Property

State lawmakers have been busy crafting new legislation since the 133rd General Assembly took shape in January.  As promised, here are some highlights and summaries of the pending bills that relate to agriculture in Ohio:

• Senate Bill 57, titled “Decriminalize hemp and license hemp cultivation.”  The Ohio Senate Agriculture and Natural Resources Committee held a second hearing about the bill on March 13th, and numerous farm organizations spoke in support of the bill.  As of now the language of the bill has not changed since we last discussed Ohio’s hemp bill in a blog post, but some changes could be made when the bill is sent out of the committee.  Click HERE for more information about the bill, and HERE for the current official bill analysis.

• Senate Bill 2, titled “Create state watershed planning structure.”  The one sentence bill expresses the General Assembly’s intent “to create and fund a comprehensive statewide watershed planning structure to be implemented at the local soil and water conservation district level.”  It further expresses the intent “to provide authorization and conditions for the operation of watershed programs implemented by local soil and water conservation districts.”  Click HERE for more information about the bill.

• House Bill 24, titled “Revise humane society law.”  The bill would make various changes to Ohio’s Humane Society Law, including changes to enforcement powers, appointment and removal procedures, training, and criminal law applicability.  One of the significant changes would expand to all animals the seizure and impoundment provisions that currently apply only to companion animals.  This change would allow an officer to seize and impound any animal that the officer has probable cause to believe is the subject of a violation of Ohio’s domestic animal law.  At the same time, the bill would remove certain provisions from current law that pertain to harm to people, thereby focusing the new law solely on the protection of animals.  Click HERE for more information about the bill, and HERE for the current official bill analysis.

• House Bill 124, titled “Allow small livestock on residential property.”  Under this bill, counties and townships would no longer be allowed to restrict via zoning certain noncommercial agricultural activities on residential property conducted for an individual’s personal use and enjoyment.  Instead, owners of residential property that is not generally agricultural would be allowed to keep, harbor, breed, and maintain small livestock on their property.  Small livestock includes goats, chickens and similar fowl, rabbits, and similar small animals.  Roosters are explicitly excluded from this definition.  However, the owner would lose his or her rights to keep small livestock if the small livestock create a nuisance, are kept in a manner that causes noxious odors or unsanitary conditions, are kept in a building that is unsafe as defined under the statute, or if the number of animals exceeds a certain ratio of animals to acres as defined under the statute.  The ratio may be modified by the local jurisdiction to allow for more animals per acre.  Click HERE for more information about the bill.

• House Bill 55, titled “Require oil and gas royalty statements.”  Owners of oil and gas wells would have to provide mandatory reports to holders of royalty interests under this bill.  Current law only requires disclosure of the information upon request, but this bill would make the disclosure mandatory.  The bill would expand the types of information that the reports must include, and allows the holder of royalty interests to sue to enforce the new rights.  Click HERE for more information about the bill, and HERE for the current official bill analysis.

• House Bill 94, titled “Ban taking oil or natural gas from bed of Lake Erie.”  The Ohio Department of Natural Resources handles oil and gas permitting in Ohio, and this bill would bar the agency from issuing permits or making leases “to take or remove oil or natural gas from and under the bed of Lake Erie.”  Click HERE for more information about the bill.

• House Bill 95, titled “Revise Oil and Gas Law about brine and well conversions.”  The bill would ban the use of brine in secondary oil and gas recovery operations.  It would also ban putting brine, crude oil, natural gas, and other fluids associated with oil and gas exploration in ground or surface waters, on the ground, or in the land.  This restriction would apply even if the fluid received treatment in a public water system or other treatment process.  Further, brine disposal permits would not be allowed to utilize underground injection or disposal on the land or in surface or ground water.  Click HERE for more information about the bill.

