We can count on legal questions about surface water drainage to flow steadily in the Spring, and this year is no exception. Spring rains can cause drainage changes made on one person’s land to show up as harm on another’s land. When that happens, is the person who altered the flow of surface water liable for that harm? Possibly. Here is a reminder of how Ohio law deals with surface water drainage problems and allocates liability for drainage interferences, followed by guidance on how to deal with a drainage dispute.
Ohio law allows landowners to change surface water drainage
Back in 1980, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted a new rule for resolving surface water disputes in the case of McGlashan v. Spade Rockledge. Previous Ohio law treated water as a “common enemy” to be pushed onto others, then absolutely prohibited any land changes that would increase surface water drainage for lower landowners. In McGlashan, the Court replaced these old laws with the “reasonable use rule” that remains the law in Ohio. The rule states that landowners do have a right to interfere with the natural flow of surface waters on their property, even if those changes are to the detriment of other landowners. But the right to alter drainage is limited to only those actions that are “reasonable.”
Drainage changes must be “reasonable”
Although it allows drainage changes, the reasonable use doctrine also states that landowners incur liability when their interference with surface water drainage is “unreasonable.” What does that mean? The law contains factors that help clarify when an interference is unreasonable, a determination made on a case-by-case basis. The factors attempt to balance the need for the land use change that altered drainage against the negative impacts that change has on other landowners. A court will examine four factors to determine whether the drainage change is unreasonable: the utility of the land use, the gravity of the harm, the practicality of avoiding that harm, and unfairness to other landowners. For example, if a land use change has low utility but causes drainage harm to other landowners, or the landowner could take measures to prevent unfair harm to others, a court might deem the landowner’s interference with drainage as “unreasonable.”
What to do if a neighbor’s drainage is causing harm?
The unfortunate reality of the reasonable use doctrine is that it requires litigation, forcing the harmed party to file an action claiming that the neighbor has acted unreasonably. Before jumping into litigation, other actions might resolve the problem. An important first step is to understand the physical nature of the problem. Can the cause of the increased flow be remedied with physical changes? Is there a simple change that could reduce the interference, or is there need for a larger-scale drainage solution? Identifying the source of the harm and the magnitude of the drainage need can lead to solutions. Involving the local soil and water conservation district or a drainage engineer might be necessary.
Based on the significance of the solutions necessary to eliminate the problem, several options are available:
- If identified changes would remedy the problem, a talk with a drainage expert or a letter from an attorney explaining the reasonable use doctrine and demanding the changes could encourage the offending landowner to resolve the problem. If the landowner still refuses to remedy the problem, litigation is the last resort. The threat of litigation often spurs people into action.
- Sometimes the issue is one that requires collaboration by multiple landowners. Identifying a solution and sharing its costs among landowners, based on acreage draining into the area, can be a way to solve the problem.
- For more substantial drainage problems, a petition for a drainage improvement with the soil and water conservation district or the county engineer might be necessary. Petitioned drainage improvements involve all landowners in the affected area and are financed through assessments on land within that area. A visit with those agencies would determine whether a petition improvement is necessary and if so, how to proceed with the petition.
- For smaller fixes, a landowner always has the option of filing a claim for damages through the small claims court. The estimated damages or repairs must fall below the $6,000 limit for small claims. A landowner can make the claim without the assistance of an attorney, and the dispute could be resolved more quickly through this forum.
As the Spring rains continue, keep in mind that the reasonable use doctrine sets a guideline for Ohio landowners: make only reasonable changes to your surface water drainage and don’t cause an unreasonable drainage problem for your neighbors. Where changes and interferences are unreasonable and landowners are unwilling to resolve them, the reasonable use doctrine is the last resort that provides the legal remedy for resolving the problem.
For more information on Ohio drainage law, refer to our law bulletin on Surface Water Drainage Rights.
An appeals court ruling now stands in the way of a bikeway project begun more than 27 years ago by the Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District (MetroParks) in Mahoning County. The Seventh District Court of Appeals recently ruled that MetroParks did not have the power of eminent domain when it attempted to acquire undeveloped stretches of the bikeway. Several landowners have challenged MetroPark’s use of eminent domain for the project over the years, but this is the first case to yield a positive outcome for landowners who have not wanted the bikeway on their properties. We take a closer look at the decision in today’s post.
The court case began in 2019, when MetroParks offered landowner Diane Less $13,650 for a permanent easement for construction of the bikeway across her land. When the landowner did not agree to the conveyance, MetroParks filed an eminent domain proceeding in the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas. The landowner responded that MetroParks did not have authority to use eminent domain for the bikeway project and attempted to have the case dismissed through a summary judgment motion. The trial court found that MetroParks was authorized to appropriate the property for the bikeway and denied the motion, and the landowner appealed.
The appellate court began its review of the case by pointing out that whenever Ohio’s legislature grants the power of eminent domain to a subdivision of the state, that grant must be “strictly construed” and any doubts about the right must be resolved in favor of the property owner. An entity like a park district has eminent domain authority (also referred to as appropriation or takings) only when the Ohio legislature grants the power in statutory law. MetroParks relied on Ohio Revised Code 1545.11 as the grant of power to acquire the bikeway land by eminent domain. That statute states:
The board of park commissioners may acquire lands either within or without the park district for conversion into forest reserves and for the conservation of the natural resources of the state, including streams, lakes, submerged lands, and swamplands, and to those ends may create parks, parkways, forest reservations, and other reservations and afforest, develop, improve, protect, and promote the use of the same in such manner as the board deems conducive to the general welfare. Such lands may be acquired by such board, on behalf of said district, (1) by gift or devise, (2) by purchase for cash, by purchase by installment payments with or without a mortgage, by entering into lease-purchase agreements, by lease with or without option to purchase, or, (3) by appropriation.
The appeals court examined MetroParks’ purpose for acquiring the land for the bikeway to determine if it met either of the authorized purposes in the statute of “conversion into forest reserves” or “conservation of natural resources.” MetroParks explained that it established its purposes and the necessity of acquiring the bikeway land in two resolutions in 1993 and 2018. The first resolution stated that the “public interest demanded the construction of a bicycle path” and the second stated that the bikeway “will provide local and regional users with a safe, uniformly-designed, multi-use, off-road trail facility dedicated for public transportation and recreational purposes.”
