of a patted subdivision; and (3) the owner of the land derived annual gross revenue of $500 or more from the marketing of agricultural products, or if the land is leased, the lessee derived annual gross revenues of $1,000 or more from the marketing of agricultural products.
Wyoming House Bill 23 sought to increase the threshold amount of gross revenues derived from the marketing of agricultural products to $5,000 for all producers. The Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation and Wyoming Stock Growers associations supported the bill. Proponents of the bill argued that the intent of agricultural land appraisals is to support commercial agriculture, not wealthy landowners taking advantage of Wyoming’s tax laws. Opponents of the bill argued that House Bill 23 hurt small agricultural landowners and that the benefits of the bill did not outweigh the harms. House Bill 23 died with a vote of 34-25, failing to reach the 2/3 approval for bills to advance.
Oregon introduces legislation relating to overtime for agricultural workers. Oregon House Bill 4002 proposes to require agricultural employers to pay all agricultural employees an overtime wage for time worked over 40-hours in a workweek. House Bill 4002 does propose a gradual phase-in of the overtime pay requirements for agricultural employees. For the years 2023 and 2024, agricultural employees would be entitled to overtime pay for any time worked over 55 hours in a workweek. For 2025 and 2026, the overtime pay requirement kicks in after 48 hours. Then in 2027, and beyond, agricultural employers would be required to pay an overtime pay rate to employees that work more than 40 hours in a workweek.
Tags: Animals, Animal Cruelty, Agriculture, Agricultural Labor, Labor and Employment, overtime, tax, Agricultural Land, Land Value, Criminal Law, Food Labeling, Zoning, Statute of Limitations
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Did you know that ants are the only creatures besides humans that will farm other creatures? It’s true. Just like we raise cows, sheep, pigs, and chickens in order to obtain a food source, ants will do the same with other insects. This is particularly true with aphids. Ants will protect aphids from natural predators and shelter them during heavy rain showers in order to gain a constant supply of honeydew.
Like an ant, we have done some heavy lifting to bring you the latest agricultural and resource law updates. We start with some federal cases that deal with the definition of navigable waters under the Clean Water Act, mislabeling honey products, and indigenous hunting rights. We then finish with some state law developments from across the country that include Georgia’s right to farm law and California’s Proposition 12.
Supreme Court to review navigable waters definition under the Clean Water Act. The Supreme Court announced that it would hear the case of an Idaho couple who have been battling the federal government over plans to build their home. Chantell and Mike Sackett (“Plaintiffs”) began construction on their new home near Priest Lake, Idaho but were halted by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). The EPA issued an administrative compliance order alleging that Plaintiffs’ construction violates the Clean Water Act. The EPA claims that the lot, on which the Plaintiffs are constructing their new home, contains wetlands that qualify as federally regulated “navigable waters.” Plaintiffs are asking the Court to revisit its 2006 opinion in Rapanos v. United States and help clarify how to determine when a wetland should be classified as “navigable waters.” In Rapanos, the Court found that the Clean Water Act regulates only certain wetlands, those that are determined to be “navigable waters.” However, two different tests were laid out in the Court’s opinions. The Court issued a plurality opinion which stated that the government can only regulate wetlands that have a continuous surface water connection to other regulated waters. A concurring opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, put forth a more relaxed test that allows for regulation of wetlands that bear a “significant nexus” with traditional navigable waters. Justice Kennedy’s test did not take into consideration whether there was any surface water connection between the wetland and the traditional navigable waters. In the lower appellate court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test to uphold the EPA’s authority to halt Plaintiffs’ construction. Now, Plaintiffs hope the Supreme Court will adopt a clear rule that brings “fairness, consistency, and a respect for private property rights to the Clean Water Act’s administration.”
SueBee sued for “bee”ing deceptive. Sioux Honey Association Cooperative (“Defendant”) finds itself in a sticky situation after Jason Scholder (“Plaintiff”) brought a class action lawsuit against the honey maker for violating New York’s consumer protection laws by misrepresenting the company’s honey products marketed under the SueBee brand. Plaintiff claims that the words “Pure” or “100% Pure” on the Defendant’s honey products are misleading and deceptive because the honey contains glyphosate. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the class action lawsuit and a federal district court in New York granted Defendant’s motion in part and denied it in part. Defendant asked the court to find that its labels could not be misleading as a matter of law because any trace amounts of glyphosate in the honey is a result of the natural behavior of bees interacting with agriculture and not a result of Defendant’s production process. However, the court declined to dismiss Plaintiff’s mislabeling claims. The court concluded that a reasonable consumer might not actually understand that the terms “Pure” or “100% Pure” means that trace amounts of glyphosate could end up in honey from the bees’ foraging process. The court also declined the Defendant’s request to dismiss Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim because of the alleged misrepresentations of the honey. However, the court did dismiss Plaintiff’s breach of express warranty claim and request for injunctive relief. The court dismissed Plaintiff’s breach of express warranty claim because Plaintiff failed to notify Defendant of its alleged breach of warranty, as required by New York law. Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief was also dismissed because the court could not find any imminent threat of continued injury to Plaintiff since he has now learned that the honey contains trace amounts of glyphosate. The court ordered the parties to proceed with discovery on Plaintiff’s remaining claims, keeping the case abuzz.