• House Bill 100, titled “Revise requirements governing abandoned mineral rights.”  Ohio has a statute that governs when a surface owner can take the mineral rights held or claimed by another by operation of law, essentially because of the passage of time.  The bill would require a surface owner to attempt to give notice to a holder of mineral rights by personal service, certified mail, or if those are unsuccessful then by publication.  Currently, if a holder of mineral rights believes that his or her interest remains valid, he or she may file an affidavit that complies with Ohio Revised Code (ORC) § 5301.56(H)(1) in the county property records.  If the holder of mineral rights fails to file an affidavit, the surface owner may then file an affidavit under ORC § 5301.56(H)(2) that effectively vests the mineral rights in the surface owner.  The new law would allow the surface owner to challenge a holder of mineral rights’ ORC § 5301.56(H)(1) affidavit.  This process would require the surface owner to obtain a court determination that the affidavit is invalid.  Then the surface owner would be able to file the new ORC § 5301.56(H)(3) affidavit to obtain the mineral rights.  Click HERE for more information about the bill.

There are also some bills that could have some indirect implications in the agricultural and natural resources sectors.  These indirect effects make this next set of bills noteworthy, or at least interesting.

• Senate Bill 1, titled “Reduce number of regulatory restrictions.”  The bill would require each state agency to count its total number of regulatory restrictions, and then reduce the number of restrictions based on that baseline by 30% by 2022.  Once an agency meets its reduction target, it would not be able to increase the number of regulatory restrictions without making additional cuts elsewhere.  The bill would target agency rules that require or prohibit specific acts.  Click HERE for more information about the bill, and HERE for the current official bill analysis.

• Senate Bill 21, titled “Allow corporation to become benefit corporation.”  Much like the LLC merged the principles of a corporation and a partnership, the benefit corporation merges the principles of a corporation and a non-profit.  A benefit corporation must follow the formalities of a corporation, but the articles of incorporation can designate a social purpose for the business to pursue, such as promoting the environment through sustainable practices.  One of the unique traits of benefit corporations is that benefit corporations cannot be held liable for damages for failing to seek, achieve, or comply with their beneficial purpose, or even obtain a profit; however, certain individuals may seek a court ordered injunction to force the company to pursue those interests.  In a sense, the benefit corporation reduces the traditional fiduciary duties expected in general corporations.  The bill purports to maintain the traditional fiduciary duties, but by allowing a social purpose other than profit to guide decisions, the traditional fiduciary duties are in effect modified.  Click HERE for more information about the bill, and HERE for the current official bill analysis.

• House Bill 33, titled “Establish animal abuse reporting requirements.”  Under the bill, veterinarians and social service professionals would have to report their knowledge of abuse, cruelty, or abandonment toward a companion animal.  Social service professionals would include licensed counselors, social workers, and marriage or family therapists acting in their professional capacity.  Companion animals include non-wild animals kept in a residential dwelling, along with any cats and dogs kept anywhere.  These individuals would be required to report the neglect to law enforcement, agents of the county humane society, dog wardens, or other animal control officers.  Further, dog wardens, deputy dog wardens, and animal control officers would become mandatory reporters of child abuse.  Lastly, the bill explains the information that must be reported, the timing, and the penalties for failure to comply.  Click HERE for more information about the bill, and HERE for the current official bill analysis.

• House Bill 48, titled “Create local government road improvement fund.”  The bill proposes to deposit into a new local government road improvement fund some of the surplus funds generated when the state spends less than it appropriates in the general revenue fund.  Under current law, this surplus is split between the budget stabilization fund, also known as the “rainy day fund,” and the income tax reduction fund, which would redistribute remaining surplus to taxpayers.  Click HERE for more information about the bill.

• House Bill 54, titled “Increase tax revenue allocated to the local government fund.”  The bill would increase the proportion of state tax revenue allocated to the Local Government Fund from 1.66% to 3.53%.  Click HERE for more information about the bill.

