Environmental

Did you know that the Nile Crocodile has the strongest bite of any animal in the world?  The deadly jaws can apply 5,000 pounds of pressure per square inch, which is about 10 times more powerful than the crunch of the Great White Shark. Humans?  Well, they can apply about 100 pounds of pressure per square inch.  

This edition of the Ag Law Harvest takes a bite out of some federal lawsuits, Department of Labor developments, and USDA announcements affecting agriculture and the environment. 

Animal advocates lack standing to sue poultry producer.  In 2020, animal advocacy groups In Defense of Animals (“IDA”) and Friends of the Earth (“FoE”) (collectively the “Plaintiffs”) filed a lawsuit against Sanderson Farms (“Sanderson”), a Mississippi poultry producer, alleging that Sanderson engaged in false advertising as it relates to its chicken products.  According to Plaintiffs, Sanderson advertises that its chickens are “100% natural” with no “hidden ingredients.”  However, Plaintiffs allege that Sanderson has been misleading the public after many of Sanderson’s products tested positive for antibiotics and other unnatural substances.  This however is not the first court battle between FoE and Sanderson.  In 2017, FoE sued Sanderson for the same false advertising.  However, the 2017 case was dismissed because the court held that FoE did not have standing to bring the lawsuit.  The 2017 case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals where the decision to dismiss the lawsuit was upheld.  Fast forward to 2020, FoE joined forces with a new plaintiff, IDA, hoping to file a lawsuit that would finally stick.  Recently however, a federal district court in California dismissed the most recent lawsuit because FoE was precluded, or prohibited, from suing Sanderson again on the same claims and because IDA lacked the standing to bring the lawsuit.  The California district court found that FoE could not bring its claims against Sanderson because those same claims were litigated in the 2017 lawsuit.  This legal theory, known as issue preclusion, prevents the same plaintiff from a previous lawsuit from bringing the same claims against the same defendant in a new lawsuit, when those claims were resolved or disposed of in a prior lawsuit.  Issue preclusion did not affect IDA, however, because it was a new plaintiff.  But the California district court still found that IDA lacked standing to bring this lawsuit against Sanderson.  IDA argued that because it expended resources to launch a campaign against Sanderson to combat the allegedly false advertising, it had organizational standing to bring the lawsuit.  Standing requires a plaintiff to show they suffered an “injury-in-fact” before they can maintain a lawsuit.  Organizational standing is the theory that allows an organization like IDA to establish an “injury-in-fact” if it can demonstrate that: (1) defendant frustrated its organizational mission; and (2) it diverted resources to combat the defendant’s conduct.  IDA argued that because it diverted resources including writing letters to Sanderson and the Federal Trade Commission, filing a complaint with the Better Business Bureau, publishing articles and social media posts, and diverting staff time from other campaigns to focus on countering Sanderson’s advertising, it had the organizational standing to bring the lawsuit.  The Court disagreed.  The Court reasoned that the diverting of resources by IDA was totally voluntary and not a result of Sanderson’s advertising.  The Court determined that in order to obtain organizational standing, IDA must have been forced to take the actions it did as a result of Sanderson’s advertising, the diverting of resources cannot be self-inflicted.  The Court held that Sanderson’s advertising did not ultimately frustrate IDA’s organizational mission and that any diverting of resources to counter Sanderson’s advertising was the normal course of action taken by a group like IDA.  