Indigenous Hunting Rights. Recently, two members of the Northwestern Band of the Shoshone Nation (“Northwestern Band”) were cited for hunting on Idaho lands without tags issued by the state. The Northwestern Band filed suit against the state of Idaho declaring that its members possessed hunting rights pursuant to the Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868 (the “1868 Treaty”). The 1868 Treaty provided that the Shoshone Nation agreed to permanently settle on either Fort Hall Reservation, located in Southeastern Idaho, or Wind River Reservation, located in Western Wyoming. By agreeing to settle on one of the two reservations, the Shoshone Nation was granted hunting rights on unoccupied lands of the United states. However, the Northwestern Band ended up settling in Northern Utah and not on one of the two named reservations. After considering the 1868 Treaty, the Federal District Court of Idaho dismissed Northwestern Band’s lawsuit. The court held that the hunting rights contained in the 1868 Treaty were tied to the promise to live on one of the reservations, and that a tribe cannot receive those hunting rights without living on one of the appropriate reservations. Thus, the court found that because the Northwestern Band settled in Northern Utah and not on one of the reservations, the hunting rights of the 1868 Treaty did not extend to the Northwestern Band of the Shoshone Nation.
Tensions rise over Georgia’s Freedom to Farm Act. A few days ago, Georgia lawmakers introduced legislation that seeks to further protect Georgia farmers from nusiance lawsuits. House Bill 1150 (“HB 1150”) proposes to change current Georgia law to protect farmers and other agricultural operations from being sued for emitting smells, noises, and other activities that may be found offensive by neighboring landowners. Georgia’s current law, which became effective in 1980, does provide some protection for Georgia farmers, but only from neighboring landowners that have moved near the farm or agricultural operation after the current law went into effect. All neighboring landowners that lived near the farming operation prior to the current law going into effect have retained their right to sue. HB 1150, on the other hand, will prevent these nuisance lawsuits by all neighboring landowners, as long as the farm or agricultural operation have been operating for a year or more. Passing a right to farm law has proven to be difficult in Georgia. In 2020, House Bill 545, also known as the “Right to Farm bill” failed to pass before the final day of the 2019-2020 legislative session. Private landowners, farmers, and their supporters, are divided on the issue and seek to protect their respective property rights. It doesn't look like HB 1150 will have the easiest of times in the Georgia legislature.
Confining California's Proposition 12. Meat processors and businesses that sell whole pork meat in California (collectively the “Petitioners”) have delayed the enforcement of California’s Proposition 12 (“Prop 12”), for now. Prop 12 is California’s animal confinement law that has sent shockwaves across the nation as it pertains to raising and selling pork, eggs, and veal. Last week, the Superior Court for Sacramento County granted Petitioners’ writ of mandate to delay the enforcement of Prop 12 on sales of whole pork meat. Petitioners argue that Prop 12 cannot be enforced until California has implemented its final regulations on Prop 12. To date, California has yet to implement those final regulations. California, on the other hand, suggests that final regulations are not a precondition to enforcement of Prop 12 and the civil and criminal penalties that can be brought against any farmer or business that violates Prop 12. The court disagreed. The court found that the language of Prop 12, as voted on by California residents, explicitly states that California voters wanted regulations in place before the square-footage requirements of Prop 12 took effect. Therefore, the court granted Petitioners’ writ of mandate to prevent the enforcement of Prop 12 until final regulations have been implemented. The court’s writ will remain in effect until 180 days after final regulations go into effect. This will allow producers and businesses to prepare themselves to comply with the final regulations. Opponents of Prop 12 believe this is another reason why the Supreme Court of the United States should review California’s Proposition 12 for its constitutionality.
Tags: Clean Water Act, Navigable Waters, Wetlands, Food Labeling, Hunting Rights, Property, Property Rights, nuisance, right to farm, animal welfare, California Proposition 12
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Did you know there is a bird with talons larger than grizzly bear claws? The Harpy Eagle’s back talons can reach lengths of 5 inches, which is larger than a grizzly bear’s claws which reach lengths of around 4 inches. Thankfully, the Harpy Eagle is not usually found in the United States, they are traditionally found in the rainforests of Central and South America.
The variety and extent of the animal kingdom can be a good analogy when we talk about the scope and variability of agricultural and resource law. “Ag law” isn’t in and of itself a core area of law, at least not an area of law taught in most law schools across the country. Those core areas of law are traditionally contracts, constitutional, tort, property, and a few others. But ag law includes most, if not all, of the core legal subjects. This includes property law, tax law, tort law, international law, intellectual property law, environmental law, contracts, business, labor and employment, and others. This week’s edition of the Ag Law Harvest shows you how diverse ag law really is. We review some legislation moving in parts of the country that deal with tax law, property law, and administrative law. We also review Federal regulations and court cases that address food law, trademark law, and antitrust law.