• House Bill 74, titled “Prohibit leaving junk watercraft or motor uncovered on property.”  The bill would allow a sheriff, chief of police, highway patrol officer, or township trustee to send notice to a landowner to remove a junk vessel or outboard motor within 10 days.  The prohibition applies to junk vessels, including watercraft, and outboard motors that are three years or older, apparently inoperable, and with a fair market value of $1,500 or less.  Failure to cover, house, or remove the item in ten days could result in conviction of a misdemeanor.  Click HERE for more information about the bill, and HERE for the current official bill analysis.

As more bills are introduced, and as these bills move along, stay tuned to the Ag Law Blog for updates.

Written by Evin Bachelor, Law Fellow, OSU Extension Agricultural & Resource Law Program

Toledo’s Lake Erie Bill of Rights (LEBOR) has been in the headlines a lot lately, and certainly on the minds of farmers in the Lake Erie watershed.  So far, the Ag Law Blog has focused attention on what LEBOR is, why it was on the ballot, and what types of defenses agricultural producers can raise if sued.  Because voters approved the ballot measure, the focus now shifts to how LEBOR will be treated in the courts.

On February 26th, Toledo held a special election, with one of the ballot questions being whether to amend the City of Toledo’s charter to adopt LEBOR.  While less than 9 percent of Toledo’s registered voters cast a ballot, the majority of those who did voted in favor of amending the city’s charter to include LEBOR. 

On February 27th, the Drewes Farm Partnership filed a complaint and initiated a lawsuit in federal court against the City of Toledo.  Family owned and operated, this Wood County based grain farm operates wholly within the Lake Erie watershed.  Drewes Farm utilizes both manure and commercial fertilizers, and states in its complaint that it follows industry best practices, scientific recommendations, and all legal requirements such as keeping records and not applying fertilizer on snow covered ground.  Two of the family members obtained Fertilizer Applicator Certificates, and the Ohio Department of Agriculture certified the farm under its Ohio Agricultural Stewardship Verification Program.

The complaint specifically alleges violations of Drewes Farm’s rights under the First Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, and Due Process Clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Further, the complaint argues that LEBOR exceeds the City of Toledo’s authority by intruding on state and federal powers by attempting to meddle with international relations, invalidate state and federal permits, invalidate state law, alter the rights of corporations, and create new causes of action in state courts.  Drewes Farm requests that the court 1) grant it a preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent LEBOR’s enforcement, 2) invalidate LEBOR, and 3) grant the plaintiff an award for costs and fees.

The following day, Drewes Farm filed a motion for a preliminary injunction.  Parties use preliminary injunctions as a way to enforce the status quo and prevent the other parties from acting in a way that would cause further harm.  If granted, the preliminary injunction would prevent the enforcement of LEBOR against the Drewes Farm Partnership during the course of the litigation.  At the end of the case, there would be a determination of whether Drewes Farm should receive a permanent injunction, which would prevent LEBOR from being enforced against it after the case has ended.

The party who brings the motion must argue and prove four elements in order for the court to grant the motion for a preliminary injunction:

First, that the movant has a likelihood of success on the merits, meaning that it is likely that the movant will win the underlying case.  Drewes Farm’s motion examines each of the grounds that it believes violates its constitutional rights and state and federal law.  Drewes Farm argues that it can win on each of the dozen grounds it examines, and that it need only show a likelihood of success on one ground to satisfy this element.

Second, that the movant could suffer irreparable harm without a preliminary injunction, meaning that without a preliminary injunction, the other party may take action to harm the movant in a way that it will not be able to recover.  Here, Drewes Farm cites court cases explaining that the loss of one’s constitutional rights for any amount of time constitutes irreparable harm, and that a likelihood of success also demonstrates irreparable harm.