Joshua trees, a threatened species?  WildEarth Guardians (“Plaintiff”), a conservation organization, brought suit against the U.S. Secretary of the Interior and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“Defendants”) for failing to list the Joshua tree as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).  Plaintiff argued that the Defendants’ decision not to list the Joshua tree as threatened was arbitrary, capricious, contrary to the best scientific and commercial data available, and otherwise not in line with the standards set forth by the ESA.  In 2015 Plaintiff filed a petition to have the Joshua tree listed as a threatened species after Plaintiff provided scientific studies showing that climate change posed a serious threat to the continued existence of the Joshua tree.  The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) issued a 90-day finding that Plaintiff’s petition presented credible information indicating that listing the Joshua tree as threatened may be warranted.  However, the FWS’s 12-month finding determined that listing the Joshua tree as threatened or endangered under the ESA was not necessary due to the Joshua tree’s long lifespan, wide range, and ability to occupy multiple various ecological settings.  That’s when Plaintiff decided to bring this lawsuit asking the federal district court in California to set aside the 12-month finding and order the Defendants to prepare a new finding, and the Court agreed.  The Court held that Defendants’ decision was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the ESA and ordered the Defendants to reconsider Plaintiff’s petition.  The Court reasoned that the FWS’s climate change conclusions were arbitrary and capricious because it failed to consider Plaintiff’s scientific data and failed to explain why in its 12-month finding.  Further, the Court noted that the FWS’s findings regarding threats to the Joshua tree posed by climate change and wildfire were unsupported, speculative, or irrational.  And finally, the Court determined that the FWS’s conclusion that Joshua trees are not threatened in a significant portion of their range was arbitrary and capricious.  The FWS must now prepare a new finding that addresses all the above deficiencies.  

Department of Labor announces expanded measures to protect workers from extreme heat.  The U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) announced that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) is working on ways to protect workers in hot environments and reduce the dangers associated with exposure to high heat.  According to the DOL, OSHA will be implementing an enforcement initiative on heat-related hazards,  developing a National Emphasis Program on heat inspections, and launching a rulemaking process to develop a workplace heat standard.  Current and future extreme heat initiatives and rules apply to indoor and outdoor worksites in general industry, construction, agriculture and maritime where potential heat-related hazards exist. 

Deadline to apply for pandemic assistance to livestock producers extended.  The USDA announced that it is providing additional time for livestock and poultry producers to apply for the Pandemic Livestock Indemnity Program (“PLIP”).  Producers who suffered losses during the Covid-19 pandemic due to insufficient access to processing may now apply for relief for those losses through October 12, 2021.  Payments are based on 80% of the fair market value of the livestock and poultry and for the cost of depopulation and disposal of the animals.  Eligible livestock include swine, chickens, and turkeys.  For more information on PLIP, and how to apply, visit farmers.gov/plip.

Did you know there is a sea creature capable of producing bubbles that are louder than a gun and hotter than lava?  Pistol shrimp, also known as snapping shrimp, are the super-powered creatures under the sea that no one talks about.  These bite-sized crustaceans have a special claw that allows them to form the deadly bubble to shoot at unsuspecting victims or enemies.  The sound of the pop of the bubble has been measured at 218 decibels, which is louder than a speeding bullet, and the heat generated by the bubble has been measured to reach almost 8,000 degrees Fahrenheit, making the bubble four-times hotter than lava.  Like the pistol shrimp, we have brought you the heat in this edition of the Ag Law Harvest.  

This Ag Law Harvest brings you agricultural and resource issues from across the country that have created their own noise, including animal liability laws, the reversal of relaxed environmental regulations, and requiring federal agencies to consider the impact of future agency activities on the environment. 

Farmers and ranchers begin to enjoy new protections under Texas animal liability laws. Texas House Bill 365, which expands protections under Texas’ Farm Animal Liability Act (“FALA”), went into effect on September 1, 2021.  House Bill 365 was passed in response to a 2020 Texas Supreme Court ruling which found that farmers and ranchers were not protected under FALA and could be liable for injuries that occur on working farms and ranches.  The new law prevents an injured individual from holding a farmer or rancher liable for their injuries, so long as the injuries are a result of the inherent risks of being involved in routine/customary activities on a farm or ranch.   