Florida introduces legislation to protect farmers’ preferential tax benefits amid agritourism boom. Florida’s legislature is hard at work to ensure the success of Florida’s agriculture and agritourism industries. Recently, Florida’s legislature introduced Senate Bill 1186 and House Bill 717. The purpose of both bills is to promote Florida’s agritourism industry and protect farmers when it comes to land classification, taxation, and regulation. Both pieces of legislation look to:
- Eliminate duplicate regulatory authority over agritourism by preventing local government from enacting regulations that prohibit, restrict, or otherwise limit an agritourism activity from taking place on land classified as agricultural land.
- Prevent land from being classified “non-agricultural” simply because an agritourism activity takes places on the land, so long as the agritourism activity is taking place on a bona fide farm.
- Implement a hybrid property taxation scheme which allows the buildings and other structures used for agritourism activities to be assessed at just value and added to the agriculturally assessed value of the land.
Both bills are currently making their way through their respective chamber’s committees and should be voted on soon.
Michigan looking to pass legislation to reduce fines for family farmers that do not report accidental workplace deaths to the state. The Michigan Senate recently passed a substitute for House Bill 4031, which is focused on reducing the fine incurred by family farms for not reporting the death of a family member within eight hours. Under current Michigan law, a family farm must report any fatality to the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Administration within eight hours or face a fine of at least $5,000, which is exactly what happened to the Eisenmann family in 2019. The Eisenmann family ran a family farm and was fined $12,000 after Keith Eisenmann fell to his death while repairing a barn roof. The bill seeks to reduce the fine for families that are grieving the unexpected loss of a loved one. Although a family farm will still be required to report the accidental work-related death of a loved one within eight hours, if a family fails to do so, the substitute bill drastically reduces the penalty. The original bill passed Michigan’s House of Representatives late last year, but the substitute bill passed by the Michigan Senate clarifies the definition of family farm. The substitute bill now goes back to the House of Representatives for approval.
Bioengineered food standard now in effect. January 1st marked the first day of compliance for the Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard (the “Standard”). The Standard requires food manufacturers, importers, and certain retailers to disclose to consumers that foods are or may be bioengineered. The Standard defines bioengineered foods as “those that contain detectable genetic material that has been modified through certain lab techniques and cannot be created through conventional breeding or found in nature.” The Agricultural Marketing Service has created a list of bioengineered foods to identify the crops or foods that are available in a bioengineered form. For more information on the Bioengineered Food Disclosure Statement visit https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/be.
A bite into the cheesier side of trademark law. Last month, a federal court in Virginia decided on a dispute between European and American cheesemakers. The dispute arose over whether the term “Gruyere” should only be used to identify cheeses produced in the Gruyère region of France and Switzerland or whether the term can be used generically to describe a type of cheese, regardless of where the cheese is produced. The Plaintiffs, two European business groups, filed an application with the United States Patent Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to register “Gruyere” as a certification mark under 15 U.S.C. § 1127 which would only allow cheesemakers to use the term “Gruyere” if the cheese came from the Gruyère region. The U.S. Dairy Export Council and others (“Defendants”) filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ application with the Trademark Trials and Appeals Board (“TTAB”). The TTAB found the term “Gruyere” to be generic term used to describe a type of cheese, not a cheese’s origin. Plaintiffs’ then filed suit in a federal court in Virginia. The federal court held that the “Gruyere” term had become a generic term to describe a type of cheese and failed to find the term worthy of trademark protection. The court reasoned that although the term “Gruyere” may have once been understood to indicate where a cheese came from, over time “Gruyere” became a generic term to describe a type of cheese. The court noted the term “Gruyere” has become generic overtime because: (1) U.S. regulations allow the use of the term “Gruyere” regardless of where the cheese is produced, (2) there is widespread sale and import of Gruyere cheese that is produced outside the Gruyère region, and (3) “Gruyere” is commonly used in dictionaries, media communications, and cheese industry events to describe a type of cheese without regards to where the cheese is produced. Plaintiffs have since appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which means we still have a gooey situation on our hands.
USDA and Department of Justice announce commitment to protect farmers against unfair anticompetitive practices. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) each announced their shared commitment to enforcing federal competition laws that are aimed at protecting farmers, ranchers, and other agricultural producers from unfair, anticompetitive practices. In continuing their commitment to enforcing such laws, the agencies released a statement of principles and commitments which include:
- Farmers, ranchers, and other producers and growers deserve the benefits of free and fair competition. The DOJ and USDA are therefore prioritizing matters impacting competition in agriculture.
- The agencies will develop an accessible, confidential process for agricultural producers to submit complaints about potential violations of the antitrust laws and the Packers and Stockyards Act.
- Increased cooperation between the agencies to enforce the laws that protect agricultural producers and to identify areas where Congress can help modernize rules and regulations.
As we have seen over the past few months, the federal government is keen on preventing the consolidation of the agricultural industry in order promote fair and equal competition. The announced commitments and principles demonstrate the government’s continued dedication to cracking down on unfair practices.