According to the court, however, both resolutions failed to relate the necessity of the bikeway to the purposes in the statute of acquiring land “for conversion into forest reserves and for the conservation of the natural resources of the state.” The court noted other Ohio court decisions that do conclude that a bikeway meets the purpose of acquiring land for the “conservation of natural resources” when it “supplies a human need,” “contributes to the health, welfare, and benefit of the community” and is “essential for the well-being of such community and the proper enjoyment of its property.” But important to the landowner is the court’s statement that it disagrees with these principles, “especially when applied to a rural area where it appears the public need is speculative at best and the harm to the private property owners is great." Reminding us that a statutory grant of eminent domain authority must be strictly construed and interpreted to favor a property owner, the court stated that prior decisions characterizing any project that serves the public and contributes to the health and welfare of the community as “conservation of natural resources” for purposes of R.C. 1545.11 is “a bit of a stretch.”
A second point the court made in questioning whether a bikeway fits within the purposes of park district land acquisition outlined in R.C. 1545.11 is that a law enacted after that statute assigned Ohio’s Department of Natural Resources the duty to plan and develop recreational trails, along with the authority to appropriate land for recreational trails. The statute suggests that the state agency, not park districts, possesses the authority to use eminent domain to establish recreational trails and bikeways.
Despite its disagreement with the assumption that R.C. 1545.11 permits the acquisition of land for bikeways as the “conservation of natural resources,” the court reviewed the MetroParks resolutions to determine if the park’s purpose constituted the “conservation of natural resources.” Not surprisingly, the court concluded that the resolutions were completely devoid of any purposes that met the statute’s requirements. Creating a bikeway through an extensive acreage of family-owned farmland in a rural area does not constitute the purpose of acquiring land for “conservation of natural resources of the state,” the court stated. Nor does providing recreation automatically equate to the conservation of natural resources. The resolutions did not “indicate that the creation of this particular trail or bikeway is designed to promote the general health and welfare of the pubic, which we believe requires more than just a recreational purposes” and failed at “even remotely tying the creation of the bikeway to the conservation of natural resources.”
Lacking a required statutory purpose for acquiring the bikeway land, the court concluded that MetroParks abused its discretion in attempting to appropriate the landowner’s property. The appeals court instructed the Mahoning Court of Common Pleas to grant summary judgment not only in this case, but also for a second bikeway eminent domain case the landowner was a party to with MetroParks.
A question now before MetroParks is whether it will ask the Ohio Supreme Court to review the decision of the Seventh District Court of Appeals. The park district board will meet on May 9 to discuss how it will proceed.
A continuing problem
The case highlights a recurring issue with the use of eminent domain for bike paths, as this is not the only legal issue MetroParks has faced in its mission to build its bikeway. Several other court cases have challenged the park’s eminent domain authority, though unsuccessful, and an amendment to last year’s budget bill included specific language that prohibits the use of eminent domain for recreational trails for five years in a county with a population between 220,000 and 240,00 people. Mahoning County falls within that population range. Recent attempts by Mahoning County legislators to enact laws that prohibit the use of eminent domain for recreational trails or give local governments the right to veto such actions have not made it through the Ohio General Assembly. The divisive issue is clearly one that requires a closer look by our legislators.
One of the core principles of the American legal system is that people are free to enter into contracts and negotiate those terms as they see fit. But sometimes the law prohibits certain rights from being “signed away.” The interplay between state and federal law and the ability to contract freely can be a complex and overlapping web of regulations, laws, precedent, and even morals. Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled on a case that demonstrates the complex relationship between Ohio law and the ability of parties to negotiate certain terms within an oil and gas lease.
The Background. Ascent Resources-Utica, L.L.C. (“Defendant”) acquired leases to the oil and gas rights of farmland located in Jefferson County, Ohio allowing it to physically occupy the land which included the right to explore the land for oil and gas, construct wells, erect telephone lines, powerlines, and pipelines, and to build roads. The leases also had a primary and secondary term language that specified that the leases would terminate after five years unless a well is producing oil or gas or unless Defendant had commenced drilling operations within 90 days of the expiration of the five-year term.
After five years had passed, the owners of the farmland in Jefferson County (“Plaintiffs”) filed a lawsuit for declaratory judgment asking the Jefferson County Court of Common Pleas to find that the oil and gas leases had expired because of Defendant’s failure to produce oil or gas or to commence drilling within 90 days. Defendant counterclaimed that the leases had not expired because it had obtained permits to drill wells on the land and had begun constructing those wells before the expiration of the leases. Defendant also moved to stay the lawsuit, asserting that arbitration was the proper mechanism to determine whether the leases had expired, not a court.
What is Arbitration and is it Legal? Arbitration is a method of resolving disputes, outside of the court system, in which two contracting parties agree to settle a dispute using an independent, impartial third party (the “arbitrator”). Arbitration usually involves presenting evidence and arguments to the arbitrator, who will then decide how the dispute should be settled. Arbitration can be a quicker, less burdensome method of resolving a dispute. Because of this, parties to a contract will often agree to forgo their right to sue in a court of law, and instead, abide by any arbitration decision.
Ohio law also recognizes the rights of parties to agree to use arbitration, rather than a court, to settle a dispute. Ohio Revised Code § 2711.01(A) provides that “[a] provision in any written contract, except as provided in [§ 2711.01(B)], to settle by arbitration . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except upon grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” What this means is that Ohio will enforce arbitration clauses contained within a contract, except in limited circumstances. One of those limited circumstances arises in Ohio Revised Code § 2711.01(B). § 2711.01(B)(1) provides that “[s]ections 2711.01 to 2711.16 . . . do not apply to controversies involving the title to or the possession of real estate . . .” Because land and real estate are so precious, Ohio will not enforce an arbitration clause when the controversy involves the title to or possession of land or other real estate.
To be or not to be? After considering the above provisions of the Ohio Revised Code, the Jefferson County Court of Common Pleas denied Defendant’s request to stay the proceedings pending arbitration. The Common Pleas Court concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims involved the title to or possession of land and therefore was exempt from arbitration under Ohio law. However, the Seventh District Court of Appeals disagreed with the Jefferson County court. The Seventh District reasoned that the controversy was not about title to land or possession of land, rather it was about the termination of a lease, and therefore should be subject to the arbitration provisions within the leases.
The case eventually made its way to the Ohio Supreme Court, which was tasked with answering one single question: is an action seeking to determine that an oil and gas lease has expired by its own terms the type of controversy “involving the title to or the possession of real estate” so that the action is exempt from arbitration under Ohio Revised Code § 2711.01(B)(1)?
The Ohio Supreme Court determined that yes, under Ohio law, an action seeking to determine whether an oil and gas lease has expired by its own terms is not subject to arbitration. The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that an oil and gas lease grants the lessee a property interest in the land and constitutes a title transaction because it affects title to real estate. Additionally, the Ohio Supreme Court found that an oil and gas lease affects the possession of land because a lessee has a vested right to the possession of the land to the extent reasonably necessary to carry out the terms of the lease. Lastly, the Ohio Supreme Court provided that if the conditions of the primary term or secondary term of an oil and gas lease are not met, then the lease terminates, and the property interest created by the oil and gas lease reverts back to the owner/lessor.