Third, that the issuance of an injunction will not cause greater harm.  This element balances the previous element to see whether the injunction is fair.  Where the second element looks at the harm to the movant, the third element looks at whether a preliminary injunction will harm others.  Here, Drewes Farm argues that others will not be harmed by the granting of a preliminary injunction because it will merely allow the farm to continue operating as required under the law and its permits using best practices.  Further, Drewes Farm mentions that the other farms in the watershed will actually experience a benefit from the prevention of LEBOR’s enforcement.

Fourth, that the issuance of a preliminary injunction would serve the public interest.  Here, Drewes Farm cites additional court cases explaining that the enforcement of constitutional rights is inherently in the public interest.  Further, it argues that the State of Ohio holds its portion of Lake Erie in trust “for all Ohio citizens, not just those residing in a single municipality.”

If the court is satisfied that Drewes Farm has established each of the four elements, it may grant a preliminary injunction.

At this time, the City of Toledo has not filed any responses to the complaint or motion; however, procedural rules require it to respond in a timely manner.  Because it has not filed anything with the court, it is unclear how the City of Toledo intends to defend or respond.  However, since enforcement of LEBOR had not been commenced against the Drewes Farm Partnership, it is possible that Toledo will challenge the plaintiff’s standing to sue at the present time.

The case is cited in court records as Drewes Farm Partnership v. City of Toledo, Ohio, 3:19-cv-00343 (N.D. Ohio).  Stay tuned to the Ag Law Blog for updates about the case.

Written by: Ellen Essman, Sr. Research Associate, and Evin Bachelor, Law Fellow

Here’s our latest gathering of agricultural law news that you may want to know:

GIPSA as we know it is no more.  A rule was released November 29, 2018 by the USDA as part of the Trump administration’s ongoing efforts to reorganize the agency.  Of particular note, the rule, which was published in the Federal Register, eliminates the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) as a “stand-alone agency.”  According to the GIPSA website (which is currently still available here), the agency “facilitate[d] the marketing of livestock, poultry, meat, cereals, oilseeds, and related agricultural products, and promote[d] fair and competitive trading practices for the overall benefit of consumers and American agriculture.”  The new administrative rule relocates GIPSA responsibilities to the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) Administrator.  The change is not without controversy, as some farmers and agricultural groups argue that the protection of farmers through fair trading practices is antithetical to AMS, an agency responsible for marketing and promoting commodities.  The rule is available here.

Supreme Court considers when habitat is “critical habitat” under the Endangered Species Act.  The Supreme Court of the United States ruled in favor of private landowners when it recently determined that protected "critical habitat" for an endangered species must be habitat in which the species could actually survive.  The Court's decision in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service et al  involved the dusky gopher frog, an endangered species that once lived throughout the coastal regions of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi.  Some of the habitat deemed by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service to be protected "critical habitat" for the frog was not actually occupied by the frog, and was instead being used for commercial timber production.  Weyerhaeuser and other affected landowners brought suit, claiming that the land couldn't be critical habitat because the frog could not survive there without significant human intervention, such as intensive tree planting.  The Court agreed that critical habitat "cannot include areas where the species could not currently survive."  Weyerhouser and other landowners had also challenged the agency's cost-benefit analysis for the critical habitat designation, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and stated that it had no power to review the FWS  analysis.   The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that federal courts can review an agency's economic impact analysis to determine whether the agency abused its discretion or was arbitrary and capricious.  With that guidance, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit for further proceedings.  The Supreme Court’s decision is here.

A second judge finds that Trump’s WOTUS repeal was not procedurally sound.  Surprise, surprise, the WOTUS, or “waters of the United States” rule is in the news again.  In many previous blog posts, we have chronicled decisions on the ever-present WOTUS rule (search “WOTUS” in our search bar for our other posts).  Readers will recall that last February, the Trump administration published a new rule which was meant to repeal Obama’s WOTUS rule and replace it with the pre-2015 definition of WOTUS until a new definition could be developed.  Trump’s  rule was published on February 6, 2018, giving the administration until 2020 to come up with a new definition.  On August 16, 2018, a district court judge in South Carolina found that the Trump administration did not comply with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when it enacted the February 6 rule.  Similarly, on November 26, 2018, Judge John Coughenour in the Western District of Washington found that “by restricting the content of the comments solicited and considered [about the February rule], the Agencies deprived the public of a meaningful opportunity to comment on relevant and significant issues in violation of the APA’s notice and comment requirements.”  Rulemaking that violates the APA is invalid.  Judge Coughenour’s full decision is available here.