Federal Court revokes Trump Navigable Waters Protection Rule. The U.S. District Court in Arizona recently ruled that the Trump Administration’s Navigable Waters Protection Rule (“NWPR”) must be vacated because the rule contains serious errors and the Trump Administration’s rule could do more harm than good to the nation’s waters if left alone.  Opponents of the NWPR argued that rule disregards established science and the advice of the EPA’s own experts in order to redefine the phrase “waters of the United States.”  Specifically, opponents to the Trump Administration’s rule voiced their concern that the NWPR failed to take into consideration the effect ephemeral waters would have on traditional navigable waters. And the Court agreed.  The Court found that the NWPR must be vacated because the rule “could result in possible environmental harm.”  The Court also reasoned that because the EPA is likely to alter the definition of “waters of the United States” under the Biden Administration, the NWPR should not remain in place.  Proponents of the NWPR claim that the Court’s ruling creates uncertainty for farmers and ranchers across the country.  

EPA revokes Minnesota attempts to relax feedlot regulations. Earlier this year, Minnesota passed a law that relaxed the requirements to obtain a “Feedlot General Permit.”  The Feedlot General Permit is usually only for Minnesota’s largest feedlots, some 1,200 farms.  The permits are required under federal clean water laws but enforced by the state.  Prior to the law being passed, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency required those farmers that applied manure during the first two weeks of October to implement one of four approved nitrogen management practices.  However, Minnesota lawmakers wanted to relax those regulations by prohibiting regulatory authorities from requiring farmers to take new steps to limit nitrogen runoff during October.  But, the EPA “vetoed” Minnesota’s relaxed regulations, which it can do when a state’s law conflicts with a federal law or regulation.  The EPA sent a letter notifying Minnesota that the relaxed regulations would be inconsistent with the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and would result in an improper modification to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency’s authority to administer the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”), which administers the feedlot permits.  Proponents of the new Minnesota law claimed that the existing permits were not flexible enough and that regulatory authorities focused on an arbitrary calendar date rather than focusing on natural conditions when limiting a farmer’s ability to spread manure.  Opponents to Minnesota’s law argue that the EPA did the right thing by using “common sense improvements to prevent manure runoff.” 

Department of Homeland Security found to have violated environmental regulations for its border-enforcement activity.  The Center for Biological Diversity and U.S. Congressman Raul Grijalva (the “Plaintiffs”) filed suit in federal court claiming that the Department of Homeland Security and its agency, Customs and Border Protection, (the “Defendants”) violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).  Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants failed to update their programmatic environmental analysis for border-enforcement activity since 2001, as required by NEPA, and that Defendants failed to consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) about the impacts of border-enforcement activity on threatened or endangered species, as required by the ESA.  In its opinion, the U.S. District Court of Arizona ruled that the Defendants did violate NEPA but not the ESA.  The Court found that NEPA has two primary goals: (1) require every federal agency to consider the environmental impact of the agency’s actions; and (2) require the federal agency to inform the public that it has considered the environmental impact.  NEPA also requires a federal agency to supplement its environmental impact statement if there is ongoing action being taken by the federal agency.  The Defendants claimed they did not violate NEPA because they conducted and provided site-specific or project-specific environmental assessments.  However, the Court ruled that although the Defendants did conduct project-specific analysis, they are required to supplement their environmental impact statement for the activity/program, as a whole, unless they legally opt out of the supplementation, which Defendants did not do until 2019.  Therefore, the Court found the Defendants did violate NEPA prior to 2019.  The Court also ruled that the ESA does not require federal agencies to consult with the FWS on a broad and continuing basis.  The Court felt that the Defendants had met any requirements under the ESA by meeting with the FWS for any site-specific or project-specific analysis.  Although the Court found that Defendants had violated NEPA, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs had waited too long to bring the lawsuit and that no remedy was available to Plaintiffs for the previous procedural violations of NEPA.  

USDA announces changes to CFAP 2. The USDA’s Farm Service Agency announced changes to the Coronavirus Food Assistance Program 2 (“CFAP 2”).  As a result of the changes, contract poultry, egg, and livestock producers, and producers of “sales-based commodities” – mostly specialty crops – can modify existing or file new applications by October 12, 2021, using either 2018 or 2019 to measure lost revenue in 2020.  The changes were published on August 27, 2021, and can be found here.