In reaching its holding, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiffs’ lawsuit is exactly the type of controversy that involves the title to or the possession of real estate. If Plaintiffs are successful, then it will quiet title to the farmland, remove the leases as encumbrances to the property, and restore the possession of the land to the Plaintiffs. If Plaintiffs are unsuccessful, then title to the land will remain subject to the terms of the leases which affects the transferability of the land. Additionally, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that if Plaintiffs were unsuccessful then Defendant would have the continued right to possess and occupy the land. Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs’ controversy regarding the termination of oil and gas leases is the type of controversy that is exempt from arbitration clauses under § 2711.01(B)(1).
Conclusion. Although Ohio recognizes the ability of parties to freely negotiate and enter into contracts, there are cases when the law will step in to override provisions of a contract. The determination of title to and possession of real property is one of those instances. Such a determination can have drastic and long-lasting effects on the property rights of individuals. Therefore, as evidenced by this Ohio Supreme Court ruling, Ohio courts will not enforce an arbitration provision when the controversy is whether or not oil and gas leases have terminated. To read more of the Ohio Supreme Court’s Opinion visit: https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2022/2022-Ohio-869.pdf.
UPDATE: Governor DeWine signed H.B. 95, the Beginning Farmer bill, on April 18, 2022. The effective date for the new law is July 18, 2022. The Governor signed the Statutory Lease Termination bill, H.B. 397, on April 21, and its effective date is July 19, 2022.
Bills establishing new legal requirements for landowners who want to terminate a verbal or uncertain farm lease and income tax credits for sales of assets to beginning farmers now await Governor DeWine’s response after passing in the Ohio legislature this week. Predictions are that the Governor will sign both measures.
Statutory termination requirements for farm leases – H.B. 397
Ohio joins nine other states in the Midwest with its enactment of a statutory requirement for terminating a crop lease that doesn’t address termination. The legislation sponsored by Rep. Brian Stewart (R-Ashville) and Rep. Darrell Kick (R-Loudonville) aims to address uncertainty in farmland leases, providing protections for tenant operators from late terminations by landowners. It will change how landowners conduct their farmland leasing arrangements, and will hopefull encourage written farmland leases that clearly address how to terminate the leasing arrangement.
The bill states that in either a written or verbal farmland leasing situation where the agreement between the parties does not provide for a termination date or a method for giving notice of termination, a landlord who wants to terminate the lease must do so in writing by September 1. The termination would be effective either upon completion of harvest or December 31, whichever is earlier. Note that the bill applies only to leases that involve planting, growing, and harvesting of crops and does not apply to leases for pasture, timber, buildings, or equipment and does not apply to the tenant in a leasing agreement. A lease that addresses how and when termination of the leasing arrangement may occur would also be unaffected by the new provisions.
The beginning farmer bill – H.B. 95
A long time in the making, H.B. 95 is the result of a bi-partisan effort by Rep. Susan Manchester (R-Waynesfield) and Rep. Mary Lightbody (D-Westerville). It authorizes two types of tax credits for “certified beginning farmer” situations. The bill caps the tax credits at $10 million, and sunsets credits at the end of the sixth calendar year after they become effective.
The first tax credit is a nonrefundable income tax credit for an individual or business that sells or rents CAUV qualifying farmland, livestock, facilities, buildings or machinery to a “certified beginning farmer.” A late amendment in the Senate Ways and Means Committee reduced that credit to 3.99% of the sale price or gross rental income. The bill requires a sale credit to be claimed in the year of the sale but spreads the credit amount for rental and share-rent arrangements over the first three years of the rental agreement. It also allows a carry-forward of excess credit up to 7 years. Note that equipment dealers and businesses that sell agricultural assets for profit are not eligible for the tax credit, and that an individual or business must apply to the Ohio Department of Agriculture for tax credit approval.
The second tax credit is a nonrefundable income tax credit for a “certified beginning farmer” for the cost of attending a financial management program. The program must be certified by the Ohio Department of Agriculture, who must develop standards for program certification in consultation with Ohio State and Central State. The farmer may carry the tax credit forward for up to three succeeding tax years.
Who is a certified beginning farmer? The intent of the bill is to encourage asset transition to beginning farmers, and it establishes eligibility criteria for an individual to become “certified” as a beginning farmer by the Ohio Department of Agriculture. One point of discussion for the bill was whether the beginning farmer credit would be available for family transfers. Note that the eligibility requirements address this issue by requiring that there cannot be a business relationship between the beginning farmer and the owner of the asset.
An individual can become certified as a beginning farmer if he or she:
- Intends to farm or has been farming for less than ten years in Ohio.
- Is not a partner, member, shareholder, or trustee with the owner of the agricultural assets the individual will rent or purchase.
- Has a household net worth under $800,000 in 2021 or as adjusted for inflation in future years.
- Provides the majority of day-to-day labor and management of the farm.
- Has adequate knowledge or farming experience in the type of farming involved.
- Submits projected earnings statements and demonstrates a profit potential.
- Demonstrates that farming will be a significant source of income.
- Participates in a financial management program approved by the Department of Agriculture.
- Meets any other requirements the Ohio Department of Agriculture establishes through rulemaking.
We’ll provide further details about these new laws as they become effective. Information on the statutory termination bill, H.B. 397, is here and information about the beginning farmer bill, H.B. 95, is here. Note that provisions affecting other unrelated areas of law were added to both bills in the approval process.
In farm estate and transition planning, we caution against leaving farmland to multiple heirs as co-owners on the deed to the property. That’s because Ohio law allows any co-owner of property to seek “partition,” a legal action asking the court to either sell the property and divide sale proceeds among the co-owners or, in some cases, to physically divide the property between co-owners. If the goal of a farm family is to keep property in the family, co-ownership and partition rights put that goal at risk. A recent case from the Ohio Court of Appeals illustrates how partition can force the unwilling sale of property from a co-owner of the property.
The recent court case didn’t involve farmland, but concerned a home and four acres of land owned jointly by an unmarried couple, each on the deed to the property as co-owners with rights of survivorship. The couple separated and one remained in the home, but the two could not agree upon how to resolve their interests in the property. That led to a court case in which one co-owner asked the court to declare that the other had no remaining interest in the property. The other co-owner disagreed and filed a partition claim asking the court to sell the property and divide sale proceeds according to each person’s property interest. The trial court determined that each co-owner did have ownership interests in the property and ordered the property to be sold according to the partition law.