Tags: agritourism, Workplace Safety, Bioengineered Foods, Food Labeling, Antitrust, Trademark law
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Did you know that a group of ferrets is called a business? Ironically, we are in the business of ferreting out agricultural and resource law issues and providing you updates. This edition of the Ag Law Harvest provides an update on recent court decisions from across the country that deal with the right to farm, food labeling, and conditional use permits for solar gardens.
Right to Farm Act upheld in North Carolina. Earlier this month, a three-judge panel on the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of North Carolina’s right to farm law. In 1979, the North Carolina legislature enacted the Right to Farm Act (the “Act”). In 2017 and 2018 the North Carolina legislature amended the Act by passing House Bill 467 and Senate Bill 711 (collectively referred to as “the Amendments”). The Amendments sought to clarify and strengthen North Carolina’s right to farm law. The Plaintiffs argued that the Amendments violated North Carolina’s equivalent of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and that the Act exceeded the scope of North Carolina’s police power. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The Court recognized North Carolina’s interest in promoting and preserving agriculture and that North Carolina has the authority to regulate such an interest. The Court found that the Act’s limitation on potential nuisance claims against those engaged in agriculture, forestry, and other related operations helps to protect North Carolina’s interest, and encourages North Carolina’s goal to encourage the availability and continued “production of food, fiber, and other products.” The Plaintiffs also argued that the Amendments were “private laws” to specifically protect the swine industry in violation of North Carolina’s Constitution. The Court found, however, that the Act and the Amendments are laws of general applicability that apply to all agricultural and forestry operations, not just swine producers. Lastly, the Plaintiffs argued that because the language in House Bill 467 limited the amount of compensation that can be recovered in a nuisance action against agricultural and forestry operations, the Plaintiffs’ right to a trial by jury had been impaired and/or abolished. The Court ruled, however, that North Carolina has the authority to “define the circumstances under which a remedy is legally cognizable and those under which it is not.” The Court found that there are many examples where compensation and remedies are limited within North Carolina law and that House Bill 467 did not “impair nor abolish the right to a jury trial.”
Where is the cacao? A California man (“Plaintiff”) is suing Costco Wholesale Corporation (“Costco”) for allegedly mislabeling Costco’s “Chocolate Almond Dipped Vanilla Ice Cream Bars” (the “Product”). Plaintiff argues that because of the Product’s packaging and name, he expected the Product’s chocolate would have been predominately derived from cacao beans. Plaintiff asserts that chocolate is defined by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and California law “as prepared from ground roasted cacao bean” and that it must be “made chiefly from cacao beans with a small amount of optional ingredients.” Based on this definition, Plaintiff claims that Costco’s packaging is misleading because the Product’s chocolate contains mostly vegetable oils and small amounts of ingredients derived from cacao beans. In his Complaint, Plaintiff argues that federal regulations require Costco to label the Product as “milk chocolate and vegetable oil coating” rather than just “chocolate.” However, the court found that neither of Plaintiff’s cited regulations support a viable theory of liability against Costco. First, the court could not find Plaintiff’s definition of chocolate anywhere in the Code of Federal Regulations. Secondly, the court held that there are no federal regulations that require a certain amount of cacao bean ingredients as opposed to vegetable oils to be used in “chocolate” and that there is no language mandating the labeling of Costco’s Product as “milk chocolate and vegetable oil coating almond dipped ice cream bars.” The court also dismissed Plaintiff’s claim that Costco engaged in consumer deception with its Product’s label. The court found that a reasonable consumer would not have been deceived by the Product’s label and that if there were any questions about the ingredients of the Product, a consumer could have resolved those questions by looking for the ingredients list on the back of the Product’s packaging.
Conditional use permits at the center of the Minnesota’s “solar system.” Move over Sun because conditional use permits are at the center of attention in Minnesota, for now. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has recently ruled against a county’s decision to deny two conditional use permits to build solar gardens in McLeod County, Minnesota. Two subsidiary companies of Nokomis Energy LLC (“Plaintiff”) each applied for a conditional use permit (“CUP”) to build separate, one-megawatt solar energy facilities. McLeod County considered the two CUP applications at public hearings. Two neighboring landowners expressed concerns about stray voltage and the number of fetal deaths among their livestock. The landowners claimed that the number of fetal deaths increased after other solar facilities were constructed nearby. Plaintiff did not deny that solar gardens can produce stray voltage but proposed to alleviate those concerns by hiring only licensed professionals and to allow third-party oversight during construction. Plaintiff also offered to conduct stray voltage testing before and after construction and indicated that it would accept any conditions set forth by county officials. The county, however, denied both applications on the basis that the proposed sites are “prime farmland” and because the stray voltage would negatively affect livestock. The court rejected the county’s assessment. First, the court held that preserving prime farmland is not a sufficient legal basis for denying a CUP. Second, the court ruled that the county cannot deny a CUP without first considering whether any proposed conditions would eliminate any concerns about the application. Here, the court found that McLeod County’s failure to address Plaintiff’s proposals to eliminate the stray voltage concerns amounts to an unjust denial of Plaintiff’s CUPs.
Thanks for reading and Happy New Year!