Did you know that the “wise old owl” saying is a myth?  Generally speaking, owls are no wiser than other birds of prey.  In fact, other bird species like crows and parrots have shown greater cognitive abilities than the owl.  An owl’s anatomy also helps dispel the myth because most of the space on an owl’s head is occupied by their large eyes, leaving little room for a brain. 

This week’s Ag Law Harvest brings you EPA bans, Ohio case law, USDA announcements, and federal case law which could make your head spin almost as far as an owl’s.  

EPA banning use of chlorpyrifos on food crops.  The EPA announced that it will stop the use of the pesticide chlorpyrifos on all food to better protect producers and consumers.  In its final rule released on Wednesday, the EPA is revoking all “tolerances” for chlorpyrifos.  Additionally, the EPA will issue a Notice of Intent to Cancel under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) to cancel all registered food uses of chlorpyrifos.  Chlorpyrifos is an insecticide used for a variety of agricultural uses, including soybeans, fruit and nut trees, broccoli, cauliflower, and other row crops, in addition to non-food uses.  The EPA’s announcement comes in response to the Ninth Circuit’s order directing the EPA to issue a final rule in response to a petition filed by opponents to the use of chlorpyrifos.  The petition requested that the EPA revoke all chlorpyrifos tolerances because those tolerances were not safe, particularly because of the potential negative effects the insecticide has on children.  For more information about chlorpyrifos and the EPA’s final rule, visit the EPA’s website.

Trusts aren’t to be used as shields.  An Ohio appeals court recently reinforced the concept that under Ohio law, trusts are not be used as a way to shield a person’s assets from creditors.  Recently, a plaintiff filed a lawsuit against a bank alleging breach of contract and conversion, among other things.  Plaintiff, an attorney and real estate developer, claimed that the bank removed money from his personal account and a trust account in violation of Ohio law and the terms of the loan agreement between the parties.  Prior to the lawsuit, plaintiff established a revocable trust for estate planning purposes and to acquire and develop real estate. This dispute arose from a $200,000 loan from the bank to the plaintiff to help establish a restaurant.  A provision of the loan agreement, known as the “Right to Setoff” provision, allowed the bank to “setoff” or effectively garnish all accounts the plaintiff had with the bank.  The setoff provision explicitly prohibited any setoff from any IRA or trust accounts “for which setoff would be prohibited by law.”  Plaintiff made all monthly payments but failed to make the final balloon payment on the loan.  Plaintiff argued that the bank broke the loan contract and violated Ohio law by taking funds from the trust account to pay off the remaining balance of the loan.  The court disagreed.  The court noted that under Ohio law, a settlor’s property in a revocable trust is subject to the claims of the settlor’s creditors.  A settlor is a person who creates or contributes property to a trust.  In this case, plaintiff was the creator, settlor, and sole beneficiary of the revocable trust.  Because of that, the court concluded the bank did not violate Ohio law when using the trust account to setoff the balance of the loan.  Additionally, the court found that the bank did not violate the terms of the loan agreement because a setoff from the trust account was not prohibited by law.  The court noted that Ohio law did not intend to allow a settlor who is also a beneficiary of the trust to use a trust as a “shield” against creditors.  Although trusts can be a useful estate planning tool, there are limits to what a trust can do, as evidenced by this case. 

Renewable fuel supporters file appeal on E15 summer sales. Corn farmers have joined forces with the biofuel industry (“Petitioners”) to ask the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals for a new hearing on a ruling that struck down the EPA’s 2019 decision to allow year-round E15 sales.  Earlier this year, the same D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion that ruled the legislative text in the law supporting the biofuel mandate does not support the Trump administration’s regulatory waiver that allowed E15 to be sold during the summer months. In their petition, Petitioners argue that the D.C. Circuit Court made “significant legal errors.”  Petitioners contend that the court should rehear the case because the intent behind the nation’s biofuel mandate is better served by the sale of E15 through the summer months because it is less volatile, has less evaporative emissions, and is overall better for the environment than other fuel sources.  Petitioners also believe the court’s original decision deprives American drivers the choice of lower carbon emitting options at the gas pump.