The trial court granted each party the right to purchase the property within 14 days before it would be sold, but neither exercised that right. After an appraisal, the court ordered the property sold and also ordered payment of the outstanding mortgage. That left the court with the challenge of determining how to divide the remaining sale proceeds according to each party’s interests in the property. A complicated analysis of payments, credit card debts, a home equity loan, rental value, and improvements to the property resulted in a final determination that granted one co-owner more of the proceeds than the other.
Both parties appealed the division of proceeds to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, unfortunately adding more cost and consternation to resolving the co-ownership problem. The court of appeals noted that Ohio law grants a court the duty and discretion to apply broad “equitable” principles of fairness when determining how to divide property interests among co-owners in a partition proceeding. A review of the trial court’s division of the proceeds led the appeals court to affirm the lower court’s holding as “equitable,” ending the three-and-a-half-year legal battle.
Ohio’s partition statute itself provides a warning of the risk of property co-ownership. It states in R.C. 5307.01 that co-owners of land “may be compelled to make or suffer partition…” While the purpose of partition is to allow a co-owner to obtain the value of their property interests, it can certainly force others to “suffer.” If a co-owner can’t buy out another co-owner, the power of partition can force the loss of farm property. As a result, family land can leave the family and a farming heir can lose land that was part of the farming operation. That’s most likely not the outcome parents or grandparents expected when they left their farmland to heirs as co-owners.
Fortunately, legal strategies can avoid the risk of partition. For example, placing the land in an LLC removes partition rights completely, as the land is no longer in a co-ownership situation—the LLC is the single owner of the land. The heirs could have ownership interests in the LLC instead of in the land, so heirs could still receive benefits from the land. The LLC Operating Agreement could contain rules about if and how land could be sold out of the LLC, and could ensure terms that would allow other LLC members to buy out another member’s ownership interests. An agricultural attorney can devise this and other legal strategies to ensure that partition isn’t a risk to farmland or farm heirs.
It’s time to round up a sampling of legal questions we’ve received the past month or so. The questions effectively illustrate the breadth of “agricultural law,” and we’re happy to help Ohioans understand its many parts. Here’s a look at the inquiries that have come our way,
I’m considering a carbon credit agreement. What should I look for? Several types of carbon credit agreements are now available to Ohio farmers, and they differ from one another so it’s good to review them closely and with the assistance of an attorney and an agronomist. For starters, take time to understand the terminology, make sure you can meet the initial eligibility criteria, review payment and penalty terms, know what types of practices are acceptable, determine “additionality” requirements for creating completing new carbon reductions, know the required length of participation and how long the carbon reductions must remain in place, understand how carbon reductions will be verified and certified, be aware of data ownership rights, and review legal remedy provisions. That’s a lot! Read more about each of these recommendations in our blog post on “Considering Carbon Farming?”
I want to replace an old line fence. Can I remove trees along the fence when I build the new fence? No, unless they are completely on your side of the boundary line. Both you and your neighbor co-own the boundary trees, so you’ll need the neighbor’s permission to remove them. You could be liable to the neighbor for the value of the trees if you remove them without the neighbor’s approval, and Ohio law allows triple that value if you remove them against the neighbor’s wishes or recklessly harm the trees in the process of building the fence. You can, however, trim back the neighbor’s tree branches to the property line as long as you don’t harm the tree. Also, Ohio’s line fence law in ORC 971.08 allows you to access up to 10 feet of the neighbor’s property to build the fence, although you can be liable if you damage the property in doing so.
I want to sell grow annuals and sell the cut flowers. Do I need a nursery license? No. Ohio’s nursery dealer license requirement applies to those who sell or distribute “nursery stock,” which the law defines as any “hardy” tree, shrub, plant, bulb, cutting, graft, or bud, excluding turf grass. A “hardy” plant is one that is capable of surviving winter temperatures. Note that the definition of nursery stock also includes some non-hardy plants sold out of the state. Because annual flowers and cuttings from those flowers don’t fall into the definition of “nursery stock,” a seller need not obtain the nursery dealer license.
Must I collect sales tax on cut flowers that I sell? Yes. In agriculture, we’re accustomed to many items being exempt from Ohio’s sales tax. That’s not the case when selling flowers and plants directly to customers, which is a retail sale that is subject to the sales tax. The seller must obtain a vendor’s license from the Ohio Department of Taxation, then collect and submit the taxes regularly. Read more about vendor’s licenses and sales taxes in our law bulletin at this link.
I’m an absentee landowner who rents my farmland to a tenant operator. Should I have liability insurance on the land? Yes. A general liability policy with a farm insurer should be affordable and worth the liability risk reduction. But a few other steps can further minimize risk. Require your tenant operator to have liability insurance that adequately covers the tenant’s operations, and include indemnification provisions in your farm lease that shift liability to the tenant during the lease period. Also consider requiring your tenant or hiring someone to do routine property inspections, monitor trespass issues, and ensure that the property is in a safe condition.
My neighbor and I both own up to the shoreline on either side of a small lake--do I have the right to use the whole lake? It depends on where the property lines lay and whether the lake is connected to other waters. If the lake is completely surrounded by private property and not connected to other “navigable” waters, such as a stream that feeds into it, the lake is most likely a private water body. Both of you could limit access to your side of the property line as it runs through the lake. You also have the legal right to make a “reasonable use” of the water in the lake from your land, referred to as “riparian rights.” You could withdraw it to water your livestock, for example; but you cannot “unreasonably” interfere with your neighbor’s right to reasonably use the water. The law changes if the lake is part of a “navigable” waterway. It is then a “water of the state” that is subject to the public right of navigation. Others could float on and otherwise navigate the water, and you could navigate over to your neighbor’s side. Public users would not have the riparian rights that would allow them to withdraw and use the water, however, and would be trespassing if they go onto the private land along the shore.
If I start an agritourism activity on my farm, will I lose my CAUV status? No, not if your activities fit within the legal definition of “agritourism.” Ohio law states in ORC 5713.30(A)(5) that “agritourism” activities do not disqualify a parcel from Ohio’s Current Agricultural Use Valuation (CAUV) program. “Agritourism,” according to the definition in ORC 901.80, is any agriculturally related educational, entertainment, historical, cultural, or recreational activity on a “farm” that allows or invites members of the general public to observe, participate in, or enjoy that activity. The definition of a “farm” is the same as the CAUV eligibility—a parcel devoted to commercial agricultural production that is either 10 acres or more or, if under 10 acres, grosses $2500 annually from agricultural production. This means that land that is enrolled in the CAUV program qualifies as a “farm” and can add agritourism activities without becoming ineligible for CAUV.
Send your questions to email@example.com and we’ll do our best to provide an answer. Also be sure to check out our law bulletins and the Ag Law Library on https://farmoffice.osu.edu, which explain many of Ohio’s vast assortment of agricultural laws.