Tags: right to farm, Zoning, Conditional Use Permits, solar energy, Food Labeling
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In Ohio, we are no strangers to the dreaded “black ice.” You probably know someone that has fallen victim to this invisible nuisance. We see it time and time again. Someone hits a patch of black ice and inevitably swerves off the road. Sometimes, a motorist may hit a mailbox, a tree, or a telephone pole and suffer serious injury. A common question that arises after such an incident is whether the owner or the party responsible for that tree or pole can be held liable for the motorist’s injuries. After all, had they removed the off-road object the motorist may have just slid into a ditch without any serious injury, right?
Well, in a recent decision, the Ohio Supreme Court clarified the duty owed to motorists by landowners or occupiers of land adjacent to a public roadway with respect to off-road objects. The case arises after a motorist hit a patch of black ice causing him to veer off the road and hit a mailbox, which then caused his truck to roll. The central issue of the case revolved around the landowner’s potential liability for the mailbox being within the right-of-way and causing the motorist’s truck to flip. Below we review the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Snay v. Burr and the duty owed to motorists by landowners or occupiers of land.
Background. On December 19, 2016, Cletus Snay was driving from his home in Norwalk, Ohio to his place of work in Bellevue, Ohio. Mr. Snay was traveling along a two-lane country road when he hit a patch of black ice that caused him to veer off the road. Ohio Highway Patrol found Mr. Snay’s truck rolled over. The state trooper had concluded that Mr. Snay’s truck went off the right side of the road, struck the first mailbox, owned by Matthew and Diane Burr, and began to flip, hitting the second mailbox and eventually ending up overturned further down the road. As a result of the accident, Mr. Snay suffered damage to his spine, rendering him quadriplegic.
After the accident, it was discovered that the Burrs’ mailbox post remained in the ground, while the second mailbox post that Mr. Snay’s truck hit was destroyed. Mr. Burr installed his mailbox approximately 20 years before Mr. Snay’s accident. Before installing the mailbox, Mr. Burr obtained guidelines for mailbox installation published by the United States Postal Service. The guidelines recommended, but did not require, that a metal mailbox support be two-inch-diameter standard-steel or aluminum pipe and be buried no more than 24 inches deep. Mr. Burr, however, used an eight-inch-diameter metal pipe that he buried 36 inches deep.
Mr. Snay and his wife hired an accident reconstructionist that agreed with the state trooper that Mr. Snay’s truck began to roll over after hitting the Burrs’ mailbox. However, the accident reconstructionist was of the opinion that the Burrs’ unyielding mailbox post was the mechanism that caused Mr. Snay’s truck to overturn. The accident reconstructionist characterized the Burrs’ mailbox support as a “dangerous hazard to motorists.”
The Snays filed suit alleging that the Burrs were negligent in constructing their mailbox because “it was supported by a thick, non-breakaway metal pipe.” The Burrs moved for summary judgment, arguing that they owed no duty of care to Mr. Snay and that Mr. Snay’s failure to control his vehicle was the cause of Mr. Snay’s injuries, not the mailbox. Both the trial court and the appellate court agreed with the Burrs. The Snays then brought the case before the Ohio Supreme Court.
What is the duty that a landowner owes to motorists traveling on a roadway with respect to off-road objects and obstructions? The Snays asked the Ohio Supreme Court to hold the Burrs liable for breaching the duty of care owed to motorists traveling on the road adjacent to their property. The Snays argued that the Burrs negligently misused the right-of-way by creating an unreasonable hazard that a motorist might encounter when they veer off the road. The Court disagreed.
The Court went through a historical analysis of Ohio’s law as it relates to off-road objects and the duty owed to motorists by landowners or occupiers. The Court found that under Ohio law “the effect that an object or obstruction in a right-of-way has on the ordinary use of the roadway” controls when determining the existence of a duty owed to motorists. The Court reasoned that if any duty is owed to a motorist by a landowner, it is the duty to ensure that any off-road hazard does not make “the roadway unsafe for the usual and ordinary course of travel.” Examples of off-road objects that may make the roadway unsafe for the usual course of travel include corn growing in the right-of-way that obstructs a motorist’s view of cross traffic or a large sign that obstructs a motorist’s view of the road.
The Court also found that there is no precedent to impose a duty on a landowner to remove an off-road hazard that makes only off-road travel unsafe, unless the off-road travel is shown to be an aspect of the ordinary and usual course of travel on that particular roadway. Here the Court held that the Burrs’ mailbox did not make ordinary travel on the road adjacent to the Burrs’ property unsafe. The Court found that the motorists traveling on the roadway usually drove on the paved area of the road. The Court recognized that motorists are not free to drive on a right-of-way as they please and found that the Burrs’ mailbox only presented a hazard to a motorist once the motorist errantly left the road.
So, if a landowner has an off-road object in the right-of-way, the Ohio Supreme Court has now ruled that the landowner’s duty is to ensure that the off-road object does not make the ordinary or usual travel of the roadway unsafe for motorists, otherwise all fixed objects like mailboxes or trees could impose liability on a landowner.