Monsanto asks Supreme Court to review Ninth Circuit’s Roundup Decision.  In its petition to the Supreme Court of the United States Monsanto Company (“Monsanto”) asked the Supreme Court to review the $25 million decision rendered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  In that decision, the Ninth Circuit held that the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) did not preempt, or otherwise prevent, the plaintiff from raising California failure-to-warn claims on Roundup products and allowed plaintiff to introduce expert testimony that glyphosate causes cancer in humans.  In trial, the plaintiff argued that Monsanto violated California’s labeling requirements by not including a warning on the Roundup label that glyphosate, which is found in Roundup, causes cancer.  Monsanto argues that FIFRA expressly preempts any state law that imposes a different labeling or packaging requirement.  Under FIFRA, Monsanto argues that the EPA did not require Monsanto to include a cancer warning on its Roundup label.  Therefore, Monsanto maintains, that because California law differed from FIFRA, Monsanto was not required to follow California law when it came to labeling its Roundup product.  Secondly, the Ninth Circuit allowed plaintiff to present expert evidence that glyphosate could cause non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma in the general public and that glyphosate caused the plaintiff’s lymphoma.  Monsanto contends that the lower courts have distorted established precedent by allowing the expert testimony because the testimony is not based on generally accepted scientific principles and the scientific community has consistently found that glyphosate does not cause cancer in humans.    

USDA working to protect nation’s dairy industry.  The USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service (“AMS”) has struck a deal with the European Union (“EU”) to satisfy the EU’s new import requirements on U.S. dairy.  The EU will require new health certificates for U.S. dairy products exported to the EU to verify that the U.S. milk used for products exported to the EU is sourced from establishments regulated under the Grade “A” Pasteurized Milk Ordinance or the USDA AMS Milk for Manufacturing Purposes.  Officials representing the U.S. Dairy Export Council and International Dairy Foods Association claim that the deal will allow U.S. producers to comply with the EU’s mandates while also satisfying the concerns within the American dairy industry.  The deal pushes back the EU’s deadline for new health certificates to January 15, 2022, to allow U.S. producers and exporters enough time to bring their products into compliance.  The USDA also announcedthat it is providing around $350 million to compensate dairy producers who lost revenue because of market disruptions due to the COVID-19 pandemic and a change to the federal pricing formula under the 2018 farm bill.  Additional details are available at the AMS Dairy Program website.

Tale as old as time.  An Ohio appeals court recently decided a dispute between neighbors about a driveway easement.  The driveway in dispute is shared by both neighbors to access their detached garages. Defendants used the driveway to access their garage and then the driveway extends past the Defendants’ garage onto Plaintiff’s property and ends at Plaintiff’s garage.  The dispute arose after Defendants built a parking pad behind their garage and used parts of the driveway they never used before to access the parking pad.  The original easement to the driveway was granted by very broad and general language in a 1918 deed, when the property was divided into two separate parcels.  In 1997, a Perpetual Easement and Maintenance Agreement (“Agreement”) was entered into by the two previous property owners.  The Agreement was much more specific than the 1918 deed and specifically showed how far the easement ran and what portions of the driveway could be used by both parties.  The 1997 Agreement did not allow for Defendants to use the portion of the driveway necessary to access their parking pad.  Plaintiffs argue that the 1997 Agreement controls the extent of the easement, whereas Defendants argue that the broad general language in the 1918 deed grants them authority to use the whole length of the driveway.  The Court found the more specific 1997 Agreement to be controlling and ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs.   The Court reasoned that the 1918 deed creates an ambiguity as to the extent of the easement and there is no way of knowing what the original driveway looked like or how it was used.  The Court concluded that the 1997 Agreement does not contradict or invalidate the 1918 deed, rather the 1997 Agreement puts specific parameters on the existing easement and does not violate any Ohio law.  The Defendants were found liable for trespass onto the Plaintiffs’ property and is expected to pay $27,500 in damages.  The lesson to be learned from all of this?  Make sure your easements are as specific and detailed as possible to ensure that all parties are in compliance with the law.