Did you know that the loudest land animal is the howler monkey? The howler monkey can produce sounds that reach 140 decibels. For reference, that is about as loud as a jet engine at take-off, which can rupture your eardrums.
Like the howler monkey, we are here to make some noise about recent agricultural and resource law updates from across the country. This edition of the Ag Law Harvest brings you court cases dealing with zoning ordinances, food labeling issues, and even the criminal prosecution of a dairy farm. We then look at a couple states proposing, or disposing, of legislation related to agriculture.
A zoning ordinance has Michigan landowners hogtied. The Michigan Supreme Court recently ruled that Michigan’s 6-year statute of limitations does not prevent a township from suing a landowner for alleged ongoing zoning violations, even if the start of landowner’s alleged wrongdoing occurred outside the statute of limitations period.
Harvey and Ruth Ann Haney (“Defendants”) own property in a Michigan township that is zoned for commercial use. Defendants began raising hogs on their property in 2006. Defendants started with one hog and allegedly grew their herd to about 20 hogs in 2016. In 2016, Fraser Township (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against Defendants seeking a permanent injunction to enforce its zoning ordinance and to prevent Defendants from raising hogs and other animals that would violate the zoning ordinance on their commercially zoned property. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and argued that Plaintiff’s claims were barred because of Michigan’s 6-year statute of limitations. A statute of limitations is a law that prevents certain lawsuits from being filed against individuals after a certain amount of time has passed. In Ohio, for example, if someone were to be injured in a car accident, they would only have 2 years to bring a personal injury claim against the person who caused the accident. That’s because Ohio has passed a law that mandates most personal injury claims to be brought within 2 years of the date of injury.
In the Michigan case, Defendants argued that because their first alleged wrongdoing occurred in 2006, Plaintiff could not file their lawsuit against the Defendants in 2016. A trial court disagreed with Defendants and denied their motion to dismiss. Defendants took the motion up to the Michigan Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals found that Plaintiff’s claim was barred because of the 6-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which overturned the Court of Appeals’ decision and held that Plaintiff’s claim was not barred. The Michigan Supreme Court reasoned that the presence of the hogs constitutes the alleged unlawful conduct of the Defendants, and that unlawful conduct occurred in 2006 and has occurred almost every day thereafter. The court concluded that because Defendants unlawful conduct was ongoing after 2006, Plaintiff’s claims were not barred by the statute of limitations. The case now goes back to the trial court to be tried on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants.
Where there’s smoke, there’s fire. Family Dollar Stores, Inc. (“Family Dollar”) has found itself in a bit of nutty situation. Plaintiff, Heather Rudy, has filed a class action lawsuit against Family Dollar, alleging that Family Dollar has misled her and other consumers by marketing its Eatz brand Smoked Almonds as “smoked.” Plaintiff asserts that Family Dollar is being deceptive because its Smoked Almonds are not smoked over an open fire, but instead flavored with a natural smoke flavoring. Plaintiff’s claims against Family Dollar include violating the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“ICFA”); breaches of express warranty and implied warranty of merchantability; violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; negligent misrepresentation; fraud; and unjust enrichment.
Family Dollar filed an early motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for which relief can be granted. A federal district court in Illinois dismissed some of Plaintiff’s claims but ruled that some claims against Family Dollar should be allowed to continue. Plaintiff’s claims for breaches of warranty, violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud were all dismissed by the court. The court did decide that Plaintiff’s claims under ICFA unjust enrichment should stay. The court reasoned that Plaintiff’s interpretation that Family Dollar’s almonds would be smoked over an open fire are not unreasonable. Moreover, the court recognized that nothing on the front label of Family Dollar’s Smoked Almonds would suggest, to consumers, that the term “smoked” refers to a flavoring rather than the process by which the almonds are produced. The court even pointed out that competitors’ products contain the word “flavored” on the front of similar “smoked” products. Therefore, the court concluded that Plaintiff’s interpretation of Family Dollar’s Smoked Almonds was not irrational and her claims for violating the ICFA should continue into the discovery phase of litigation, and possibly to trial.
Undercover investigation leads to criminal prosecution of Pennsylvania dairy farm. A Pennsylvania Court of Appeals (“Court of Appeals”) recently decided on Animal Outlook’s (“AO”) appeal from a Pennsylvania trial court’s order dismissing AO’s petition to review the decision of the Franklin County District Attorney’s Office (“DA”) to not prosecute a Pennsylvania dairy farm (the “Dairy Farm”) for animal cruelty and neglect. An undercover agent for AO held employment at the Dairy Farm and captured video of the condition and treatment of animals on the farm, which AO claims constitutes criminal activity under Pennsylvania’s animal cruelty laws.
AO compiled a report containing evidence and expert reports documenting the Dairy Farm’s alleged animal cruelty and neglect. AO submitted its report to the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) in 2019. The PSP conducted its own investigation which lasted for over a year, and in March 2020, issued a press release indicating that the DA would not prosecute the Dairy Farm.
In response, AO drafted private criminal complaints against the Dairy Farm and submitted those to the local Magisterial District Judge. The local Magisterial Judge disapproved all of AO’s complaints and concluded that the complaints “lacked merit.” AO then filed a petition in a Pennsylvania trial court to review the Magisterial Judge’s decision. The trial court dismissed AO’s petition and concluded that the DA correctly determined “that there was not enough evidence, based upon the law, to initiate prosecution against any of the Defendants alleged in the private criminal complaints.” AO appealed the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals which ended up reversing the trial court’s decision.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court failed to view the presented evidence through a lens that is favorable to moving forward with prosecution and the trial court failed to consider all reasonable inferences that could be made on the evidence. The Court of Appeals observed that the trial court made credibility determinations of the evidence by favoring the evidence gathered by PSP over the evidence presented by AO. The Court of Appeals noted that a trial court’s duty is to determine “whether there was evidence proffered to satisfy each element of an offense, not to make credibility determinations and conduct fact-finding.” Additionally, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not do a complete review of all the evidence and favored the evidenced obtained by PSP over the evidence presented by AO. The Court of Appeals determined that had the trial court reviewed all the evidence, it would have found that AO provided sufficient evidence to establish prima facie cases of neglect and animal cruelty, which would have provided the legal basis for the DA’s office to prosecute the claims.
Lastly, the DA argued that no legal basis for prosecution exists because the Dairy Farm is protected by the normal agricultural operations exemption to Pennsylvania’s animal cruelty laws. However, the Court of Appeals found that the conduct of the Dairy Farm, as alleged, would fall outside the normal agricultural operations exemption because AO’s report demonstrates that the Dairy Farm’s practices were not the dairy industry norm.