Do landowners owe a duty of care to motorists that leave the roadway? The Snays also argued that the Burrs’ “unreasonably dangerous construction” of the mailbox and deviation from the nonbinding guidelines of the United States Postal Service, gave rise to a duty of care to motorists that might leave the road and hit the mailbox. Again, the Ohio Supreme Court disagreed.
The Court again reiterated the fact that in order for a landowner or occupier to be liable there must first “be a condition or obstruction that jeopardizes the safety of traffic on the ordinarily traveled portion of the road.” The Court reasoned that the right-of-way beyond the paved portion of the road adjacent to the Burrs’ property was not used for ordinary travel. Therefore, the Court stated that a “vehicle traveling ordinarily and with due care on the road would not come in contact with the Burrs’ mailbox.” The Court also reasoned that adjacent landowners are entitled to presume that motorists will observe the law and exercise ordinary care while driving on a roadway and that a motorist hitting a patch of black ice is neither normal or expected.
The Court concluded that Mr. Burr’s construction of the mailbox, even though inconsistent with the United States Postal Service guidelines, “does not warrant a departure from the general rule that the duty to motorists owed by an adjacent landowner or an occupier of land adjacent to the road extends only to conditions in the right-of-way that render ordinary travel on the regularly traveled portion of the road unsafe.” Therefore, a landowner owes no duty to a motorist that errantly veers off the road and hits an off-road hazard.
Conclusion. As a landowner, or an occupier of land adjacent to a public roadway, it is your duty to ensure that any off-road object or obstruction does not make the ordinary and usual travel of the roadway unsafe. Only then can a landowner, or occupier of land, be liable for injuries caused by an off-road object or obstruction. Ohio does not impose a duty on landowners or occupiers of land to keep a right-of-way free of objects that may pose a danger to wayward vehicles. To read the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision, visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s website.
Tags: Right-of-way, Negligence, landowner liability, Duty of Care, Roadways, Travel, Motorists
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Did you know that female turkeys can lay a fertilized egg without mating? This process is called parthenogenesis, a type of asexual reproduction that can also occur in other types of animals including invertebrates, fish, and lizards. In turkeys, this process always produces a male chick. The likelihood of an embryo from parthenogenesis surviving to chick-hood is small, but possible.
In this edition of the Ag Law Harvest and in the spirit of Thanksgiving, we are thankful for the opportunity to present to you the newly proposed definition of “waters of the United States”, Kansas’s battle to protect agricultural facilities, and food labeling cases from across the country.
EPA and Army Corps of Engineers propose rule to establish the definition of “waters of the United States.” The EPA and Army Corps of Engineers announced a proposed rule to return the definition of “waters of the United States” (“WOTUS”) to the pre-2015 definition with a few updates to reflect Supreme Court decisions. In 2020, the Navigable Waters Protection Rule went into effect and interpreted WOTUS to include: “(1) territorial seas and traditional navigable waters; (2) tributaries of such waters; (3) certain lakes, ponds, and impoundments of jurisdictional waters; and (4) wetlands adjacent to other jurisdictional waters (other than jurisdictional wetlands).” On January 20, 2021, President Biden signed Executive Order 13990 directing all executive agencies to review and address any federal regulations that went into effect during the previous administration. After reviewing the Trump Administration’s Navigable Waters Protection Rule, the agencies determined that the rule is significantly reducing clean water protections. The new rule proposed by the agencies seeks to interpret WOTUS to include: (1) traditional navigable waters; (2) interstate waters; (3) the territorial seas and their adjacent wetlands; (4) most impoundments of WOTUS; (5) tributaries to traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, the territorial seas, and impoundments, that meet either the relatively permanent standard of the significant nexus standard; (6) wetlands adjacent to impoundments and tributaries, that meet either the relatively permanent standard or the significant nexus standard; and (7) “other waters” that meet either the relatively permanent standard or the significant nexus standard. The agencies will be taking comment on the proposed rule for 60 days once the rule is published in the Federal Register.
Kansas Attorney General asks Supreme Court to review Kansas “Ag Gag” Law. Derek Schmidt, Attorney General of Kansas, has asked the United States Supreme Court to review the Kansas Farm Animal and Field Crop and Research Facilities Protection Act (the “Act”) which criminalizes the unauthorized access to agricultural facilities without consent of the owner of the facility with the intent to damage the business of the facility. Under the Act, consent is not effective if it is “[i]nduced by force, fraud, deception, duress or threat.” Earlier this year, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals found the Kansas law to be unconstitutional by violating the free speech clause in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and prohibited Kansas from enforcing the Act. Now, Derek Schmidt has petitioned the Supreme Court to review the Kansas law arguing that the Act does not violate the First Amendment because the Act regulates conduct not speech. The Attorney General goes on to argue that even if trespass by deception were to be considered a form of speech, it is a form of speech that is not protected by the First Amendment. The Attorney General reasoned that the Act protects a private property owner’s right to exclude and that the First Amendment does not provide a license to violate a person’s property rights.