“Carbon farming” is a term that came and went about a decade ago, but it’s back and gaining traction.  Ohio farmers now have opportunities to engage in the carbon farming market and receive payments for generating “carbon credits” through farming practices that reduce carbon emissions or capture atmospheric carbon.   As with any emerging market, there are many uncertainties about the carbon market that require a cautious approach.  And as we’d expect, there are legal issues that arise with carbon farming.

Some of those legal issues center on carbon agreements--the legal instruments that document the terms of a carbon farming relationship.  Each carbon market program has its own carbon agreement, so the terms of those agreements vary from program to program.  Even so, understanding the basics of this unique legal agreement is a necessity. 

Here’s what we know at this point about carbon agreements and the legal issues they may raise.

New terminology.  Carbon markets and carbon agreements speak a new language, containing many terms we don’t ordinarily use in the agricultural arena.  The terms are not fully standardized, and their meanings may differ from one program to another.  Understanding these new terms and their legal significance to the carbon agreement relationship is important.  Common terms to know are below but check each program to clarify its definitions for these terms.

• Carbon practices.  Farming practices that have the potential to reduce carbon emissions or sequester carbon.
• Carbon sequestration.  The process of capturing and storing atmospheric carbon.
• Carbon credit.  A measurable, quantifiable unit representing a reduction of carbon dioxide emissions that can be transferred from one entity to another.  A credit typically represents one metric ton of “carbon dioxide equivalent, which is a metric that standardizes the global warming potential of all greenhouse gases by converting methane, nitrous oxide and fluorinated gases to the equivalent global warming potential of carbon dioxide.
• Carbon offset.  Using a carbon credit generated by another entity to offset the emissions of an entity that emits carbon elsewhere.
• Carbon inset.  A reduction of carbon within a specific supply chain that emits carbon, accomplished by adopting practices within that supply chain.
• Carbon registry.  An entity that oversees the registration and verification of carbon credits and offsets.
• Verification.  The process of confirming carbon reduction benefits, typically performed by a third-party that reviews the carbon practices and the accounting of carbon credits generated by the practices.
• Additionality.  Carbon reduction that results from carbon practices incentivized by the carbon agreement and that would not have occurred in the absence of the incentive.
• Permanence.  The longevity of a carbon reduction, which may be enhanced by a requirement that carbon practices remain in place over a long period of time and steps are taken to reduce the risk of reversal of the carbon reduction.
• Reversal risk.  Risk that a carbon reduction will be reversed by future actions such as changing tillage or harvesting the trees or vegetation planted to generate the carbon reduction.

Initial eligibility criteria.  Each carbon program has specific requirements for participating in the program.  Two common eligibility criteria are:

• Location.  The program may be open only to farmers in a particular geographic location, such as within a specified watershed, region, or state.
• Acreage.  A minimum acreage requirement often exists, although that can vary from 10 acres to 1,000 or more acres.  Some projects may allow adjacent landowners to aggregate to meet the minimum acreage requirement, but that can raise questions of ineligibility should one landowner leave the program.
• Land control.  If the farmer doesn’t own the land on which carbon practices will occur, an initial requirement may be to offer proof that the farmer will have legal control over the land for the period of the agreement, such as a written lease agreement or certification by the tenant farmer.