Ultimately the Court of Appeals found that AO’s private criminal complaints did have merit and that the DA had enough evidence and a legal basis to prosecute AO's claims. The Court of Appeals remanded the trial court’s decision and ordered that the DA to go ahead and prosecute the Dairy Farm on its alleged animal cruelty violations.
Wyoming fails to pass legislation limiting what can be considered agricultural land. The Wyoming House of Representatives struck down a recent piece of legislation looking to increase the threshold requirement to allow landowners the ability to classify their land as agricultural, have their land appraised at an agricultural value, and receive the lower tax rate for agricultural land. Current Wyoming law classifies land as agricultural if: (1) the land is currently being used for an agricultural purpose; (2) the land is not part of a patted subdivision; and (3) the owner of the land derived annual gross revenue of $500 or more from the marketing of agricultural products, or if the land is leased, the lessee derived annual gross revenues of $1,000 or more from the marketing of agricultural products.
Wyoming House Bill 23 sought to increase the threshold amount of gross revenues derived from the marketing of agricultural products to $5,000 for all producers. The Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation and Wyoming Stock Growers associations supported the bill. Proponents of the bill argued that the intent of agricultural land appraisals is to support commercial agriculture, not wealthy landowners taking advantage of Wyoming’s tax laws. Opponents of the bill argued that House Bill 23 hurt small agricultural landowners and that the benefits of the bill did not outweigh the harms. House Bill 23 died with a vote of 34-25, failing to reach the 2/3 approval for bills to advance.
Oregon introduces legislation relating to overtime for agricultural workers. Oregon House Bill 4002 proposes to require agricultural employers to pay all agricultural employees an overtime wage for time worked over 40-hours in a workweek. House Bill 4002 does propose a gradual phase-in of the overtime pay requirements for agricultural employees. For the years 2023 and 2024, agricultural employees would be entitled to overtime pay for any time worked over 55 hours in a workweek. For 2025 and 2026, the overtime pay requirement kicks in after 48 hours. Then in 2027, and beyond, agricultural employers would be required to pay an overtime pay rate to employees that work more than 40 hours in a workweek.
Did you know that ants are the only creatures besides humans that will farm other creatures? It’s true. Just like we raise cows, sheep, pigs, and chickens in order to obtain a food source, ants will do the same with other insects. This is particularly true with aphids. Ants will protect aphids from natural predators and shelter them during heavy rain showers in order to gain a constant supply of honeydew.
Like an ant, we have done some heavy lifting to bring you the latest agricultural and resource law updates. We start with some federal cases that deal with the definition of navigable waters under the Clean Water Act, mislabeling honey products, and indigenous hunting rights. We then finish with some state law developments from across the country that include Georgia’s right to farm law and California’s Proposition 12.
Supreme Court to review navigable waters definition under the Clean Water Act. The Supreme Court announced that it would hear the case of an Idaho couple who have been battling the federal government over plans to build their home. Chantell and Mike Sackett (“Plaintiffs”) began construction on their new home near Priest Lake, Idaho but were halted by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). The EPA issued an administrative compliance order alleging that Plaintiffs’ construction violates the Clean Water Act. The EPA claims that the lot, on which the Plaintiffs are constructing their new home, contains wetlands that qualify as federally regulated “navigable waters.” Plaintiffs are asking the Court to revisit its 2006 opinion in Rapanos v. United States and help clarify how to determine when a wetland should be classified as “navigable waters.” In Rapanos, the Court found that the Clean Water Act regulates only certain wetlands, those that are determined to be “navigable waters.” However, two different tests were laid out in the Court’s opinions. The Court issued a plurality opinion which stated that the government can only regulate wetlands that have a continuous surface water connection to other regulated waters. A concurring opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, put forth a more relaxed test that allows for regulation of wetlands that bear a “significant nexus” with traditional navigable waters. Justice Kennedy’s test did not take into consideration whether there was any surface water connection between the wetland and the traditional navigable waters. In the lower appellate court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test to uphold the EPA’s authority to halt Plaintiffs’ construction. Now, Plaintiffs hope the Supreme Court will adopt a clear rule that brings “fairness, consistency, and a respect for private property rights to the Clean Water Act’s administration.”
SueBee sued for “bee”ing deceptive. Sioux Honey Association Cooperative (“Defendant”) finds itself in a sticky situation after Jason Scholder (“Plaintiff”) brought a class action lawsuit against the honey maker for violating New York’s consumer protection laws by misrepresenting the company’s honey products marketed under the SueBee brand. Plaintiff claims that the words “Pure” or “100% Pure” on the Defendant’s honey products are misleading and deceptive because the honey contains glyphosate. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the class action lawsuit and a federal district court in New York granted Defendant’s motion in part and denied it in part. Defendant asked the court to find that its labels could not be misleading as a matter of law because any trace amounts of glyphosate in the honey is a result of the natural behavior of bees interacting with agriculture and not a result of Defendant’s production process. However, the court declined to dismiss Plaintiff’s mislabeling claims. The court concluded that a reasonable consumer might not actually understand that the terms “Pure” or “100% Pure” means that trace amounts of glyphosate could end up in honey from the bees’ foraging process. The court also declined the Defendant’s request to dismiss Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim because of the alleged misrepresentations of the honey. However, the court did dismiss Plaintiff’s breach of express warranty claim and request for injunctive relief. The court dismissed Plaintiff’s breach of express warranty claim because Plaintiff failed to notify Defendant of its alleged breach of warranty, as required by New York law. Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief was also dismissed because the court could not find any imminent threat of continued injury to Plaintiff since he has now learned that the honey contains trace amounts of glyphosate. The court ordered the parties to proceed with discovery on Plaintiff’s remaining claims, keeping the case abuzz.
Indigenous Hunting Rights. Recently, two members of the Northwestern Band of the Shoshone Nation (“Northwestern Band”) were cited for hunting on Idaho lands without tags issued by the state. The Northwestern Band filed suit against the state of Idaho declaring that its members possessed hunting rights pursuant to the Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868 (the “1868 Treaty”). The 1868 Treaty provided that the Shoshone Nation agreed to permanently settle on either Fort Hall Reservation, located in Southeastern Idaho, or Wind River Reservation, located in Western Wyoming. By agreeing to settle on one of the two reservations, the Shoshone Nation was granted hunting rights on unoccupied lands of the United states. However, the Northwestern Band ended up settling in Northern Utah and not on one of the two named reservations. After considering the 1868 Treaty, the Federal District Court of Idaho dismissed Northwestern Band’s lawsuit. The court held that the hunting rights contained in the 1868 Treaty were tied to the promise to live on one of the reservations, and that a tribe cannot receive those hunting rights without living on one of the appropriate reservations. Thus, the court found that because the Northwestern Band settled in Northern Utah and not on one of the reservations, the hunting rights of the 1868 Treaty did not extend to the Northwestern Band of the Shoshone Nation.