Both the South Carolina and the Washington state district court decisions are applicable to the entire country.  As a result, one might think that the Obama WOTUS rule should be in effect nationwide.  However, it is important to remember that in some states, there are injunctions against carrying out Obama’s WOTUS rule.  This means that it cannot be carried out in those states, and that the pre-2015 rule is actually effective in those states.  EPA has a map depicting which version of the rule applies where.  Uncertainty and WOTUS seem to be synonymous these days.  The only thing we know for certain is that the WOTUS saga is not over, meaning things are likely to change again in the future.

Ohio Treasurer pioneers paying taxes with Bitcoin.  Any business operating in Ohio may now pay certain taxes to the state of Ohio using Bitcoin, as recently announced by outgoing Ohio Treasurer Josh Mandel.  The move makes Ohio the first state to accept Bitcoin as a form of tax payment.  The official press release expressed hopes that other cryptocurrencies could be used, but at this time only Bitcoin will be accepted.  Cryptocurrencies are said to be secure because they use blockchain, which is a digital register of transactions and information that is difficult to modify because changes to the register cannot be done by any single user.  The Treasurer’s Office has specified 23 different taxes that can be paid with cryptocurrencies, including: Commercial Activity Taxes (CAT), consumer’s use taxes, Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA) taxes, Pass-Thru Entity (PTE) taxes, sales taxes, and more.  Paying with cryptocurrency is being accepted as an additional form of payment, as businesses can still pay with ACH credit, ACH debit, check, and money order.  However, the state will not keep the cryptocurrency, but instead will use a third party to cash out the Bitcoin and convert it into U.S. dollars before depositing them into the state’s account.  For more information, visit www.OhioCrypto.com or view the Treasurer’s Frequently Asked Questions page here.

Bayer prepares to bear with multiple jury trials over Monsanto’s glyphosate.  Bayer AG continues to battle more and more plaintiffs claiming that their health problems were caused as a direct result of Monsanto’s Roundup and glyphosate.  Another 600 plaintiffs have reportedly sued Bayer/Monsanto in the past two months since we last reported the number of lawsuits initiated with this argument.  Following the multi-billion dollar verdict in California state court late this summer, more jury trials are set to begin.  Over 620 cases have been filed in federal court, and the first case to reach a federal jury is now set for trial in San Francisco in February 2019.  Another California state court case has been fast-tracked to be heard in March 2019 because of the condition and age of the plaintiffs.  Yet another case is expected to be scheduled in Missouri state court for sometime later in 2019.  The cases largely depend upon a plaintiff’s ability to convince a jury that his or her cancer was more likely than not directly caused by glyphosate.  This question because controversial in 2015 when the United Nation’s World Health Organization released a report stating that the widely used herbicide is “probably carcinogenic to humans.”  However, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issued a release in 2017 saying that its own findings demonstrate that glyphosate is unlikely to be carcinogenic in humans.