Payment.  While the goal of a carbon agreement is often to generate carbon credits to be traded in the carbon market, there are varied ways of paying a farmer for adopting the practices that create those credits.  One is a per-acre payment for the practices adopted, with the payment amount tied to the reduction of carbon resulting from the adopted practices.   Another approach incorporates the carbon market—a guaranteed payment that can increase according to market conditions.  Concerns about market transparency abound here.  Yet another method is to calculate the payment after verification and quantification by a third-party.  For each of these different approaches, the amount could be based upon a model, actual soil sampling, or a combination of the two.  Payments may be annual or every several years.  Another consideration is the form of payment, which could be cash, company credits, or “cryptocurrency”—digital money that can be used for certain purposes.  Also be aware that some carbon agreements prohibit “payment stacking,” or receiving payments for the same carbon practices from multiple private or public sources.

Acceptable carbon practices.   Carbon practices are the foundation for generating carbon credits.  An agreement might outline acceptable carbon practices a farmer must adopt as the basis for the carbon credit, such as NRCS Conservation Practices.  Alternatively, an agreement might allow flexibility in determining which carbon practices to use or could state practices that are not acceptable.  Typical carbon practices include planting cover crops, using no-till or reduced tillage practices, changing fertilizer use, rotating or diversifying crops, planting trees, and retiring land from production. 

Additionality.  Many agreements require “additionality,” which means there must be new or “additional” carbon reductions that occur because of the carbon agreement, which would not have occurred in the absence of the agreement.  On the other hand, some agreements accept past carbon practices up to a certain period of time, such as within the past two years.  This is a tricky term to navigate for farmers who have engaged in acceptable practices in the past.  An agreement may address whether those practices count toward the generation of a carbon credit or for payment purposes.

Time periods.  Two time periods might exist in an agreement.  The first is the required length of time for participation in the program, which may vary from one year to ten or more years.  The second relates to the concept of “permanence,” or long-term carbon reductions.  To ensure permanence and reduce the risk that gains in one year could be lost by changes in the next year, the agreement may require continuation of the carbon practices for a certain time period after the agreement ends, such as five or ten years.

Verification and certification.  Here’s an important question—how do we know whether the carbon practices do generate carbon reductions that translate into actual carbon credits?  Verification and certification help provide an answer.  But verification is a testy topic because there is uncertainty about how to identify and measure carbon reductions resulting from different practices on different soils in different settings.   Predictions that are based upon models are common, but there is disagreement over appropriate and accurate methodology for the models.   Some programs may also verify practices with data acquisition and on-the-ground monitoring activities and soil tests.  And it’s common to require that an independent third party verify and certify the practices and carbon credits, raising additional questions of which verifiers are acceptable.  A final concern:  who pays the costs of verification and certification?

Data rights and ownership.  The verification question naturally leads us to a host of data questions.  Data is critical to understanding and verifying carbon practices, and every agreement should include data sharing and ownership provisions.  What data must be shared, who has access to the data, how will data be used, and who owns the data are questions in need of clear answers in the agreement.

Legal remedies.  There’s always the risk that a contract will go bad in some way, whether due to non-performance, non-payment, or disputes about performance and payment.  A carbon agreement could include provisions that outline how the parties will remedy these problems.  An agreement might define circumstances that constitute a breach and the actions one party may take if breach conditions occur.  An agreement could also list reasons for withholding payment from a farmer; one concern is that insufficient data or proof of carbon reductions or carbon credit generation could be a basis for withholding payment.  There could also be penalties for early withdrawal from the program or early termination of the agreement.   It’s important to decipher any legal remedies that are contained within a carbon agreement.

We’ve heard of carbon farming before, but today it raises new uncertainties.  Caution and careful consideration of a carbon agreement should address some of those uncertainties.  Our list offers a starting point, but it’s not yet a complete list.  As we learn more about the developing carbon farming market, we’ll continue to raise and hopefully resolve the legal issues it can present.

For more information on carbon agreements, see this listing from the Ohio Soybean Council of programs available to Ohio farmers with a side-by-side comparison of those programs, and this report on How to Grow and Sell Carbon Credits in US Agriculture from Iowa State University Extension..