Oklahoma’s meat labeling law on trial. Earlier this month, the Plant Based Foods Association and the Tofurky Company (“Plaintiffs”) filed an amended complaint challenging Oklahoma’s Meat Consumer Protection Act (the “Act”) alleging that the Act violates the dormant commerce clause, the due process clause, and the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs allege that the Oklahoma law “institutes a protectionist trade barrier” that is contrary to and preempted by federal law. According to Plaintiffs, the Act “forbids plant-based meat producers from using meat terms unless they include a disclaimer on their product labels in the same type size and prominence to the ‘name of the product’ that their plant-based products are not actually meat derived from animals.” Plaintiffs argue that the Oklahoma law would require plant-based meat producers to develop Oklahoma specific labels or abandon the Oklahoma market which is essentially interfering with interstate commerce and in violation of established federal law. This case is set for trial in 2022. But, this is not the first time the Oklahoma law has been challenged on constitutional grounds. Plant Based Foods Association and Upton’s Naturals Company also filed suit alleging the Oklahoma law violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. However, a Federal District Court in Oklahoma denied an injunction to prevent Oklahoma from enforcing the law. The court found that the disclosure requirement in the Act is reasonably related to Oklahoma’s interest in preventing the confusion or deception of consumers. The court reasoned that the commercial speech at issue could potentially be misleading to reasonable consumer. The court argued that “the possibility of deception flowing from the use of meat-related terms for the plant-based products is self-evident from the natural inference a consumer would draw from the meat-related terms used.” This not the end of the battle for the Oklahoma law, there will likely be appeals to higher courts to help settle the dispute.
Pepperidge Farm sued over “Golden Butter” cracker label. Hawa Kamara decided to file a lawsuit against Pepperidge Farm, Inc. after purchasing “Golden Butter” crackers at a local Target store in New York. According to the ingredients list attached to Kamara’s complaint, the crackers were made with butter but also included vegetable oils. Kamara asserted that the presence of vegetable oils makes the “Golden Butter” packaging misleading and/or deceptive because a reasonable consumer would conclude the crackers were “all or predominantly made with butter.” A Federal District Court in New York, however, did not find the packaging misleading or deceptive. The court reasoned that “the packaging accurately indicated that the product contained butter, and the ingredients list confirmed that butter predominated over other oils and fats.” Further, the court argued that a reasonable consumer could believe the “Golden Butter” labeling described the product’s flavor and not the ingredient proportions. Ultimately, the court decided to dismiss the case against Pepperidge Farm because Kamara’s complaint did not plausibly allege that the “Golden Butter” packaging materially misrepresented the ingredients in the crackers.
Thank you for reading and we hope that everyone has a happy and safe Thanksgiving!!
Tags: WOTUS, Food Labeling, EPA, Army Corps of Engineers, Ag Gag, U.S. Constitution
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Did you know that Hippopotamuses cannot swim? It’s true. When hippos submerge themselves underwater, they don’t swim back up to the surface, instead they walk along the bottom until they reach shallow water. That is unless the hippo decides to chase you out of its territory, then it will gladly run, jump, and charge right at you.
Like the hippo, this week’s Ag Law Harvest is a little territorial. We bring you recent Ohio court decisions, a federal order allowing Colombian hippos to take the testimony of Ohio residents, and the Ohio Department of Agriculture’s directives as it ramps up its fight against Ohio’s newest pest.
Well, well, well. A recent Ohio case demonstrated the complex issues a landowner can run into when dealing with an oil and gas lease. The Plaintiff in this case owns land in Hebron, Ohio and brought suit against his neighbors and the Ohio Department of Taxation claiming that he was not the owner of a gas well located on his property or that he was responsible for paying taxes and maintaining the well under Ohio law. The Hebron, Ohio property at issue in this case passed through many hands before becoming the property of the Plaintiff. One of the prior owners was a man named William Taggart (“Taggart”). As mentioned earlier, the property also has a gas well which was subject to an oil and gas lease. The oil and gas lease passed to multiple parties and ended up with Taggart while he owned the Hebron property. After having both the property and the oil and gas lease, Taggart deeded the property to Plaintiff’s parents which eventually passed onto Plaintiff. Plaintiff argued that he is not the rightful owner of the well because the last person that was assigned the oil and gas lease was Taggart, making him the owner of the well. The Fifth District Court of Appeals disagreed. The court found that Plaintiff’s parents registered as owners of the well under Ohio Revised Code § 1509.31 which requires a person to register a well before they can operate it. Further, the court determined that when the oil and gas lease was assigned to Taggart the rights of the landowner and the lessee merged, essentially making Taggart the only individual with any property interest in the well. Relying on § 1509.31, the court found that when the entire interest of an oil and gas lease is assigned to the landowner, the landowner then becomes responsible for compliance with Chapter 1509 of the Ohio Revised Code. Therefore, when the property passed to Plaintiff’s parents, they became the owners of the well and were responsible for making sure the well was in compliance with Chapter 1509. Because this responsibility passed onto Plaintiff, the court found Plaintiff to be liable for the taxes and ensuring that the well is compliant with Ohio law. The court also denied Plaintiff’s attempt to argue that Taggart was the responsible party because the oil and gas lease was still in effect due to the fact that Plaintiff’s neighbors use the gas well for domestic purposes. The court found that the oil and gas lease had expired by its own terms, pursuant to the habendum clause contained within the lease. A habendum clause essentially defines the property interests and rights that a lessee has. The specific habendum clause in this case stated that the lease would terminate either within three years or when the well no longer produced oil and gas for commercial purposes. The lease at issue was well beyond the three-year term and, as the court found, the lease expired under Taggart because the well no longer produced oil or gas for commercial purposes. The use of the well for domestic purposes did not matter. The Fifth District ultimately held that because Plaintiff could not produce any evidence to show that another party had an interest in the well, Plaintiff is ultimately responsible for the well.