Tensions rise over Georgia’s Freedom to Farm Act. A few days ago, Georgia lawmakers introduced legislation that seeks to further protect Georgia farmers from nusiance lawsuits. House Bill 1150 (“HB 1150”) proposes to change current Georgia law to protect farmers and other agricultural operations from being sued for emitting smells, noises, and other activities that may be found offensive by neighboring landowners. Georgia’s current law, which became effective in 1980, does provide some protection for Georgia farmers, but only from neighboring landowners that have moved near the farm or agricultural operation after the current law went into effect. All neighboring landowners that lived near the farming operation prior to the current law going into effect have retained their right to sue. HB 1150, on the other hand, will prevent these nuisance lawsuits by all neighboring landowners, as long as the farm or agricultural operation have been operating for a year or more. Passing a right to farm law has proven to be difficult in Georgia. In 2020, House Bill 545, also known as the “Right to Farm bill” failed to pass before the final day of the 2019-2020 legislative session. Private landowners, farmers, and their supporters, are divided on the issue and seek to protect their respective property rights. It doesn't look like HB 1150 will have the easiest of times in the Georgia legislature.
Confining California's Proposition 12. Meat processors and businesses that sell whole pork meat in California (collectively the “Petitioners”) have delayed the enforcement of California’s Proposition 12 (“Prop 12”), for now. Prop 12 is California’s animal confinement law that has sent shockwaves across the nation as it pertains to raising and selling pork, eggs, and veal. Last week, the Superior Court for Sacramento County granted Petitioners’ writ of mandate to delay the enforcement of Prop 12 on sales of whole pork meat. Petitioners argue that Prop 12 cannot be enforced until California has implemented its final regulations on Prop 12. To date, California has yet to implement those final regulations. California, on the other hand, suggests that final regulations are not a precondition to enforcement of Prop 12 and the civil and criminal penalties that can be brought against any farmer or business that violates Prop 12. The court disagreed. The court found that the language of Prop 12, as voted on by California residents, explicitly states that California voters wanted regulations in place before the square-footage requirements of Prop 12 took effect. Therefore, the court granted Petitioners’ writ of mandate to prevent the enforcement of Prop 12 until final regulations have been implemented. The court’s writ will remain in effect until 180 days after final regulations go into effect. This will allow producers and businesses to prepare themselves to comply with the final regulations. Opponents of Prop 12 believe this is another reason why the Supreme Court of the United States should review California’s Proposition 12 for its constitutionality.
Did you know there is a bird with talons larger than grizzly bear claws? The Harpy Eagle’s back talons can reach lengths of 5 inches, which is larger than a grizzly bear’s claws which reach lengths of around 4 inches. Thankfully, the Harpy Eagle is not usually found in the United States, they are traditionally found in the rainforests of Central and South America.
The variety and extent of the animal kingdom can be a good analogy when we talk about the scope and variability of agricultural and resource law. “Ag law” isn’t in and of itself a core area of law, at least not an area of law taught in most law schools across the country. Those core areas of law are traditionally contracts, constitutional, tort, property, and a few others. But ag law includes most, if not all, of the core legal subjects. This includes property law, tax law, tort law, international law, intellectual property law, environmental law, contracts, business, labor and employment, and others. This week’s edition of the Ag Law Harvest shows you how diverse ag law really is. We review some legislation moving in parts of the country that deal with tax law, property law, and administrative law. We also review Federal regulations and court cases that address food law, trademark law, and antitrust law.
Florida introduces legislation to protect farmers’ preferential tax benefits amid agritourism boom. Florida’s legislature is hard at work to ensure the success of Florida’s agriculture and agritourism industries. Recently, Florida’s legislature introduced Senate Bill 1186 and House Bill 717. The purpose of both bills is to promote Florida’s agritourism industry and protect farmers when it comes to land classification, taxation, and regulation. Both pieces of legislation look to:
- Eliminate duplicate regulatory authority over agritourism by preventing local government from enacting regulations that prohibit, restrict, or otherwise limit an agritourism activity from taking place on land classified as agricultural land.
- Prevent land from being classified “non-agricultural” simply because an agritourism activity takes places on the land, so long as the agritourism activity is taking place on a bona fide farm.
- Implement a hybrid property taxation scheme which allows the buildings and other structures used for agritourism activities to be assessed at just value and added to the agriculturally assessed value of the land.
Both bills are currently making their way through their respective chamber’s committees and should be voted on soon.
Michigan looking to pass legislation to reduce fines for family farmers that do not report accidental workplace deaths to the state. The Michigan Senate recently passed a substitute for House Bill 4031, which is focused on reducing the fine incurred by family farms for not reporting the death of a family member within eight hours. Under current Michigan law, a family farm must report any fatality to the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Administration within eight hours or face a fine of at least $5,000, which is exactly what happened to the Eisenmann family in 2019. The Eisenmann family ran a family farm and was fined $12,000 after Keith Eisenmann fell to his death while repairing a barn roof. The bill seeks to reduce the fine for families that are grieving the unexpected loss of a loved one. Although a family farm will still be required to report the accidental work-related death of a loved one within eight hours, if a family fails to do so, the substitute bill drastically reduces the penalty. The original bill passed Michigan’s House of Representatives late last year, but the substitute bill passed by the Michigan Senate clarifies the definition of family farm. The substitute bill now goes back to the House of Representatives for approval.
Bioengineered food standard now in effect. January 1st marked the first day of compliance for the Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard (the “Standard”). The Standard requires food manufacturers, importers, and certain retailers to disclose to consumers that foods are or may be bioengineered. The Standard defines bioengineered foods as “those that contain detectable genetic material that has been modified through certain lab techniques and cannot be created through conventional breeding or found in nature.” The Agricultural Marketing Service has created a list of bioengineered foods to identify the crops or foods that are available in a bioengineered form. For more information on the Bioengineered Food Disclosure Statement visit https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/be.
A bite into the cheesier side of trademark law. Last month, a federal court in Virginia decided on a dispute between European and American cheesemakers. The dispute arose over whether the term “Gruyere” should only be used to identify cheeses produced in the Gruyère region of France and Switzerland or whether the term can be used generically to describe a type of cheese, regardless of where the cheese is produced. The Plaintiffs, two European business groups, filed an application with the United States Patent Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to register “Gruyere” as a certification mark under 15 U.S.C. § 1127 which would only allow cheesemakers to use the term “Gruyere” if the cheese came from the Gruyère region. The U.S. Dairy Export Council and others (“Defendants”) filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ application with the Trademark Trials and Appeals Board (“TTAB”). The TTAB found the term “Gruyere” to be generic term used to describe a type of cheese, not a cheese’s origin. Plaintiffs’ then filed suit in a federal court in Virginia. The federal court held that the “Gruyere” term had become a generic term to describe a type of cheese and failed to find the term worthy of trademark protection. The court reasoned that although the term “Gruyere” may have once been understood to indicate where a cheese came from, over time “Gruyere” became a generic term to describe a type of cheese. The court noted the term “Gruyere” has become generic overtime because: (1) U.S. regulations allow the use of the term “Gruyere” regardless of where the cheese is produced, (2) there is widespread sale and import of Gruyere cheese that is produced outside the Gruyère region, and (3) “Gruyere” is commonly used in dictionaries, media communications, and cheese industry events to describe a type of cheese without regards to where the cheese is produced. Plaintiffs have since appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which means we still have a gooey situation on our hands.