Is this pumpkin pie made of pumpkin?  Thanksgiving dinner conversations often involve at least one debate for many families.  Prompted by recent coverage in news outlets like the Wall Street Journal, one of the topics this year was whether grandma’s pumpkin pie is made of pumpkin, and whether it should be.  At one end of the debate are those who say that pumpkin pie must be made from pumpkins, while others say that closely related squashes have a better flavor and consistency that make a pie taste the way a “pumpkin pie” should taste.  Central to this debate is the status of firm-shelled, golden-fleshed sweet squash, which currently makes up a large portion of the market for “canned pumpkin.”  The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has a long-standing policy saying that labeling the golden-fleshed, sweet squash as “pumpkin” complies with the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act.  Since 1938, the FDA has “consistently advised canners that we would not initiate regulatory action solely because of their using the designation “pumpkin” or “canned pumpkin” on labels for articles prepared from golden-fleshed, sweet squash, or mixtures of such squash with field pumpkins.”  The FDA explains that allowing current labeling practice does not seem to mislead or deceive consumers.  While the FDA declines to take a stand on the issue, families are free to continue to debate which ingredients make for the best pumpkin pie.

Written by Ellen Essman, Sr. Research Associate

Over the last several months, three nuisance cases have been decided against Smithfield Foods in federal court in North Carolina.  The juries in the cases have found Smithfield’s large farms, with thousands of hogs, and the odor, traffic, and flies that come along with them, to be a nuisance to neighboring landowners.  Smithfield has been ordered to pay hefty damages to the neighbors, and more cases against the company remain to be decided.  Given the outcomes of the cases that have been decided thus far, farmers and landowners in Ohio might be wondering how Ohio law compares to North Carolina law as pertains to agricultural nuisances.

Ohio’s Right-to-Farm law

Many states, including both Ohio and North Carolina, have “right-to-farm” legislation, which in part is meant to protect agriculture from nuisance lawsuits such as those filed against Smithfield.  While nearly every state has a right-to-farm statute, they do differ in language and how they go about protecting agriculture. 

Ohio farmers have right-to-farm protection in two parts of the Revised Code.  ORC Chapter 929 establishes “agricultural districts.”  Generally, in order to place land in an agricultural district, the owner of the land must file an application with the county auditor.  Certain requirements must be met in order for an application to be accepted.  Slightly different rules apply if the land in question is within a municipal corporation or is being annexed by a municipality.  If the application is accepted, the land is placed in an agricultural district for five years.  The owner may submit a renewal application after that time is up.

Being part of an agricultural district in Ohio can help farmers and landowners to defend against civil lawsuits.  ORC 929.04 reads:

In a civil action for nuisances involving agricultural activities, it is a complete defense if:

• The agricultural activities were conducted within an agricultural district;
• Agricultural activities were established within the agricultural district prior to the plaintiff’s activities or interest on which the action is based;
• The plaintiff was not involved in agricultural production; and
• The agricultural activities were not in conflict with federal, state, and local laws and rules relating to the alleged nuisance or were conducted in accordance with generally accepted agriculture practices. 

The ORC’s chapter on nuisances provides additional protection for those “engaged in agriculture-related activities.”  Under ORC 3767.13, people who are practicing agricultural activities “outside a municipal corporation, in accordance with generally accepted agricultural practices, and in such a manner so as not to have a substantial, adverse effect on public health, safety, or welfare” are typically exempt from claims of nuisance due to farm noise, smells, etc.

North Carolina’s Right-to-Farm law

Much like Ohio, North Carolina farm land can be part of an “agricultural district.” North Carolina’s preservation of farmland law is available here.  This program is meant to protect agricultural land—land that is part of an agricultural district is must be used for agriculture for at least 10 years.  However, unlike Ohio’s law, North Carolina does not specifically spell out that land in agricultural districts will be protected from nuisance suits when the landowner follows the rules of the agricultural district.  North Carolina’s law does state that one of the purposes of agricultural districts is to “increase protection from nuisance suits and other negative impacts on properly managed farms,” but unlike Ohio, it does not explicitly state that being part of an agricultural district is a defense to a nuisance lawsuit. 

North Carolina also has a statute which specifically spells out the right-to-farm.  In response to the recent jury decisions, however, North Carolina has changed its right-to-farm law.  The original law read:

1. No agricultural or forestry operation or any of its appurtenances shall be or become a nuisance, private or public, by any changed conditions in or about the locality outside of the operation after the operation has been in operation for more than one year, when such an operation was not a nuisance at the time the operation began.