Amending a contract doesn’t always erase the past. Two companies (“Plaintiffs”) recently filed suit against a former managing member (“Defendant”) for allegedly using business funds and assets for personal use during his time as managing member. The primary issue in this case was whether or not an arbitration clause in the original operating agreement is enforceable after the operating agreement was amended to remove the arbitration clause. Defendant’s alleged misconduct occurred while the original operating agreement was in effect. The original operating agreement would require the parties to settle any disputes through the arbitration process and not through the court system. However, shortly before filing suit, the original operating agreement was amended to remove the arbitration provision. Plaintiffs filed suit against the Defendant arguing that the arbitration provision no longer applied because the operating agreement had been amended. Defendant, however, argued that his alleged misconduct occurred while the original operating agreement was in effect and that the amended operating agreement could not apply retroactively forcing him to settle the dispute in a court rather than through arbitration. The trial court, however, sided with the Plaintiffs and allowed the case to move forward. Defendant appealed the trial court’s decision and the Ninth District Court of Appeals agreed with him. The District Court found that the amended operating agreement did not expressly state any intention for the terms and conditions of the amended operating agreement to apply retroactively. Further, the court held that Ohio law favors enforcing arbitration provisions within contracts and any doubts as to whether an arbitration clause applies should be resolved in favor of enforcing the arbitration clause. The Ninth District reversed the trial court and found that the dispute of Defendant’s alleged misconduct should be resolved through arbitration.
Animal advocates claim victory in pursuit of recognizing animals as legal persons. A recent order issued by a federal district court in Ohio allows an attorney for Colombian Hippopotamuses to take the testimony of two expert witnesses residing in Ohio. According to U.S. law, a witness may be compelled to give testimony in a foreign lawsuit if an “interested person” applies to a U.S. court asking that the testimony be taken. The Animal Legal Defense Fund (“ALDF”) applied to the federal court on behalf of the plaintiffs, roughly 100 hippopotamuses, from a lawsuit currently pending in Colombia. According to the ALDF, the lawsuit seeks to prevent the Colombian government from killing the hippos. The interesting thing about this case is that hippos are not native to Colombia and were illegally imported into the country by drug kingpin Pablo Escobar. After Escobar’s death the hippos escaped his property and relocated to Colombia’s Magdalena River and have reproduced at a rate that some say is unsustainable. In Colombia, animals are able to sue to protect their rights and because the plaintiffs in the Colombian lawsuit are the hippos themselves, the ALDF argued that the hippos qualify as an “interested person” under U.S. law. After applying for the authorization, the federal court signed off on ALDF’s application and issued an order authorizing the attorney for the hippos to issue subpoenas for the testimony of the Ohio experts. After the federal court’s order, the ALDF issued a press release titled “Animals Recognized as Legal Persons for the First Time in U.S. Court.” The ALDF claims the federal court ruling is a “critical milestone in the broader animal status fight to recognize that animals have enforceable rights.” However, critics of ALDF’s assertions point out that ALDF’s claims are a bit embellished. According to critics, the order is a result of an ex parte application to the court, meaning only one side petitioned the court for the subpoenas and the other side was not present to argue against the subpoenas. Further, critics claim that all the federal court did was sign an order allowing the attorney for the hippos to take expert testimony, the court did not hold that hippos are “legal persons” under the law.
Ohio Department of Agriculture announces quarantine to combat the spread of the Spotted Lanternfly. According to the Ohio Department of Agriculture (“ODA”) the Spotted Lanternfly (“SLF”) has taken hold in Jefferson and Cuyahoga counties. The ODA announced that the SLF is now designated as a destructive plant pest under Ohio law and that the ODA was issuing quarantine procedures and restricting the movement of certain items from infested counties into non-infested areas of Ohio. The ODA warns that the SLF can travel across county lines in items like tree branches, nursery stock, firewood, logs, and other outdoor items. The ODA has created a checklist of things to look for before traveling within or out of infested counties. Nurseries, arborists, loggers, and other businesses within those infested counties should contact the ODA to see what their obligations and rights are under the ODA's new quarantine instructions. Under Ohio law, those individuals or businesses that fail to follow the ODA’s quarantine instructions could be found guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree on their first offense and a misdemeanor of the second degree for each subsequent offense. For more information visit the ODA’s website about the SLF.
Tags: ODA, Animal Rights, oil and gas leases, operating agreements, business law, Spotted Lanternfly
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