USDA and Department of Justice announce commitment to protect farmers against unfair anticompetitive practices. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) each announced their shared commitment to enforcing federal competition laws that are aimed at protecting farmers, ranchers, and other agricultural producers from unfair, anticompetitive practices. In continuing their commitment to enforcing such laws, the agencies released a statement of principles and commitments which include:
- Farmers, ranchers, and other producers and growers deserve the benefits of free and fair competition. The DOJ and USDA are therefore prioritizing matters impacting competition in agriculture.
- The agencies will develop an accessible, confidential process for agricultural producers to submit complaints about potential violations of the antitrust laws and the Packers and Stockyards Act.
- Increased cooperation between the agencies to enforce the laws that protect agricultural producers and to identify areas where Congress can help modernize rules and regulations.
As we have seen over the past few months, the federal government is keen on preventing the consolidation of the agricultural industry in order promote fair and equal competition. The announced commitments and principles demonstrate the government’s continued dedication to cracking down on unfair practices.
Did you know that a group of ferrets is called a business? Ironically, we are in the business of ferreting out agricultural and resource law issues and providing you updates. This edition of the Ag Law Harvest provides an update on recent court decisions from across the country that deal with the right to farm, food labeling, and conditional use permits for solar gardens.
Right to Farm Act upheld in North Carolina. Earlier this month, a three-judge panel on the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of North Carolina’s right to farm law. In 1979, the North Carolina legislature enacted the Right to Farm Act (the “Act”). In 2017 and 2018 the North Carolina legislature amended the Act by passing House Bill 467 and Senate Bill 711 (collectively referred to as “the Amendments”). The Amendments sought to clarify and strengthen North Carolina’s right to farm law. The Plaintiffs argued that the Amendments violated North Carolina’s equivalent of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and that the Act exceeded the scope of North Carolina’s police power. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The Court recognized North Carolina’s interest in promoting and preserving agriculture and that North Carolina has the authority to regulate such an interest. The Court found that the Act’s limitation on potential nuisance claims against those engaged in agriculture, forestry, and other related operations helps to protect North Carolina’s interest, and encourages North Carolina’s goal to encourage the availability and continued “production of food, fiber, and other products.” The Plaintiffs also argued that the Amendments were “private laws” to specifically protect the swine industry in violation of North Carolina’s Constitution. The Court found, however, that the Act and the Amendments are laws of general applicability that apply to all agricultural and forestry operations, not just swine producers. Lastly, the Plaintiffs argued that because the language in House Bill 467 limited the amount of compensation that can be recovered in a nuisance action against agricultural and forestry operations, the Plaintiffs’ right to a trial by jury had been impaired and/or abolished. The Court ruled, however, that North Carolina has the authority to “define the circumstances under which a remedy is legally cognizable and those under which it is not.” The Court found that there are many examples where compensation and remedies are limited within North Carolina law and that House Bill 467 did not “impair nor abolish the right to a jury trial.”
Where is the cacao? A California man (“Plaintiff”) is suing Costco Wholesale Corporation (“Costco”) for allegedly mislabeling Costco’s “Chocolate Almond Dipped Vanilla Ice Cream Bars” (the “Product”). Plaintiff argues that because of the Product’s packaging and name, he expected the Product’s chocolate would have been predominately derived from cacao beans. Plaintiff asserts that chocolate is defined by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and California law “as prepared from ground roasted cacao bean” and that it must be “made chiefly from cacao beans with a small amount of optional ingredients.” Based on this definition, Plaintiff claims that Costco’s packaging is misleading because the Product’s chocolate contains mostly vegetable oils and small amounts of ingredients derived from cacao beans. In his Complaint, Plaintiff argues that federal regulations require Costco to label the Product as “milk chocolate and vegetable oil coating” rather than just “chocolate.” However, the court found that neither of Plaintiff’s cited regulations support a viable theory of liability against Costco. First, the court could not find Plaintiff’s definition of chocolate anywhere in the Code of Federal Regulations. Secondly, the court held that there are no federal regulations that require a certain amount of cacao bean ingredients as opposed to vegetable oils to be used in “chocolate” and that there is no language mandating the labeling of Costco’s Product as “milk chocolate and vegetable oil coating almond dipped ice cream bars.” The court also dismissed Plaintiff’s claim that Costco engaged in consumer deception with its Product’s label. The court found that a reasonable consumer would not have been deceived by the Product’s label and that if there were any questions about the ingredients of the Product, a consumer could have resolved those questions by looking for the ingredients list on the back of the Product’s packaging.
Conditional use permits at the center of the Minnesota’s “solar system.” Move over Sun because conditional use permits are at the center of attention in Minnesota, for now. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has recently ruled against a county’s decision to deny two conditional use permits to build solar gardens in McLeod County, Minnesota. Two subsidiary companies of Nokomis Energy LLC (“Plaintiff”) each applied for a conditional use permit (“CUP”) to build separate, one-megawatt solar energy facilities. McLeod County considered the two CUP applications at public hearings. Two neighboring landowners expressed concerns about stray voltage and the number of fetal deaths among their livestock. The landowners claimed that the number of fetal deaths increased after other solar facilities were constructed nearby. Plaintiff did not deny that solar gardens can produce stray voltage but proposed to alleviate those concerns by hiring only licensed professionals and to allow third-party oversight during construction. Plaintiff also offered to conduct stray voltage testing before and after construction and indicated that it would accept any conditions set forth by county officials. The county, however, denied both applications on the basis that the proposed sites are “prime farmland” and because the stray voltage would negatively affect livestock. The court rejected the county’s assessment. First, the court held that preserving prime farmland is not a sufficient legal basis for denying a CUP. Second, the court ruled that the county cannot deny a CUP without first considering whether any proposed conditions would eliminate any concerns about the application. Here, the court found that McLeod County’s failure to address Plaintiff’s proposals to eliminate the stray voltage concerns amounts to an unjust denial of Plaintiff’s CUPs.
Thanks for reading and Happy New Year!