(a1) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply when the plaintiff demonstrates that the agricultural or forestry operation has undergone a fundamental change.  A fundamental change does not include any of the following:

1. A change in ownership or size.
2. An interruption of farming for a period of no more than three years.
3. Participation in a government-sponsored agricultural program.
4. Employment of new technology.
5. A change in the type of agricultural or forestry product produced.

The original law did not protect agricultural operations if their actions were negligent or improper.  The original law is available here.

Following the first decision against Smithfield, the North Carolina legislature overrode the Governor’s veto to implement amendments to the state’s right-to-farm law.  In the amendments, available here (sections 106-701 and 106-702), the legislature substantially changed the language of the law, making what constitutes a nuisance much more explicit and dependent on certain factors.  What is more, the new version of the law places limits on when plaintiffs can recover punitive damages for a private nuisance action.  

A comparison of the Ohio and North Carolina’s sections of legislation promoting the “right-to-farm” shows how different the two states are.  Ohio’s legislative language makes it obvious that the meaning of the law is to protect agriculture from nuisance suits—by specifically stating that being in an agricultural district is a complete defense to nuisance, and that otherwise, agriculture is generally exempt from nuisance suits.  North Carolina’s law concerning agricultural districts does not specifically state that being in such a district is a defense to nuisance, instead, it simply expresses the hope that districts will “increase protection from nuisance suits.”  Furthermore, while North Carolina’s original right-to-farm law stated that agricultural operations do not “become a nuisance” due to changed conditions in the community, that language is not very specific.  Ohio’s agricultural district language lays out exactly what must be done to have a complete defense against a nuisance lawsuit; North Carolina’s language in multiple parts of the General Statutes does not have the same degree of specificity.

Permit as a defense to nuisance

In addition to the right-to-farm law, under ORC 903.13, those owning, operating, or responsible for concentrated animal feeding facilities in Ohio have an affirmative defense to a private civil action for nuisance against them if the CAFO is in compliance with best management practices established in the installation permit or permit to operate and the agricultural activities do not violate federal, state, and local laws governing nuisances.  North Carolina does not appear to have similar language protecting permitted farms in its General Statutes. 

Other factors that may come into play

In the lawsuits against Smithfield farms, the lawyers for the plaintiffs (neighboring landowners) have continuously asserted that Smithfield has “means and ability” to “reduce the nuisance from existing facilities” by ending the use of “lagoon and sprayfield” systems at their farms.  Plaintiffs stress that not only is Smithfield Foods, Inc. a large, wealthy, multinational company, but that they have also changed their lagoon and sprayfield practices outside of North Carolina.  In lagoon and sprayfield systems, all waste is collected in an open-air lagoon and then sprayed on fields as fertilizer.  The practice was first banned for new construction in North Carolina in 1997, and in 2007, the state permanently banned the practice for newly constructed swine facilities.  Although many of the facilities in question were opened before any ban on the construction of lagoon and sprayfield facilities, the plaintiffs contend that changes made in other states mean Smithfield can afford to change in North Carolina.  The ban on new lagoon and sprayfield systems in North Carolina, and evidence that Smithfield has used different practices to reduce the smell from the farms in other states, likely helped the juries in the cases that have been tried to date find that the farms are a nuisance to their neighbors. The above argument is something operators of livestock facilities in Ohio should be aware of.  Although Ohio has not specifically banned lagoon and sprayfield systems like North Carolina has, the ability to change the system could still potentially be used to argue nuisance.  Ohio operators are supposed to follow best management practices and the Natural Resources Conservation Service’s Field Office Technical guide when applying and storing manure, which include ways to reduce odor from manure and other applications, as well as reducing other types of nutrient pollution.  Following such guidelines would likely help operators in any argument against nuisance.